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The discipline of International Relations (IR) has seen a growing interest in emotions dur-
ing the past two decades. But whereas ontological questions, methodological issues and the 
effects of specific emotions have come into focus, the link between emotions and one of 
the discipline’s fundamental concepts – power – has received next to no attention. This is 
a curiosity as emotions are not merely a force of nature. They are also products of social 
interaction and can be manipulated for the purpose of exercising power.  
This study therefore pursues the question of what role the manipulation of emotions can 
play in the exercise of power in international relations. Answering this question is meant 
to achieve three goals: to theoretically connect the discipline’s literature on power with that 
on emotions; to provide a framework for thinking about the link between power and emo-
tions in international relations; and to illustrate through several case studies how power has 
been exercised through the manipulation of emotions throughout history.   
The first part of this study is theoretical in nature and consists of three steps. First, it defines 
power as a process through which one actor intentionally makes another actor behave in 
accordance with the first actor’s preferences. This process can take a variety of forms and 
rely on various power mechanisms. Secondly, this study defines emotions as action tenden-
cies that influence human cognition, thinking, judgment and behavior. Emotions can be 
manipulated and can have a social dimension when they are based on social instead of 
individual identities. Power, thus, can be exercised over individuals as well as groups of 
individuals by creating, stirring or alleviating emotions. In the context of international re-
lations, collective actors such as states can be said to have emotions when a significant 
number of their members experience emotions based on their shared social identity. 
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The second part of this study consists of six case studies that illustrate how states have 
exercised power over other states by manipulating their emotions. The first of these case 
studies focuses on the emotion of shock and its deliberate creation by the United States 
through the two nuclear bombs dropped on Japan in 1945. The following three case studies 
center on the fear of abandonment and how the United States utilized it throughout the Cold 
War to exercise power over its allies. It stirred the West German fear of abandonment to 
halt the country’s nuclear ambitions during the 1950s and 1960s; it alleviated the South 
Korean fear of abandonment to overcome its opposition to American troop withdrawals 
during the Nixon era; and it used a combination of both approaches to get South Korea to 
abandon its nuclear program in the 1970s. Lastly, two case studies look at the manipulation 
of anger. The first one illustrates how Prussia in 1870 stirred the anger of the French gov-
ernment and public to provoke war. And the final case study showcases how Japan has 
been failing throughout the past decades to alleviate South Korean anger about the Japanese 
treatment of and attitudes towards the two country’s colonial history. 
In its conclusion, this study outlines the limitations of its approach to power, emotions and 
the selection of case studies as well as its contribution to IR scholarship. Lastly, it presents 
some further thoughts on the interplay of power and emotions in contemporary politics and 
the need for a theoretical toolkit to think about this link. 
Keywords: International Relations, Power, Emotions 
Student ID: 2014-31479 
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In the summer of 1870, the territory of today’s Germany was occupied by a multitude of 
small states, the biggest one of which was Prussia. Its chancellor Otto von Bismarck plotted 
their unification by provoking a French attack on Prussia which would unite the German 
states against their common enemy. His intent: to play on the “Gallic overweening and 
touchiness” and to provide a “red rag upon the Gallic bull” (1898, 101), as he himself de-
scribed it in his memoirs.  
To that purpose, Bismarck publicized minutes from a meeting between the Prussian King 
and the French ambassador to Prussia. The encounter was courteous, yet Bismarck’s notes 
depicted the king’s behavior as offensive towards the ambassador and as a diplomatic af-
front. Indeed: the French public as well as the government took the bait and called for 
revenge as well as military retaliation. And as Bismarck had planned, the prospect of a 
French attack on Prussia brought together the German states. The outcome was the Franco-
Prussian War of 1870-1871 that was declared by France but overwhelmingly won by Prus-
sia and its allies. It resulted in the fall of the French Empire and the formation of a unified 
German Empire, and thereby in a major shift of power in Europe. 
This historic episode is only one of many examples in which emotions and their manipula-
tion are utilized to change the behavior of an actor – or, in other words, to exercise power. 
This link between power and emotions can take the shape of perfidious manipulation, as is 
the case in the above-given example. It can unfold through the brute creation of emotions, 
for example fear in the face of violence, or through subtler means, such as the shaping of 
norms about the expression of emotions in a society. Power and emotions not only come 
together where emotions are created, but also where already existing emotions are stoked 
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or alleviated. Again, there is a plentitude of examples, from states fueling the fear of aban-
donment of an alliance partner to one nation trying to calm the anger of another nation.  
Emotions and power have therefore been labeled as “conceptual twins” (Heaney 2011). 
The field of International Relations (IR) has examined both concepts in their own right – 
yet it has given little attention to both emotions and power at the same time, and to the 
manifold ways in which both interact in international affairs.  
This observation stands in the context of an “emotional turn” in IR and the increasingly 
popular idea that attention to emotions is of relevance for understanding world politics1. A 
variety of authors have examined the influence of specific emotions, written on methodo-
logical issues concerning the research on emotions, and linked emotions to established con-
cepts from within the discipline. Yet only few references have been made to the notion of 
power. This is a curiosity in the face of the common assumptions that “all politics involves 
power” (Baldwin 2013, 274) and that power is “fundamental to the study of world politics” 
(Mattern Bially 2008, 691). In the same vein, the IR literature on power has given scant 
attention to emotions and continues to emphasize material factors, first and foremost of 
which are military capabilities and economic capacity (Berenskoetter 2007, 1; Schmidt 
2007, 61). This study therefore aims to explore how emotions and power interact in inter-
national relations and how power can be exercised through the manipulation of emotions. 
                                                     
1 The discipline of IR is certainly not alone in experiencing this growing popularity and quantity of 
research on emotions. Various authors therefore speak of a similar trend in the wider field of political 
studies as well as the social sciences in general (Clough and Halley 2007; S. Thompson and Hoggett 
2012). Whether it still appropriate to speak of an ongoing “turn” is furthermore up for debate. While 
IR scholarship may have paid relatively little attention to emotions in the past, prominent articles on 
the subject began to appear two decades ago already. Since then, many more have found their way 
into the field’s most prestigious journals and various books on emotions in IR have been published 
by university presses. That research on emotions is not a niche topic anymore is furthermore visible 
in the forums that some of the field’s foremost journals have organized on the topic (for examples 
see Bleiker et al. 2014; Koschut et al. 2017). 
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In doing so, this project rests on three established assumptions about emotions. First, that 
emotions affect cognition, thinking, judgment and behavior. Second, that emotions not only 
appear naturally, but that they can be intentionally manipulated. And third, that these ef-
fects of emotions as well as their manipulation can take place on the individual as well as 
the collective level. With this in mind, the guiding assumption of this project is that manip-
ulating others’ emotion can be a form of exercising power. In other words: power over the 
behavior of others can be exercised by manipulating their emotions. On the international 
stage, this process can be utilized by states as well as non-state actors, by individuals as 
well as collectives, can be intentional or unintentional, can rely on positive as well as neg-
ative emotions, and can involve the creation of emotions that didn’t exist before as well as 
the shaping, stoking and the alleviation of existing emotions. 
 Power and Emotions through the Ages 
This idea that emotions can be manipulated in order to exercise power and further one’s 
goals is not new and can be found in the writings intellectuals, scholars, strategists and 
leaders throughout the ages. The Greek philosopher Gorgias argued more than two millen-
nia ago that rhetoric can produce emotions that influence the soul just like drugs influence 
the body (Asmis 1992, 341). For his contemporary Aristotle, the manipulation of emotions 
trough pathos was one of the three ways through which persuasion can take place, aside 
from authority (or ethos) and logic (or logos). As he wrote: 
The orator persuades by means of his hearers, when they are roused to emotion 
by his speech; for the judgements we deliver are not the same when we are 
influenced by joy or sorrow, love or hate; and it is to this alone that, as we 
have said, the present-day writers of treatises endeavor to devote their atten-
tion. (Aristotle 1926) 
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Two thousand years later, John Locke continued this train of thought and arrived at a 
largely negative conclusion. He saw rhetoric as a “powerful instrument of error and deceit” 
because of its potential to “move the passions” (Locke 1997, 452). Another century down 
the road, Immanuel Kant also saw rhetoric as a perfidious tool of manipulation. As he wrote, 
its effect on the emotions has the capacity to “move people, like machines, to a judgment 
in important matters which must lose all weight for them in calm reflection” (Kant 2000, 
205). Both Locke and Kant therefore derided the use of rhetoric for the purpose of persua-
sion as problematic: where emotions are manipulated, sound reasoning and free decisions 
are hardly possible, and deceit is never far. 
Not only those who wrote on rhetoric and persuasion saw the link between power and emo-
tions; the same is true for those who wrote about the military exercise of power. Sun Tzu 
argued in the 5th century B.C. that military prowess involves the management of emotions: 
“in order to kill the enemy, our men must be roused to anger” (Sun Tzu 2010, 7). Not long 
after, Thucydides described in his account of the Peloponnesian War how exceptional lead-
ers manage fear in themselves as well as their followers and manipulate and exploit that of 
their enemies (Desmond 2006, 375–76). Carl von Clausewitz, too, paid attention to the role 
of emotions and their management in combat. He wrote that war is the product as well as 
the producer of emotions, that “emotion can easily overwhelm intellectual conviction” 
(Clausewitz 2007, 54, 86), and that the successful exercise of military power requires the 
management of these emotions by commanders.  
The same argument has been made by some of history’s most influential leaders and agi-
tators. Consider Adolf Hitler: in 1926, during a speech in Hamburg, he argued that the 
masses are “primitive in attitude” and cannot be reliably mobilized via an objective and 
even-handed presentation of facts. Understanding and intellectual insight, thus, make for a 
shaky foundation of mass mobilization. “What is stable is emotion: hatred” (as quoted in 
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Kershaw 2008, 179). Effective propaganda has to utilize this emotion to create faith and 
fanaticism in the masses. A similar quote about the necessity of emotions for the exercise 
of power has been attributed to Joseph Stalin. Asked in 1931 whether he prefers his fol-
lowers to be loyal out of conviction or out of fear, he reportedly chose the latter, explaining 
that “convictions can change; fear remains” (as quoted in Kuromiya 2013, 207). 
The link between power and emotions has also been explored by IR scholars, and in par-
ticular during the past two decades. One of the first papers on the role of emotions in inter-
national politics argued that “political actors constantly evoke and manipulate emotions” 
(Crawford 2000, 149). Maor and Gross wrote that this sort of “emotion regulation pro-
foundly changes the contours of political and public policy contests and therefore creates 
politics and policies” (Maor and Gross 2015, 10). Other examples are the arguments that 
soft power can “inspire followers through the careful management of emotion” (Nye 2008, 
92) or that terrorism works through the “personal, group, social and political power of emo-
tion” (McDonald et al. 2015, 87). Yet the linkage between emotions and power has received 
scant systematic attention in IR beyond such general statements. 
This is not to say that the link between power and emotions hasn’t been a persistent under-
current of IR scholarship. The influence of emotions stands at the start of what is commonly 
seen as IR literature: for Thucydides in the History of the Peloponnesian War it is, first and 
foremost, emotion that motivates the participants and determines their decisions (MacMul-
len 2003, 2–13). This assumption is still visible in the Realist tradition of IR theory and its 
contemporary writings. Realism may focus on the international system and material forces, 
yet the driving force behind concepts such as the security dilemma and the balance of power 
is “emotional insecurity” (Rösch and Lebow 2018, 9). Fear has therefore been described as 
“absolutely central” (Lebow 2008, 158) to the Realist tradition. But while it frequently 
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refers to or implies this connection between power and emotions, it hardly ever dwells on, 
explores and studies it (Pashakhanlou 2017, 2–7). 
This implicit reliance on the link between power and emotions without any explicit theo-
rizing is prevalent throughout the discipline’s literature and many of its standard works. 
Schelling’s work on strategic bargaining in Arms and Influence, for example, states that the 
essence of coercive power is “the very exploitation of enemy wants and fears” (Schelling 
1966, 3). Nye (2011b, x) introduces his concept of soft power as fundamentally reliant on 
emotions and processes such as attraction and persuasion. Jervis writes in a newly pub-
lished edition of Perception and Misperception in International Politics that “I missed what 
now looks obvious” (Jervis 2017, Ixix): the explanatory power of emotions for cognition 
and decision making. And Wendt (1999, 132) in Social Theory of International Politics 
stipulates that emotions and their social construction determine the interests that human 
beings have in order to fulfill their fundamental needs. Yet these authors hardly engage 
with emotions in their own right and go beyond short references to them. 
 Research Question & Structure 
Against this backdrop, this study strives to achieve two goals. First, it aims to theoretically 
connect the recent attention given to emotions in IR with the existing literature on power, 
and thereby with one of the discipline’s foundational concepts. As Hutchison and Bleiker 
argue, this offers “an ideal way to enter into a dialogue with more established international 
relations theories” (Hutchison and Bleiker 2014, 508).  
Second, this study aims to provide a framework to organize thinking about how emotions 
and power interact in international relations. The underlying ambition is to emphasize that 
the exercise of power through the manipulation of emotions plays a significant role in in-
ternational relations and that many of the emotions we can observe in world politics are the 
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result of power processes and interests that drive them. In this sense, the goal of this study 
is to “bring emotions back in”, both into the discipline in general as well as its discourse 
on and understanding of power in particular. 
Third, this study aims to illustrate how power is exercised by manipulating emotions and 
how this matters in world politics through a number of case studies. One goal of these case 
studies is to show that the link between power and emotions is worth paying attention to, 
not only in theory but also for understanding significant events in international relations. 
Case in point is the example of the Franco-Prussian War: without attention to how power 
was exercised through the manipulation of emotions, it is difficult to understand how the 
events in 1870 and 1871 unfolded and led to a significant power shift in Europe. 
With all this in mind, the research question driving this study is: 
How is power exercised through the manipulation of emotions in interna-
tional relations? 
The search for an answer to this question is split into two parts. The first part is theoretical 
in nature and seeks to provide a framework for analyzing how power is exercised through 
the manipulation of emotions. The second part consists of a number of case studies that 
attempt to illustrate how this framework can be applied and how the link between power 
and emotions has repeatedly become relevant in international relations.  
What this study is not meant to provide is a parsimonious theory about power and emotions 
that stipulates universal principles and allows for predictions. The text is more modest in 
its ambition. It strives to draw attention to a phenomenon that has received little – and as is 
argued here: not enough – attention in recent IR scholarship. And, for this purpose, it strives 
to provide the instruments necessary to bring emotions back into the IR discourse, and to 
show why doing so matters. 
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The following pages outline the structure of this study and briefly introduce the content of 
the following seven chapters. 
As was mentioned before, the link between power and emotions has received scant atten-
tion in IR. The literature review in chapter II outlines how the discipline’s work on power 
makes few references to emotions and how its growing literature on emotions makes few 
references to power. This is remarkable, especially because the existence and relevance of 
the connection between these two concepts are an implicit assumption in many IR writings. 
In addition, the literature review will show that a number of other disciplines, for example 
sociology and psychology, have explored this link between emotions and power in ways 
that are instructive for any efforts to do so in the context of IR. Against this backdrop, this 
study positions itself between the largely separate bodies of IR literature on power and 
emotions and draws from the literature in other fields that has brought together the two 
concepts in the past. 
Chapter III introduces and operationalizes the two terms at the core of this study: “power” 
and “emotions”. While most of us have an intuitive understanding of the two concepts, 
their definition is notoriously difficult and elusive. The academic literature knows a variety 
of meanings for both terms, many of which overlap, some of which contradict each other. 
Emotion has therefore been labeled as a “keyword in crisis […] from a definitional and 
conceptual point of view” (Dixon 2012, 338), and the meaning of power has been described 
as “essentially contested” (Lukes 2005, 9). To live up to the complexity of the two concepts, 
the definition of the two terms is a necessary and important prerequisite. Chapter III there-
fore explains how power and emotions are understood here, how these understandings re-
late to alternative conceptions of the terms, and how power and emotions are assumed to 
interact with each other in international relations.  
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The understandings of power and emotions that underpin this study are based on pre-exist-
ing conceptions, were chosen to fit the purposes of this study and make no claim to univer-
sal validity. Power is understood as a process through which an actor intentionally makes 
another actor behave in a way that suits the first actor’s preferences and would otherwise 
not occur. This study is therefore built on the idea of power over and an understanding of 
power as a process. This conception does not take into account that power can also be 
understood as a resource or capacity (and therefore as power to) and differs from many 
other definitions, for example those that assume that power can be exercised unintention-
ally or through social structures (and not only by actors). To highlight how different forms 
of power can be exercised through the manipulation of emotions, a number of mechanisms 
will be discussed that illustrate the many forms that power over can take. 
Emotion is understood as a process that produces propensities to act in certain ways. This 
process takes place in reaction to stimuli and depending on the meaning of these stimuli 
for what is important to an individual. Through these assumptions, this study utilizes an 
appraisal approach to emotions and relies heavily on the work of Nico S. Frijda. The emo-
tion process can be manipulated by intrinsic as well as extrinsic factors. While emotions 
take place on the level of the individual, they can be based on group identities and have a 
collective dimension. Although an event has little importance for an individual, it can there-
fore cause emotions if it matters to a group that the individual considers itself part of. This 
conception assigns little relevance to the physical dimension of emotions and does not con-
cern itself with truly collective emotions that transcend the individual.  
Taken together, these conceptions of power and emotion underpin the basic assumption of 
this study: that the manipulation of emotions can be a form of exercising power. In the 
context of international relations, this matters as emotions shape the behavior of nation 
states, which are understood here as large groups of individuals. A state itself may not be 
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able to experience emotions, but if a significant number of its members do experience emo-
tions, these emotions affect the state’s behavior. As a consequence, states can exercise 
power over other states by manipulating the emotions of their members, may it be a large 
share of the public or a small group of influential decision makers.  
Chapter IV outlines the methodological approach taken for the case studies that make up 
the second part of this study. These case studies illustrate how an exercise of power of one 
state over another state took place through the manipulation of several different emotions 
in a number of historical episodes. The analysis of these cases was undertaken in a descrip-
tive-interpretive manner and relies on both primary and secondary sources. It is obviously 
difficult to access, analyze and interpret the emotions of others – and especially so if these 
emotions occurred decades or centuries ago and were shaped by the contemporary circum-
stances and culture. The case studies, like all interpretative research, are therefore intended 
to produce accounts that are rooted in evidence, follow understandable reasoning and are 
convincingly written up. Yet they are not meant to provide an objective, positivist account 
that is beyond questioning. 
Chapter V is dedicated to the emotion of shock and its utilization to exercise power. This 
is illustrated through the example of America’s use of two nuclear bombs against Japan in 
1945. These weapons were not only meant to cause physical devastation, but to shock Japan 
into surrender through a display of overwhelming power. When the nuclear bombs were 
dropped on Hiroshima and Nagasaki, this was therefore done with the intention to maxim-
ize their emotional effect and shock. This plan worked: the Japanese leadership was caught 
off guard, had to admit the inevitability of defeat and decided to surrender. Beyond this 
case study, the concept of “shock and awe” is briefly introduced to further showcase how 
the creation of shock is utilized as a means of exercising power in conflicts. 
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Chapter VI centers on the emotion of fear. To illustrate how power can be exercised on the 
basis of fear, the relations between the United States and West Germany during the 1950s 
to 1960s will be looked at in a first step. The West German government saw its national 
security under constant threat at the time and therefore had an interest and plans to develop 
nuclear weapons together with its European partners. In order to prevent this, decision 
makers in Washington, D. C. threatened to withdraw their troops from Germany and stoked 
the German fear of abandonment. In the context of the shared military alliance, America 
thereby intentionally induced fear on the German side – and, eventually, was able to pre-
vent its German ally from following through on its ambitions. 
Two further case studies illuminate other facets of the exercise of power through the ma-
nipulation of fear. Both focus on the relations of the United States with South Korea during 
the 1960s and 1970s. The first one illustrates how fear can not only be stoked for the pur-
pose of exercising power, but also alleviated. This was visible in relations between the two 
countries after the Nixon administration announced its intention to withdraw troops from 
South Korea and subsequently tried to alleviate the growing fears of abandonment in Seoul. 
Lastly, the third case study in this chapter shows how the stoking and the alleviation of the 
fear of abandonment can also take place in tandem. This approach was visible in America’s 
diplomatic conduct with South Korea during the 1970s and after it became clear that the 
country was pursuing a nuclear weapons program of its own, against the strategic interest 
and explicit demands of the United States. 
Chapter VII is dedicated to the emotion of anger. The Franco-Prussian war of 1870-1871, 
which was already referred to on the first pages of this study, will serve as an example to 
illustrate how the provocation of anger has been utilized to exercise power. At the time, the 
Prussian chancellor Otto von Bismarck staged a diplomatic incident in order to create anger 
and the desire for revenge across the border in France. The result was a declaration of war 
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against Prussia – which, in turn, was able to portray itself as the victim of French aggression, 
unite the German states behind itself and instigate a war that it was likely to win. For Prus-
sia, the provocation of anger on the French side was therefore a means to exercise power 
and shape French behavior in accordance with its own interests. 
A different facet of how power and anger can interact is illustrated in a sixth case study. It 
showcases how attempts at alleviating anger can fail. The case utilized here is that of Ja-
pan’s government attempting to placate the South Korean anger over injustices from the 
colonial era and Japanese attitudes towards them. While the government in Tokyo repeat-
edly apologized for them, and especially so through official statements since the 1990s, 
these apologies were undermined on various occasions by contradictory statements and 
behavior, thereby failing to create any sense of reconciliation. This case thereby illustrates 
how attempts at exercising power through the manipulation of emotions can be futile. 
Chapter VIII concludes this study and looks beyond it. In a first step, it looks at the study’s 
limitations, for example the focus on the conception of power as power over (and not as 
power to or another alternative), on the nation state (to the exclusion of other actors), and 
in particular on powerful states (to the exclusion of weaker ones), on the exercise of power 
through negative emotions (to the exclusion of positive emotions), and on a behaviorist as 
well as actor-centric understanding of power (to the exclusion of structural forms of power).  
In a second step, the chapter summarizes the contribution this study makes to IR. Most 
importantly, it builds a bridge between the discipline’s literature on power and its literature 
on emotions, thereby “bringing emotions back in” to the IR discourse on power. It does so 
by providing a framework that engages with both power and emotions more seriously than 
the existing literature and by illustrating the value and relevance of this approach through 
case studies. Beyond that, this study furthers the efforts within the discipline to go beyond 
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the rationalist mainstream and provides a novel perspective on the social construction of 
preferences, here through the interplay of power and emotions.  
On the last pages of this study, some concluding thoughts on the link between power and 
emotions and its relevance for contemporary politics are presented. 
14 
 
II. Literature Review 
This study is situated between three bodies of previous research: (1) the IR literature on 
emotions, which contains few references to power; (2) the IR literature on power, which 
contains few references to emotions; and (3) the literature from other academic fields that 
– explicitly or implicitly – connects emotions and power. In answering its research question, 
this study attempts build a bridge between the first two bodies of literature, and to draw 
from the third body’s concepts and insights for that purpose. 
1.  IR Literature on Emotions 
Much of the first group of work on emotions in IR was published over the course of the 
past two decades. It sprung from critical approaches to the discipline's mainstream, for 
example Crawford’s seminal analysis of how emotions play a role in existing IR frame-
works and are yet under-theorized. She concluded that they “deserve more systematic at-
tention by scholars of world politics” (Crawford 2000, 155) - which was subsequently ech-
oed by a variety of other scholars. Jervis labeled the past disregard of emotions a “major 
blunder” (Balzacq and Jervis 2004, 564–65); Lebow emphasizes in his cultural theory of 
international relations that humans are “emotional beings, not computers” (Lebow 2008, 
514); and Coicaud argues that the field’s dominant theories have been “misled and mis-
leading” (Coicaud 2014, 493) when it comes to emotions. The assumption that unites these 
scholars is that emotions are an essential part of human and social life, and that they are of 
inescapable relevance for understanding politics (M. George 2000, 231; Hutchison 2016, 
xi; McDermott 2004, 691; Mercer 2013, 247).  
Where the mainstream of IR has dealt with emotions, this was usually done in an implicit 
fashion. Emotions such as fear and trust have long been considered as important, yet they 
have received little dedicated and systematic attention. Where the discipline engages with 
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emotions, it does so usually on the basis of simplistic and narrow assumptions. In part, this 
is the result of Realism’s dominant role in the field. Emotions were long understood as 
biological impulses that are a product of an unchanging human nature. Little attention was 
given to the social construction of emotions. Realism also came with a focus on negative 
emotions, such as mistrust and fear, that undermine trust and impede cooperation. On top 
of that, the field has sorted emotions into dichotomies such as those between body and 
mind as well as rational and irrational thought. These biases in IR’s approach to emotions 
went together with assumptions such as that emotions are largely inaccessible for scientific 
inquiry and that they can explain deviations from rational decision making but are other-
wise of little relevance (Bleiker and Hutchison 2008, 117; Crawford 2014, 536; Hutchison 
and Bleiker 2014, 494; Ross 2006, 199). 
On this foundation, and increasingly in opposition to it, a variety of scholars have written 
on emotions and their role for international politics. Much of their work either attempts to 
provide theoretical foundations for further thought about emotions in IR or analyzes and 
illustrates the role of specific emotions, for example through case studies2.    
 (1) Theoretical Foundations 
A number of authors have introduced emotions into IR by connecting them with the disci-
pline’s existing conceptual toolkit. One example for this approach are Mercer’s writings. 
In an influential article he introduced the concept of emotional beliefs, a term he defines as 
any belief that is constituted or strengthened by the influence of emotions. Based on re-
search that indicates that rationality is dependent on emotions and that beliefs are based on 
both cognition and emotion, Mercer concludes that all beliefs are emotional beliefs (and, 
                                                     
2 Similar categories were employed by Hutchison and Bleiker (2014) who speak of macro and micro 
approaches in the existing research on emotions in IR. 
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at the same time, rational). Many of the basic concepts of IR, such as credibility, trust and 
nationalism, rely therefore on emotions (Mercer 2010). Another of his arguments is that 
social identities go together with and depend on social emotions. These are different from 
individual emotions in that they are the result of identifying with a group. An example is 
“feeling like a state” through which individuals experience emotions and develop attitudes, 
such as shame or anger, that they would not have without this group identity (Mercer 2014). 
The role of emotions in identities has been explored by a number of other authors. Koschut 
has described the construction of emotional communities, and in particular of emotional 
security communities such as NATO, whose members follow certain norms about the ex-
pression of emotions, both towards the inside as well as the outside. These emotional norms 
provide an “affective glue” (Koschut 2014, 538) that stabilizes the community and ties its 
members together. A similar argument was made by Hutchison to show how shared mean-
ing can be found in experiences of collective trauma. Where the emotions associated with 
trauma become part of social representations, they can give rise to affective communities, 
may it be in response to memories of colonialism or traumatic events such as natural dis-
asters (Hutchison 2016, 2010).   
Beyond beliefs and identities, the role of emotions in institutions and the institutionalization 
of emotions have been explored by Crawford. Similar to how dominant beliefs become 
entrenched in interactions, practices and organizations, so can emotions become institu-
tions in their own right. As a result, they become normalized, reproduced and self-reinforc-
ing, oftentimes without much explicit attention. Among the examples she uses is the fear 
that became institutionalized in the United States after the 9/11 terrorist attacks, for exam-
ple through alarmist rhetoric, the extensive gathering of intelligence and even preventive 
warfare. Another example is the institutionalization of empathy. Crawford (2014) illus-
trates this process with the anti-apartheid movement in South Africa where negotiations 
17 
 
took place in an atmosphere of violence and mistrust, yet were successful through the con-
scious promotion of empathy, understanding and concessions. 
Other authors have illuminated the emotional underpinnings of a variety of other IR con-
cepts. Michel has, similar to Mercer, taken into focus the concept of trust and argues that 
many scholars conflate it with the concept of reliance. Whereas the latter is driven by ra-
tional and instrumentalist reasoning, trust is of an “intrinsically emotive nature” (Michel 
2012, 887). In a similar vein, Solomon has explored the emotional foundations of soft 
power. The concept relies on the idea that attractiveness can be a source of power. As he 
argues, it insufficient to explain attractiveness through culture, policies or identities; it re-
quires emotions and the affective investment they create to fully conceptualize soft power 
(T. Solomon 2014). Even the idea of diplomacy itself has received an emotional twist: Hall 
(2015) has introduced the notion of emotional diplomacy through which states pursue their 
objectives by displaying certain emotions, for example anger. 
Other scholars have taken the research on emotions in the field of psychology as their start-
ing point and drawn implications for IR. McDermott has done so with a focus on the role 
of emotions in decision making and outlined how they affect the cognition, thinking and 
judgment of leaders. In line with Mercer, she argues that emotions are an inescapable part 
of rationality and can therefore not be discounted in the study of international affairs. They 
determine, among other things, how memories are accessed, information is selected, risk 
judged and bias produced (McDermott 2004). Beyond that, she has argued that emotions 
are part of how leaders communicate their intentions and motivations, for example through 
speeches and facial expressions (McDermott 2013). 
Beyond these general insights about emotions, frameworks from the field of psychology 
have been used to engage with emotions in IR. One example is the adaption of Intergroup 
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Emotions Theory by Sasley. In an effort to neither treat the state as a unitary, anthropo-
morphic actor with emotions nor to focus exclusively on the emotions of individual deci-
sion makers, he conceptualizes the state as a group of individuals who can experience emo-
tions as a function of their self-identification as group members (instead of only as individ-
uals). As a result, they feel and think in similar ways as their emotions converge to what 
can be labeled state emotions (Sasley 2011).   
Among the authors who attempt to provide theoretical foundations for IR research on emo-
tions are also those who write on epistemological issues and approaches. A common refrain 
in this context is that research on emotions inevitably has to overcome the field’s persistent 
assumption that they are merely a deviation from rationality. As Mercer criticizes: “Politi-
cal scientists generally treat emotion as distinct from, and ideally subordinate to, rationality” 
(Mercer 2005, 92). Crawford, too, explained in her seminal article that “the rational actor 
paradigm became dominant” and that we see a “hegemony of rationalist approaches” 
(Crawford 2000, 122) in IR that leaves little space for the consideration of emotions. With 
this in mind, numerous authors call for an engagement with emotions that takes them seri-
ous as a fact of social life and a foundation of rational thought, not merely as a deviation 
from it and as a source of irrational behavior and mistakes (see also McDermott 2004; 
Mercer 2006). 
A crucial question in the literature is furthermore how emotions can be approached as an 
object of inquiry in the first place. As Crawford wrote about this problem: 
[T]here are methodological concerns: emotions seem ephemeral and deeply 
internal; valid measures of emotions are not obvious; and it may be difficult 
to distinguish “genuine” emotions from their instrumental display. The ways 
that psychologists study emotion are not likely to be replicated anytime soon 
in foreign policy decision settings, nor is it easy to use archives to determine 
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how actors felt versus what they argued. Further, there is wariness about gen-
eralizing from individual to group behavior and the attributes of organizations, 
including states. (Crawford 2000, 118–19) 
This results in enormous methodological challenges. Numerous authors have therefore 
called for a more systematic and rigorous study of emotions, for example by drawing from 
the toolkit of psychology, by utilizing proxy measures, such as opinion polls and statements 
by decision makers, and by being creative and flexible in the search for sources to work 
with (Crawford 2000, 155; Sasley 2013; Saurette 2006, 504). Other authors propose to take 
a step away from the methods of the social sciences that the IR field usually relies on. As 
Hutchison and Bleiker argue, these methods are “limited in their ability to understand the 
nature, role and impact of phenomena as ephemeral as emotions” (Bleiker and Hutchison 
2008, 125). Instead, they propose to expand the spectrum of methodologies with which IR 
engages emotions. They see as particularly promising approaches from the humanities that 
focus, for example, on visual and aesthetic representations. From researchers this requires 
openness and the willingness to accept that even the study of ephemeral phenomena such 
as emotions can yield valid and useful knowledge. 
One of the few contributions to the IR literature on emotions that strives to provide tangible 
methodological guidance is a forum article in the International Studies Review on research 
on emotions via the analysis of discourses. In its contributions, a number of authors outline 
how language can be approached to gain knowledge about emotions. For example, Koschut 
points out that emotions can become visible in various forms: through explicit references, 
through the use of terms with emotional connotations (such as “terrorist” or “genocide”), 
or through metaphors, comparisons and analogies (such as “floods of refugees”) (Koschut 
2017). And Hall presents a number of ways in which discourses can be emotional, for ex-
ample as expressions of the author’s emotions, as attempts to construct emotions in the 
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audience, and as examinations of the purposes and consequences of emotions in a particular 
situation (Hall 2017b)3. 
 (2) Specific Emotions in Practice 
Beyond these writings that attempt to create the theoretical foundations for IR research on 
emotions, a variety of authors have written on particular emotions, how they relate to the 
discipline’s core concepts and how they matter in international affairs. As the name of one 
of the first IR book dedicated to emotions - Mixed Emotions: Beyond Fear and Hatred in 
International Conflict by Ross (2014) – indicates, attention has so far been given especially 
to the meaning and role of fear, anger and hatred in international relations. 
In the case of fear, a number of authors have analyzed it not so much as an emotion but as 
a theoretical concept. Pashakhanlou points out that fear in IR theory is generally associated 
with the discipline’s Realist tradition, even though this literature has little to say about the 
nature of fear. It is central to the theories of Morgenthau, Waltz and Mearsheimer, yet they 
do not even provide a definition of the term. As Pashakhanlou (2017) argues, the role of 
fear in Realism should therefore be questioned. For the theories of the tradition’s three 
principal authors, the concept is not necessary, therefore redundant and even counterpro-
ductive. With the same focus on the Realist tradition in IR, Tang has pointed out that it 
showcases two basic stances towards fear: offensive Realist approaches argue that states 
assume the worst about each other’s intentions in order to cope with their fear; the non-
offensive Realist approaches are less fatalistic and see the potential to reduce fear and un-
certainty (Tang 2008). 
                                                     
3 Beyond the works referenced here, a recent book edited by Clément and Sangar (2018) is dedicated 
to the methodology of research on emotions in IR. Unfortunately, I was not able to access the book 
before the completion of this study. 
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Beyond the role of fear for Realist theories, the concept has received particular attention in 
the context of securitization. Van Rythoven has argued that securitization works “by elic-
iting culturally specific fears” (Van Rythoven 2015, 466) and, thereby, through the social 
construction of fear. Similar arguments have been made by other authors for particular 
contexts in which fear is utilized for the purpose of securitization. Among them are the “the 
fear of ‘anarchy’ itself […] as a red herring” (Karatzogianni and Robinson 2017, 283) that 
modern states use for the purpose of securitization. A more practical example is Abraham-
sen’s analysis of the political discourse about Africa during Tony Blair’s governance in the 
United Kingdom. This discourse became increasingly securitized, first and foremost 
through references to security risks and the elicitation of fear, thereby moving away from 
a pre-existing focus on development issues and humanitarian questions (Abrahamsen 2005). 
Anger, too, and a number of related emotions and phenomena have been analyzed from a 
variety of perspectives. As was mentioned above, Hall has conceptualized a diplomacy of 
anger through which states express the sensitivity of an issue and the perception of a vio-
lation. This form of emotional diplomacy was illustrated by Hall (2011, 2015) through the 
Chinese expressions of anger during the Taiwan Strait Crisis in 1995 and 1996. Hall fur-
thermore wrote about the politics of outrage which, similar to anger, describe a response to 
a perceived violation. Yet outrage goes beyond the communication of anger. It leads to 
aggressive and reckless responses, as Hall (2017a) illustrated with the case of the Franco-
Prussian War in 1870 and 1871. 
Elsewhere, the feeling of humiliation has come into focus as a source of anger. The link 
between humiliation, feelings of betrayal and anger has been interpreted as a foundation of 
radical Islam’s rise in the Middle East. The region’s political violence is an outcome of 
humiliation – and radical Islam as well as the War on Terror further exacerbate this prob-
lematic process (Fattah and Fierke 2009). The War on Terror itself and the publicity-laden 
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hunt for Osama bin Laden have also been interpreted through this lens: as a form of counter-
humiliation in response to the terrorist attacks in September 2011. The driving force behind 
this American reaction: “a deep anger which strains to reassert national pride and self-
respect in the face of this humiliation” (Saurette 2006, 518). A similar argument about the 
link between humiliation and anger was also made by Löwenheim and Heimann (2008) 
who approached this phenomenon by conceptualizing revenge. 
The IR literature on emotions has also taken into account more positive phenomena, be-
yond fear and anger. The need for this has been emphasized by Penttinen: because much 
of the field’s research concerns itself exclusively with negative events, it loses track of the 
positive dimensions of international affairs and helps to reproduce this negativity. She has 
detailed this in her writings about the role of joy, other positive emotions and resilience 
under terrible circumstances, for example war, genocide and trauma (Penttinen 2013b, 
2013a). Other venues in which the positive dimensions of emotions have been explored are 
the foundations of friendships and security communities among states (Eznack and Koschut 
2014; Koschut 2014) as well as of transnational affective communities that lead to behavior 
such as humanitarian relief in response to disasters (Hutchison 2016, 183–210).  
 (3) Emotions and Power 
What the IR literature on emotions has paid relatively little attention to is the interplay of 
emotions and power, and even less to the possibility of exercising power through the ma-
nipulation of emotions. From the beginning of the “emotional turn” onwards, a variety of 
authors have recognized this and pointed out that the connection of the two concepts is in 
need of further exploration. Crawford, in her paper from 2000, already proposed that emo-
tions and their manipulation underpin many of the processes in international relations that 
are usually analyzed from a rationalist point of view, for example persuasion, deterrence, 
peacebuilding and the enforcement of norms. She thereby insinuates the power of emotions 
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as well as the power over emotions, but they are not made explicit or linked to existing 
conceptions of power in her text (Crawford 2000, 145). 
Little research has been done that goes beyond Crawford’s initial propositions. As 
Hutchison and Bleiker wrote almost fifteen years later: “Surprisingly, few scholars in in-
ternational relations have so far taken on […] the links between emotions and power” 
(Hutchison and Bleiker 2014, 507). They, too, argue that emotions and power underpin 
many of foundational concepts of IR scholarship, such as institutions, regimes, identities 
and nationalism. As they emphasize, analyzing the linkages between emotions and power 
has the potential to unmask how phenomena on the level of the individual become of col-
lective relevance, and how seemingly unpolitical or even invisible processes shape inter-
national affairs and how we think about them. Nevertheless, the issue of emotions and 
power – and, in particular, the exercise of power through emotions - has been taken up by 
a number of authors. Yet most of these writings suffer from shortcomings. 
Hutchison and Bleiker themselves explored the link between power and emotions as part 
of a forum article in the International Studies Review on emotions and discourse in IR. 
They see discourses as a determinant of acceptable emotions and what is acceptable to say 
about emotions; and they locate the influence of emotions in how they define “the bound-
aries of what is visible and invisible, thinkable and unthinkable, seemingly rational and 
irrational” (Hutchison and Bleiker 2017, 502). Emotions are therefore a product as well as 
an instrument of social discourses that constitute as well as shape agency, behavior, social 
interactions and normative expectations. 
Solomon, in another contribution to the aforementioned forum in the International Studies 
Review, equally links emotions to the power that constitutes and shapes social relations, 
identities and meanings. For this purpose, he utilizes the concept of “productive power” as 
it was outlined by Barnett and Duval (2005). Language is commonly cast as the primary 
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means through which these discourses disseminate. Yet it remains an open question “how 
some discourses gain legitimacy, and hence hegemony, over others” (T. Solomon 2017, 
499) – which is, according to Solomon, where emotions can provide an answer. Discourses 
consist not only of language, but also of affective elements, and become powerful because 
they produce an emotional investment on the side of their audiences. Productive power, 
therefore, may take the form of language but also relies on the force of emotion to achieve 
its effect (T. Solomon 2017, 499).  
Essentially the same argument was made by Solomon (2014) in a previous article which 
focused on the concept of soft power. As argued by Nye, the author commonly associated 
with the concept, soft power works through attraction. This sets it apart from hard power 
which usually works through coercion and incentives. Solomon argues that the foundations 
of attraction, which were left largely unspecified by Nye, lie in dominant discourses as well 
as the creation of an emotional investment in particular identities. As is the case for pro-
ductive power, so can soft power take the form of linguistic discourses but requires the 
force of emotional attachment to be effective. Solomon illustrates this with the American 
effort to attract international support for its War on Terror by producing affective invest-
ments into identities of America as being on the right side of a “good-evil binary” (T. Sol-
omon 2014, 726). 
The role of emotions in discourses, socialization and the establishment of identities and 
norms also comes up in the writings of Koschut and Hutchison. The former argues in his 
article on emotional security communities that the acquisition of emotional knowledge and 
processes of emotional socialization are the foundation of power differences, both within 
the community as well as towards the outside (Koschut 2014, 540–42). Hutchison makes a 
similar argument about affective communities: emotions and the emotions that are deemed 
appropriate within a community are the product of discourses that underpin socialization, 
25 
 
rules and norms, and identities. Emotions, therefore, can be the product of entrenched in-
terests and power relations (Hutchison 2016, 286–91). 
What unites the articles by Hutchison and Bleiker as well as by Solomon and Koschut is 
that they connect emotions to a particular form of power that is exercised through dis-
courses and constitutes meanings, identities and norms. As was mentioned above, this ap-
proach can be labeled as productive power, following Barnett and Duval. But as their 
framework for understanding power shows, productive power is only one among multiple 
forms that power can take; they also speak of compulsory power, institutional power and 
structural power (Barnett and Duvall 2005, 48). Accordingly, there are at least three other 
ways of conceptualizing power – which emphasizes that the above-mentioned writings on 
power and emotions rest on a particular understanding of what power is. The term, after all, 
does not only describe discourses that produce meanings and identities, but also more 
straightforward social relationships and attributes.  
Part of the IR literature on power and emotions therefore falls short in that is based on a 
particular and narrow understanding of power. In the terminology of Barnett and Duvall, it 
is mostly the social constitution of subjects through diffuse processes that is taken into 
account by the existing literature. Left out are conceptions of power that consist of the 
direct influence of actors. As will be argued here, emotions can play a role not only in the 
conception of power that Hutchison, Bleiker and Solomon (as well as to some extent 
Koschut) utilize, but also beyond that. 
Another author who wrote about the link between power and emotions is Petersen in his 
book on “the strategic use of emotion in conflict” (Petersen 2011). Based case studies taken 
from the context of the Balkan conflicts during the 1990s, he focuses on emotions that 
result from the experience of lengthy conflict, for example fear, anger and resentment. 
Alongside structural resources, such as money and weapons, actors utilized them to achieve 
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strategic goals – and especially so if they are weaker than their opponent in terms of struc-
tural resources. Thus: “like weapons and money, emotions can be a strategic tool” (Petersen 
2011, 23). Whereas the Western interventions on the Balkans largely followed a rational 
approach, those trying to spoil these interventions and their public reception did so on the 
basis of the available emotion resources. This determined their courses of action, from in-
flammatory speeches to attacks against property and indiscriminate bombings. 
To show this, Petersen follows a highly structured approach. He provides a logic for the 
origin of the emotions that characterize a situation: the experience of violence result in 
anger and fear, the experience of status reversal results in resentment, and so on. On this 
basis, he provides several matrixes through which the dominant emotion in a given situa-
tion can be determined based on the degree of violence, the degree of stigma, and the pres-
ence of resentment. Actors can either attempt to mobilize these emotions or to transform 
them, first and foremost through violence. For example, a situation characterized by low 
violence and high stigma usually produces contempt. By escalating the degree of violence, 
this contempt can be turned first into anger and then into hatred (Petersen 2011, 53). And 
as Petersen (2011, 197) argues, in a situation characterized by the emotion of hatred even 
ethnic cleansings can find widespread support. 
Petersen thereby analyzes the interplay of emotions and power through a rationalist, be-
haviorist and game theoretical framework, even referring to interventions as “games”. As 
a result, he treats the creation of specific emotions as distinct choices and assumes a sim-
plistic relationship between action, emotion and reaction. These restrictions of a formalized 
model ignore that emotions commonly occur not in pure forms and that they can influence 
each other in a variety of ways (for similar criticism, see Wertheim 2012). In addition, 
Petersen’s book does not rely on any particular definition of what power is or present its 
argument in the vocabulary of power. Where others would refer to the exercise of power, 
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he refers to the influencing of motivations, thereby implying a particular understanding of 
power: as a process through which preferences and action tendencies are shaped. The book 
is therefore about power and emotions, but only in an implicit and narrow fashion.  
In the context of bringing emotions and power together, Petersen’s approach therefore falls 
short in two regards. First, it treats emotions in a simplistic way and forces them into a 
game theoretical framework that may provide straightforward and parsimonious analyses 
but struggles to capture the complexity of the phenomena it describes. And secondly, the 
book does not engage with power on a theoretical level and implicitly follows a narrow 
understanding of what power is (similar to the works of Hutchison, Bleiker and Solomon). 
This may limit its utility measured against the purposes of this study, but does not under-
mine its value. After all, the book’s stated goals focus on explaining the successes and 
failures of Western interventions and the utilization of emotions in this context, not on 
theorizing about power and emotions.   
A final author who has written on the link between emotions and power in international 
affairs is Hall. In his book Emotional Diplomacy he describes “the politics of officially 
expressed emotion on the international stage” through which actors attempt “to influence 
an audience for the purpose of achieving desired ends” (Hall 2015, 3, 18). He illustrates 
this process through three case studies about the displaying of different emotions: the dis-
play of anger towards the United States by the Chinese government during the Taiwan 
Strait Crisis during the 1990s; the display of sympathy among the same actors during the 
aftermath of 9/11; and the display of guilt by West Germany towards Israel in the decades 
after the Second World War. In all these cases, governments communicated attitudes and 
pursued strategic objectives through displays of emotions in ways that would hardly be 
possible via non-emotional means only.  
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Hall thereby makes an argument about how the exercise of power and can rely on emotions, 
as does this study. But, similar to Petersen, he does not write in the language of power. 
That emotional diplomacy is a form of exercising power remains implicit in the book. In 
addition, Hall’s focus lies on the display of emotions by the actor that exercises power. 
What he is not interested in is the manipulation of emotions on the side of the actors over 
whom power is exercised. Hall therefore looks at emotions on one side of the power process 
(the side where power is exercised from), whereas this study as well as the writings by 
Hutchison, Bleiker, Solomon and Petersen look at the other side (the side where power has 
its effect). 
In another article, Hall did focus on this other side in the context of provocations in inter-
national affairs. He defines provocations as “actions or incidents that state actors perceive 
as intentionally and wrongfully challenging or violating their values and goals, thereby 
eliciting outraged reactions that spur rash, aggressive responses” (Hall 2017a, 2). The out-
rage that results from provocations is described as an inherently emotional experience and 
can take multiple forms: personal, performative and popular. Hall illustrates this phenom-
enon through an example that is also used in this study: the Prussian provocation of French 
outrage that led to a transformation of preferences in Paris and, ultimately, the declaration 
of war against Prussia in 1870.  
This example of the Franco-Prussian War shows that provocation, as conceptualized by 
Hall, can be a form of exercising power through emotions. Yet this work, too, is of limited 
value for exploring the links between emotions and power. For one, and just like the pre-
viously mentioned texts, it establishes the connection to power only implicitly. Secondly, 
it focusses only on a particular form of power that changes preferences, similar to Pe-
tersen’s work. And thirdly, it treats exercises of power as a possible source of provocations 
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– but certainly not the only one. Hall, after all, defines provocations through their conse-
quences, irrespective of whether this result was intentional or not (Hall 2017a, 4). Follow-
ing this logic, the run-up to the Franco-Prussian War may be an example for how power 
was exercised over emotions in order to provoke. Yet one can imagine countless other acts 
of provocation and the influence on emotions that this implies which can hardly be de-
scribed as an exercise of power, for example because they came about unintentionally. 
In summary, much of the existing IR literature on emotions does not engage with the con-
cept of power, important as it may be to the field. Where emotions and power are brought 
together, this usually happens without explicit references to or theorizing about power. In 
addition, the existing literature on emotions and power usually conceptualized the former 
in a simplistic fashion, by fitting emotions into a game-theoretical framework, or by under-
standing latter term in a narrow way, for example by looking only at specific forms of 
power. A dedicated and comprehensive effort to explore how emotions are connected to 
power has therefore been absent from the field’s growing literature on emotions and their 
role in international affairs. 
2.  IR Literature on Power 
The IR literature on power generally agrees on two points. One is that power is among the 
discipline’s most fundamental and important theoretical pillars. It is frequently described 
as “central to international relations” (Barnett and Duvall 2005, 39) and as “fundamental 
to the study of world politics” (Mattern Bially 2008, 691). For Morgenthau, “international 
politics, like all politics, is a struggle for power” (Morgenthau 1978, 29) and the acquisition 
of power always an aim of political behavior. In the words of Mearsheimer: “What money 
is to economics, power is to international relations” (Mearsheimer 2001, 17), which is why 
calculations about power occupy a dominant position in the minds of states. References to 
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power therefore permeate the IR vocabulary, from great powers and the balance of power 
to power politics and the struggle for power. 
The second point of agreement in the IR literature on power is that, despite its importance, 
the concept remains elusive and lacks a widely accepted definition. Morgenthau already 
described power as “one of most difficult and controversial problems of political science” 
(Morgenthau 1978, 29). And because Realists in particular emphasize the role of power, 
their inability to provide a convincing definition of the term has been labeled as “the con-
ceptual Achilles' heel of realist theory” (Baldwin 2016, 129). The same argument can be 
made for the IR discipline as a whole. The concept of power may be at the center of its 
theoretical toolkit, yet there is no agreement on what the term actually means. Critical 
voices like Bially Mattern go so far as to argue that this lack of consensus contributes to 
the fragmentation of IR research, turning the discipline into an “(un)discipline” (Mattern 
Bially 2008). The lack of agreement is not confined to the definition of power; it also ex-
tends to other terms that relate to it, such as influence, coercion, control and persuasion 
(Baldwin 2016, 2).  
As if to further complicate the picture, scholars keep on churning out labels for particular 
forms of power, many of which lead into additional disputes about their meanings and how 
they relate to each other. During the past decades, the field has thus produced (and contin-
ues to produce) a billowing number of conceptions, such as soft power (Nye 2004), smart 
power (Nye 2009), normative power (Manners 2002), just power (Al-Rodhan 2009, 139–
71), civilian power (Bull 1982), meta power (Krasner 1981), sharp power (Walker and 
Ludwig 2017), bargaining power (Schelling 1966), cosmopolitan power (Gallarotti 2010) 
and go-it-alone power (Gruber 2000).  
That power can refer to a great many things in IR is evident in the variety of major ap-
proaches to the concept in the literature, as outlined by Baldwin. He speaks of six different 
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perspectives on power: (1) power as an identity, for example when referring to states as 
“great powers”; (2) power as a goal, as implied by the “struggle for power”; (3) power as 
a means, first and foremost in the form of military capabilities; (4) power as a mechanism, 
for example in the balance of power; (5) power as competition, whereby power is assumed 
to be a zero-sum game and always relative to the power of others; and (6) power as capa-
bility. Most – if not all – of these perspectives suffer from conceptual and theoretical prob-
lems, vagueness and contradictions, as Baldwin (2016, 102–22) argues.  
Decades earlier, Holsti already outlined three similar perspectives on power that he saw in 
the literature: (1) power as a “struggle for power”; (2) power as “power politics”, which 
stands in opposition to more benign and better ways of doing politics; and (3) power as a 
capability, which is usually equated with the physical assets of a state (Holsti 1964, 179–
80).  
Barnett and Duval, too, attempted to create a taxonomy which can integrate the various 
forms of power that they consider of relevance in IR. But whereas authors like Baldwin 
and Holsti also include conceptions of power as a form of capability in their frameworks, 
Barnett and Duval focus on power as a form of causation between social actors. They dif-
ferentiate these forms of power along two dimensions: specificity (diffuse or direct) and 
the channel through which power works (interactions of actors or social relations of con-
stitution). This results in four distinct forms of power: compulsory power, institutional 
power, structural power and productive power (Barnett and Duvall 2005). 
Going beyond this variety of approaches, it has also been argued that the field’s approach 
to power is increasingly characterized by an absence of debate, a separation of scholars into 
various niches and a lack of communication among them. As Bially Mattern concluded:  
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The result is that international relations not only lacks a common conception 
of power; it also lacks a common framework in which to situate the various 
conceptions and their expressions. In a peculiar twist, then, as international 
relations has broadened, power has gone from an essentially contested concept 
to a concept about which, for lack of a shared vocabulary, international rela-
tions scholars cannot even have a discussion. (Mattern Bially 2008, 695) 
On the one hand, power therefore plays a central role for IR; on the other hand, there is an 
absence in the discipline of a widely accepted understanding of what power actually is. 
Nevertheless, and following Baldwin (2013), much of the IR literature can be categorized 
as belonging in one of two camps regarding its approach to and understanding of power.  
One is the elements of national power approach which was a hallmark of the discipline 
from the 19th century until the middle of the 20th century. It perceives power as a property 
of states and locates it in material factors, and in particularly those that help states to prevail 
in conflict. Central to this idea of power are therefore factors such as financial resources, 
military capacities and geographical location. Throughout the history of the discipline, this 
approach has been “deeply embedded in the international relations literature” (Baldwin 
2013, 277), first and foremost through the works of scholars like Morgenthau, Waltz and 
Mearsheimer. Realist voices have ever since been highly influential in shaping how IR 
thinks about power, even though their understandings of the term vary and have received 
much criticism (Baldwin 2016, 123–38; Schmidt 2007). 
The dominance of this approach was challenged during the past decades by a conception 
of power as a relational concept. It perceives power as a sort of causation within a social 
relationship that results in changes of behavior. This approach was further developed by 
the debate on the “three faces of power” in which multiple authors highlighted different 
dimensions of power. The idea of relational power was thereby expanded from one that 
33 
 
takes a coercive form towards power that works through the setting of agendas and the 
limiting of alternatives, the manipulation of preferences and the social constitution of actors 
(Mattern Bially 2008). On this foundation, the discipline found power not only in situations 
of observable conflict, but also in the influence of institutions and regimes, and of structures 
in general, and in situations of consensus, concepts such as normality, and practices such 
as socialization (Berenskoetter 2007, 7–15).  
The degree to which this relational understanding of power has infringed upon the domi-
nance of the Realist perspective is up for debate. For example, Berenskoetter still argues 
that Realists have “successfully monopolised” (Berenskoetter 2007, 1) the discourse on 
power. A few pages further into the same edited collection, Schmidt argues that “Realists, 
of course, do not monopolise the study of power” (Schmidt 2007, 43). Yet there is general 
agreement that the Realist understanding of power has been highly influential in the disci-
pline.  
On this foundation, it stands to reason that the prominence the Realist approach to power 
also shaped how the field as a whole engages with the link between power and emotions. 
Realism comes with a rationalist, materialist and cognitive bias that has contributed to the 
absence of emotions in the discipline’s mainstream. Although emotions such as fear play a 
role in the Realist world view, they have received little attention as such and usually been 
approached through a rational choice framework. Even when states pursue goals that are 
the results of emotions, they are assumed to do so in ways that follow rational calculations 
(Crawford 2000, 116–19; Mercer 2005, 97; Wolf 2012, 607). These hallmarks of the Real-
ist view of international relations also characterize its approach to power. Noteworthily, 
this approach is visible even where power and emotions meet in Realist though. 
Mearsheimer’s writings exemplify this: he locates fear, self-help and power maximization 
as the mechanisms at the center of his offensive Realist theory (Mearsheimer 2001, 31). 
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The fear of one state is a function of the power of other states, and in particular of the 
weapons at their disposal, their geographic distance and the distribution of power in the 
international system (Mearsheimer 2001, 41–45). Mearsheimer thereby links power and 
fear, yet he does to in a strictly rationalist fashion and without taking fear seriously as an 
emotion. His writings, just like those of Morgenthau and Waltz, do not define what fear is, 
how and whether it operates at the level of the individual and the state, and provide “very 
little insight on the nature of fear” (Pashakhanlou 2017, 119). The Realist conception of 
power as a property of states, and the prominence of this conception in the discipline as a 
whole, goes therefore hand in hand with a superficial approach to the interplay of power 
and emotions. 
In the same vein, much of the discipline’s mainstream literature has little to say about the 
link between power and emotions. This is exemplified by numerous works that attempt to 
provide an overview of the field’s understanding of power and are frequently cited in writ-
ings on the subject. Holsti’s article on The Concept of Power in the Study of International 
Relations does not mention emotions or any related term at all. In the edited collection 
Power in World Politics by Berenskoetter and Williams, only one of fifteen chapters links 
IR’s understandings of power to emotions. And Baldwin’s Power and International Rela-
tions: A Conceptual Approach has been described by one reviewer as “the culmination of 
a long and distinguished career thinking about the subject” (Schuessler 2017, 743), yet its 
author does not devote any space to emotions.  
This is not to say that emotions do not feature in the field’s conceptions of power at all. 
The most prominent exception are Nye’s writings on soft power which refer repeatedly to 
an “emotional attraction for followers” (Nye 2008, 55), the “careful management of emo-
tion” (Nye 2008, 92) and “emotional appeal” (Nye 2008, 142). For him, emotional intelli-
gence is among the crucial skills necessary to create attraction in a target and, thereby, to 
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exercise soft power (Nye 2008, 69). Other authors have taken up this link between soft 
power and emotions and expanded on it. Solomon, as was summarized in the previous 
section, has further developed the argument that soft power relies on emotions. Following 
his argument, soft power has its foundations not only in the form it takes, for example the 
linguistic contents of a discourse, but also in the emotional investment on the side of the 
audience which results in an attachment to particular identities (T. Solomon 2014). 
Yet the concept of soft power is not particularly useful to explore how power and emotions 
interact. This is largely due to Nye’s inability (or unwillingness) to provide a coherent and 
precise definition of what soft power is and how it works. As his critics have pointed out, 
soft power is “a highly problematic concept” and little more than “an ambiguous signifier 
with a nebulous theoretical core” (Kearn 2011, 66). Although the concept has been part of 
the academic as well as public discourse for several decades, a clear understanding of and 
agreement on soft power’s foundations is missing: whether soft power is a way of conduct-
ing statecraft or a resource on which statecraft can be based; how soft and hard power relate; 
and how attraction is assumed to result in behavioral changes. Soft power has therefore 
been labeled a buzzword that can mean whatever suits the interests of a particular actor, 
that has been diluted to the point that it is simply a synonym for prudent policy making, 
and that is of questionable analytical value (Baldwin 2016, 164–71; Hall 2010; Kearn 2011; 
G. Lee 2009; Lukes 2007). 
As a result of this fuzziness, it is anything but clear how soft power and the manipulation 
of emotions relate. In The Powers to Lead, which was first published in 2008, Nye fre-
quently refers to emotional attraction, emotional intelligence and emotional maturity as 
sources of soft power in the context of personal leadership skills (see, for example, Nye 
2008, 83). Yet his preceding book on soft power, The Means to Success in World Politics, 
as well as the succeeding book on the topic, The Future of Power, barely make references 
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to emotions. It therefore stands to reason that the link between soft power and emotions is 
not as close as insinuated at times. And even when Nye does actually write about soft power 
and the role that emotions play in the context of attraction, he does not go beyond superfi-
cial assertions. As Hall concludes: “Nye’s writings present attraction as a psychological 
mechanism, but the psychology behind it is missing” (Hall 2010, 206). 
In proximity to the literature on soft power, the concept of Public Diplomacy has also been 
linked to the interplay of power and emotions. Similar to what others have pointed out 
about soft power, Graham argues that the existing research on Public Diplomacy has pro-
duced insufficient answers about how it works and exercises power. This leads her to call 
for an increased focus on emotions, and in particular on the emotions that states display, 
convey and manipulate through the ways in which they represent themselves. As emotions 
play an integral role in persuasion and reasoning as well as for discourses that negotiate 
values and identities, a focus on them has the potential to substantiate Public Diplomacy as 
a concept (Graham 2014).  
In summary, the IR literature on power has barely taken emotions into consideration. One 
reason can be found in the mainstream conception of power as an attribute or resource and 
rooted in material factors. This understanding leaves little space for emotions. Even where 
the IR literature brought together power and emotions, for example in the Realist assump-
tions about fear being a product of power as well as in Nye’s writings on soft power, this 
engagement has remained on a superficial and vague level. Beyond that, and similar to how 
the IR literature on emotions has taken into consideration only particular forms of power, 
links between power and emotions were so far established only based on a rather narrow 
understanding of what emotions are. The vast literature on power, and thereby one of IR’s 
most important concepts, has therefore taken very few steps to seriously engage with the 
role of emotions in international affairs. 
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3.  Literature on Emotions and Power from Other Fields 
As is the case within IR, so has the link between emotions and power received little explicit 
attention outside of it. As Heaney argues, the mainstream power literature “is mostly silent 
about the emotions” (Heaney 2013, 355) just as the literature on emotions has treated power 
“in a restrictive and cursory manner” (Heaney 2013, 356). Nevertheless, a variety of au-
thors have brought together both concepts in ways that are instructive for IR’s approach to 
power and emotions. Much of this literature does not deal with this connection in explicit 
ways, as a form of theorizing about power and emotions, and in the vocabulary of power 
and emotions. Nevertheless, this link between the two is implicit in writings from various 
disciplines, in particular sociology and psychology. 
 Power and Emotions in Sociology 
Most prominent is the work done in field of sociology, and in particular by scholars doing 
research on the sociology of emotions. Since the 1970s, they have been following the basic 
assumption that emotions are not merely naturalistic and intrinsic reactions but also “social 
objects” and “products of human activity and interaction” (McCarthy 1989, 54–55)4. Sub-
sequently, they can be the products of power processes in social interactions and represent 
“yet another site where power [is] surreptitiously exercised over us” (Reddy 2001, 318). 
Research in this area has therefore sought the exercise of power in practices and discourses 
that produce, regulate and control the emotions we experience and the ways we interact 
with emotions.  
                                                     
4 In contrast to this constructivist understanding of emotions, the naturalist conception is based on 
the assumption that “emotions are products of natural processes which are independent of social 
norms and conscious interpretation” and that they “result from hormones, neuro-muscular feedback 
from facial expressions, and genetic mechanisms” (Ratner 1989). 
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Among the most prominent approaches within the sociology of emotions are those that deal 
with the management of emotions and the rules that govern feeling (Olson, McKenzie, and 
Patulny 2017, 807). These concepts are oftentimes traced back to the work of Hochschild 
(although usually not exclusively to her) who examined occupations in which employees 
are expected to express certain emotions. These expressions go beyond mere surface acting; 
they oftentimes involve the regulation of personal feelings. Emotions, thus, become part of 
a service on sale. Hochschild illustrated this through the example of flight attendants in the 
1960s who were taught and expected to provide a personal, friendly, helpful and even flirty 
service at all times. This represents an extension of corporate power from determining what 
gets done to the way in which it gets done. Employees perform not only physical and mental 
work, but also what Hochschild (2012, 119) calls emotional labor. 
Hochschild’s work has sparked a plethora of research that utilizes the concepts and the 
vocabulary introduced by her. Among the subjects of these studies are occupations and 
their requirements for emotional labor ranging from clerks in convenience stores (Sutton 
and Rafaeli 1988), female attorneys in corporate law firms (Pierce 1995), employees in call 
centers (van Jaarsveld and Poster 2013), librarians (Matteson and Miller 2013), teachers 
(Zembylas 2005) to workers in fast food restaurants and insurances salesmen (Leidner 
1991). The feeling rules at work in these contexts represent a form of power, even though 
the sociological research usually does not directly refer to conceptions or power or use their 
vocabulary. Hochschild (2012) speaks of social control through feeling rules and empha-
sizes that scholars like Goffman have underestimated “the power of the social” (Hochschild 
1979, 558) as a determinant of the emotions that individuals experience. 
Beyond studies of particular occupations and individual behavior, the idea that emotions 
are socially constructed and the product of power processes is also visible in research on 
forms of social and political organization. Prominent in this area is the study of social 
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movements: activists fighting the sexual abuse of children utilize strategic displays of emo-
tions, for example by victims, to produce “oppositional emotions” like anger in audiences; 
and animal rights activists in an American college town legitimize anger as a driving force 
of protest by framing it as an appropriate, rational reaction to grievances (Goodwin, Jasper, 
and Polletta 2001, chaps. 12, 13)5. These ideas were also applied to politics in general where, 
as Ost argues, especially anger is utilized for the purpose of gaining and maintaining sup-
port. His conclusion: “elite politics need anger and emotions every bit as much as social 
movements do” (Ost 2004, 242).  
Similar arguments with implicit references to emotions and power have been made in closer 
proximity to international affairs. Examples are research on the role of emotions in the 
success of international policing (Hughes 2009), the targeting of enemy morale through 
displays of air power in military campaigns (Anderson 2010) and the effects of emotional 
regimes in the context of global human rights movements (Flam 2013). In the general field 
of political science, emotions and power have been brought together in works on emotional 
appeals in political campaigns (Brader 2006; Kühne et al. 2011; Wettergrena and Jansson 
2013), the intentional creation of certain emotions through the media (Altheide 2006) and 
the interplay of power and emotions in political organizations (Simpson, Clegg, and 
Freeder 2013). Yet few of these works are explicit about the linkage between power and 
emotion, and those that are make little effort to connect emotions with existing frameworks 
for the analysis of power and lie in fields distant to that of IR. 
Apart from this social-constructivist approach, the field of sociology has examined the link 
between power and emotions from several other perspectives. The most prominent of these 
                                                     
5 At the same time, it is noteworthy that the research on social movements, too, has been criticized 
for not giving much attention to emotions, their role in social mobilization and – implicitly – in the 
power processes at work there (R. Aminzade and McAdam 2001, 14–18). 
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alternatives is, arguably, the structural perspective. It is less interested in the interplay of 
power and emotions in particular situations but rather the structural dimension of social 
relations. The seminal work in this area was done by Kemper who analyzed social relation-
ships with a focus on the relative power and status of participants. As he argues, changes 
of these two factors can account for most emotions. For example, a feeling of safety is a 
product of one’s own power increasing and that of someone else decreasing; fear is the 
product of one’s own power decreasing and that of someone else increasing; pride if the 
result of being given a certain status; anger that of having a status withdrawn; and so on 
(Kemper 2006, 2001, 66). 
 Power and Emotions in Psychology 
The link between power and emotions is also visible in the field of psychology, although 
the vocabulary of power is commonly not used there. A prime example is the concept of 
emotion regulation (Gross 2013a, 2013b). While much of the work in this context has fo-
cused on the intrinsic management of emotions in individuals, a number of recent works 
have connected it to the regulation of emotion in others, collective psychology (Goldenberg 
et al. 2016) and to leadership-relevant concepts such as emotional intelligence (M. George 
2000; Peña-Sarrionandia, Mikolajczak, and Gross 2015). Against this backdrop, numerous 
experiments have been undertaken and studies written about the potential of emotion reg-
ulation in the context of conflict resolution (E. Halperin 2013). Some of these are based on 
domestic conflicts, for example in Rwanda and Bosnia and Herzegovina (Cehajić-Clancy 
et al. 2011; Paluck 2009); others on international conflicts, for example between Israel and 
Palestine as well between the two states on the island of Cyprus (Cehajić-Clancy et al. 2011; 
E. Halperin et al. 2012, 2013; E. Halperin and Gross 2011). 
As these examples show, the link between power and its exercise through the manipulation 
of emotions has informed research in numerous fields. Much of this work was done in 
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sociology and psychology, where traditions such as the sociology of emotions as well as 
concepts such as emotion regulation frequently imply a link between power and emotions. 
Beyond that, research in the fields of political science, anthropology and marketing studies 
has engaged with the topic. But as is the case in IR, little of the literature in these fields is 
explicit about how power and emotions interact, even when this linkage is oftentimes im-
plied. Even when power is explicitly referred to, this is usually done without even defining 
the term or utilizing any of the established frameworks for understanding the concept. 
Nevertheless, this research from other fields offers useful insights for how IR engages with 
power and emotions. First and foremost is the social-constructivist perspective on emotions. 
It stands in contrast to the idea that emotions are the product of biological, intrinsic pro-
cesses and has great potential for IR. As Ross has argued, emotions have so far been mo-
nopolized within the discipline by Realist approaches that imagine them as impulses, not 
as socially constructed phenomena. At the same time, the constructivist tradition in IR has 
so far struggled to incorporate emotions into its analyses. It has yet to overcome “conven-
tional models of intentionality” in order to understand “modes of belief and identity that 
are inspired and absorbed before being chosen” (Ross 2006, 199) – for example through 
the influence of emotions. 
Equally useful is the concept of emotion regulation. While some IR research, such as Nye’s 
writings on soft power, refers to the manipulation of emotions, these ideas are usually un-
derdeveloped and lack psychological backing. As Maor and Gross have demonstrated, the 
concept of emotion regulation has the potential to help overcome this hurdle. For example, 
they show how different political practices can be classified as particular ways of regulating 
emotions in the political arena. Situation selection exposes audiences to specific emotional 
appeals, for example on television or through rhetoric. Cognitive change aims at the rein-
terpretation of political promises and policies, oftentimes with the goal of weakening or 
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inversing negative emotions created by them. And response modulation spreads norms and 
rules for the expression of certain emotions, for example in political movements (Maor and 
Gross 2015, 11–17).  
Altogether, this leads to three conclusions about the existing literature in IR and beyond 
about power and emotions. First, the IR literature on emotions has so far given only cursory 
attention to power and the exercise of power through the manipulation of emotions. Second, 
the IR literature on power has so far barely taken emotions and their role in the exercise of 
power into account. In both bodies of literature, the mainstream is largely silent on how 
emotions and power come together. Where both concepts together receive attention, this 
usually takes place in a superficial or narrow manner. And third, numerous other disciplines 
have explored how power and emotions relate, in particular sociology and psychology. 
While the link between power and emotions is usually only implicit there, traditions such 
as social-constructivist approaches to the sociology of emotions and concepts like emotion 
regulation offer helpful pointers for IR. 
This study intends to locate itself between these three bodies of literature. It strives to con-
tinue on the path of IR’s “emotional turn” and to connect it with power, one of IR’s foun-
dational concepts. For this purpose, it utilizes concepts from several other disciplines that 
have already done work, even if only implicitly, on the interplay of power and emotions. 
In this process, it connects with several currents in the existing research. In the context of 
the IR literature on emotions, this study follows the call for more attention to the links 
between emotions and power as well as the few works that have explored how power can 
be dependent on and utilize emotions. In the context of the IR literature on power, this 
study utilizes the conception of power as a relational concept and follows in the footsteps 
of the few authors who have devoted attention to the role that the manipulation of emotions 
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can play there. And against the backdrop of research from other disciplines, this study bor-
rows from sociology’s social-constructivist approach to emotions and some of the work 
done on emotions and power in the field of psychology. 
44 
 
III. Theoretical Framework: Power and Emotions 
The goal of this study is to illustrate how power in international relations can be exercised 
by manipulating emotions. But as the preceding chapters have already shown, it is neither 
obvious not generally agreed upon what power and emotions actually are. Both refer to 
essential components of the human experience, social life and the social sciences, yet there 
is no consensus about what power and emotions actually refer to, neither among academics 
nor among people who speak of them in more casual terms. It is therefore important to 
clearly outline what power and emotions are understood as here and what the two terms 
refer to in the context of this study. This chapter introduces the two concepts and lays the 
theoretical groundwork that is necessary to answer the research question of this study.  
This is done in three steps. First, the concept of power is introduced. This is done by show-
casing the most prominent approaches to defining power in the social sciences, and by 
outlining the specific definition of the term that is employed here. Secondly, the concept of 
emotions is introduced. This is done against the backdrop of the prominent approaches 
from the field of psychology and with a specific definition for the purpose of this study. In 
addition, the collective dimension of emotions is introduced in order to take into account 
that IR usually does not concern itself with individuals but rather collective actors. This 
study, on this basis, settles on specific definitions of both terms that have no claims to 
universal validity or general acceptability; they are merely meant to serve the purposes of 
this study. Naturally, this approach comes with a number of limitations on how power and 
emotions are understood here. The conclusion of this study, thus, devotes some space to 
clarifying these limitations and pointing out how other understandings of power and emo-
tions could open up new venues for research. 
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The third step of this chapter brings together power and emotions. It thereby represents the 
theoretical core and the most important contribution of this study. To outline how power 
and emotions are assumed to interact in international relations, their interplay is illustrated 
in schematic form and detailed through the introduction of the concept of power mecha-
nisms. This concept is then further elaborated on by outlining several power mechanisms 
that are prominent in the literature on power, by illustrating how they feature in the IR 
literature, and by explaining the role that emotions can play for them. 
1. Power and the Power over Others 
At the center of this study stands the concept of power6. As Bertrand Russell wrote, power 
is the most fundamental concept of the social sciences, just like physics finds its fundamen-
tal concept in energy (B. Russell 2004, 4). At the same time, power has been described as 
“the most disputed and contested of all concepts in the sociological lexicon” (Scott 1994, 
vol. 1, sec. General Commentary) and no single definition of the concept has been able to 
establish itself in the social sciences. Some therefore consider it as essentially contested: 
what power is and how it works will forever be a matter of dispute and disagreement (Lukes 
2005, 30). This study, in its approach to the concept of power, therefore cannot rely on any 
authoritative definition of the term. Instead, it introduces and picks from a number of cate-
gories and ideas that are well-established in the social sciences and allow for a reasonably 
comprehensive and yet parsimonious approach towards power. Key among these categories 
that order the established literature on power in the social sciences is the distinction be-
tween power to and power over. 
                                                     
6 While potentially obvious, it shall be clarified here that this study understands power exclusively 
in the sense of social power. Power, in the context of this study, therefore relates to two or more 
social actors and refers to a phenomenon that originates and produces its consequences, first and 
foremost, in the social world. 
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 Power to and Power over 
On the most basic level, conceptions of power can be categorized along the differentiation 
between power to and power over. These two categories are usually traced back to Pitkin 
(1993, 276) and have become prominent over the past decades in order to structure the 
manifold definitions in the social sciences of what power is and how it works. Many prom-
inent definitions of power can therefore be seen as fitting into either of these two categories. 
Because of this sweeping approach, the distinction between power to and power over has 
received criticism for being simplistic, misleading, ambiguous and unable to integrate cer-
tain definitions of power (Göhler 2009; Lukes 2005, 69). Nevertheless, these categories 
will be employed in this study as they have been the foundation for a variety of writings 
and discussions on power. 
This is not to imply that no other categorizations of power concepts have been proposed. 
Other authors distinguish between actor-based and system-based forms of power; between 
instrumental, structuralist and discursive forms of power; between innovative, constitutive, 
transformative and systemic forms of power; between transitive and intransitive forms of 
power, and between various other categories through which ideas about power can be or-
ganized (Göhler 2009, 35; Peter Meusburger 2015, 29–30). There have also been attempts 
to further develop Pitkin’s binary understanding of power conceptions, for example by Al-
len (1998) who introduces the concept of power with alongside of power to and power over 
as a principally feminist approach. For the sake of parsimony, these alternative categoriza-
tions of power will not be taken into account here7. 
                                                     
7 Elsewhere, the principal distinction between power to and power over has been kept yet the labels 
of these categories have been changed. Dowding, for example, speaks of “outcome power” instead 
of power to and “social power” instead of power over, even though these concepts are otherwise 
similar (Dowding 1991; see also Bosworth 2011, 616). 
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In Pitkin’s framework, the power to describes an ability to act and produce an outcome – 
or, simply put, the power to do something. The power over describes a social relation in 
which one actor influences another actor to produce an outcome – or, in other words, the 
power over someone else. The power to has therefore been described as “outcome power”. 
It refers to the latent potential or ability to produce an outcome, not the act of actually 
exercising power, and is not necessarily related to other actors. In contrast to that, the power 
over has been described as “social power” as it inevitably involves more than one actor and 
their interaction. It refers to the process of one actor influencing another actor, not merely 
the potential or the ability to do so (Dowding 1991, 48; Pansardi 2011, 521). 
The power over can furthermore take a structural form when it is not one actor exercising 
power over another actor but structural factors exercising power over an actor. As this con-
ception received comparatively little attention in the discourse on the basic distinction be-
tween power to and power over, the definitions provided at this point speak exclusively of 
actors and do not mention structures. Yet this is not meant to deny that there is a long-
ranging debate about whether social structures should actually be included in any concep-
tion of power (as will be described further down).  
The differences between these basic categories of power conceptions have been expressed 
in different terms by a variety of authors. For example, following the words of Dowding, 
every successful exercise of power over changes the incentive structure of another actor 
whereas the power to does not involve changing the incentives of another actor (Dowding 
1991, 55). But as is common in the literature on power, there is little agreement on whether 
this terminology is adequate to truly capture the meaning of power in all its complexities. 
Case in point are Lukes and Haglund who reject Dowding’s focus on changing incentive 
structures as overtly narrow and restrictive (Lukes and Haglund 2005).  
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The power over has oftentimes received a negative connotation as it involves one actor 
making another actor behave in a way they otherwise would not8. This has been interpreted 
as one actor limiting the freedom of another actor. Especially feminist authors have linked 
power over to conflictual social relations, domination and illegitimacy. Elsewhere, this 
negative connotation of power over has been called into question. Some authors argue that 
the moral evaluation of power is only possibly on a case-by-case basis. Even though power 
over implies that one person has a greater degree of control than another person, this degree 
of control is not necessarily negative. After all, what sometimes receives a negative inter-
pretation is precisely the act of losing control instead of having it (Morriss 2012, 95; Pan-
sardi 2012, 74). In contrast to that, power to usually receives a positive connotation as it 
implies the empowerment of an actor, which usually makes it a consensual and legitimate 
phenomenon (Baldwin 2016, 8; Göhler 2009, 28–29).  
Various prominent definitions of power can be located within these two categories. Among 
those that fall under the conception of power to are the definition of power by Hobbes as 
the “present means, [sic] to obtain some future apparent Good [sic]” (Hobbes 1968, 150), 
Bierstedt’s definition as “the ability to employ force, not its actual employment” (Bierstedt 
1994, 8), Lukes argument that power is “a capacity not the exercise of that capacity” (Lukes 
2005, 12), and Arendt’s definition of power as “the human ability not just to act but to act 
in concert” (Arendt 1972, 143). Within this category, a number of authors emphasize that 
this understanding of power as a capacity should not be equated with the idea of power as 
a resource. Just because one has the resources necessary to exercise power does not mean 
that one is able to successfully deploy these resources for the exercise of power, after all 
(Lukes 2005, 70; Morriss 2002, 19). 
                                                     
8 Throughout this study, the hypothetical actors used to illustrate what power is and how it works 
are referred to with the gender-neutral “they”, “their” and “them”, even when in singular.   
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In contrast to that stand understandings of power that fit the concept of power over and 
understand the term as describing a relationship and a process. Among the examples for 
this category are Russel’s statement that power is “the production of intended effects” (B. 
Russell 2004, 23). The same is true for Dahl’s (1957, 202–3) prominent argument that 
power is at its most basic a relation among people in which one actor gets another actor to 
do something that the latter actor would otherwise not do. This focus on social relations is 
also present in Foucault’s writings which “suppose that certain persons exercise power over 
others” and that power thus “designates relationships between partners” (Foucault 1983, 
217). What unites these definitions is that they refer to power as a process that actually 
takes place, not to a latent potential, an attribute, an ability or a resource. 
The relationship between the power to and the power over has been debated extensively. 
Ringmar argues that, “more than anything, power is a matter of capabilities” and that “what 
really matters is the 'power to' rather than the 'power over'” (Ringmar 2007, 90). Various 
other authors have furthermore pointed out that power to is “the more basic notion” (Mor-
riss 2009, 55) as any power over requires the power to. Where the power to is absent, the 
power over cannot be exercised. Following this logic, the power over is a subset of the 
power to. The former denotes the production of an outcome based on the ability to do so; 
the later denotes this ability to produce a desired outcome by influencing another actor 
(Dowding 1991, 4, 2016, 113; Isaac 1987, 5; Lukes 2005, 69, 74). 
Other authors have pointed out that the relationships of these two understandings of power 
might be less straightforward. For example, it is not quite clear whether the power to of one 
actor does not in itself influence other actors or that the power over always depends on the 
power to. The line between the two concepts can be difficult to draw: military capabilities, 
for example, represent a power to that does not have to be exercised in order to influence 
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other actors, for example by deterring them from attacking. And while it is commonly as-
sumed that the power to underpins the power over, one can also imagine this relationship 
the other way around. The power to of a group of people, for example, might be dependent 
on the group’s power over itself and its members (Göhler 2009, 34). 
Pansardi even goes so far as to argue that these two conceptions of power should not be 
seen as clearly distinct but rather as two aspects of a unitary concept of power. She rejects 
the common perception that the main difference lies in the relational nature of power over 
and the non-relational nature of power to. As the points out, power to also makes a reference 
to the relational context of an actor but does so in an implicit fashion. Power, accordingly, 
is always social and the two concepts usually refer “to the same social facts” (Pansardi 
2012, 86). In this sense, the power to of one actor does not describe an attribute or a capa-
bility that can be spoken of without any reference to another actor. This may be possible 
for the height, weight and hair color of a person – but the power to that derives from owning 
a weapon already implies a relation to another actor (Baldwin 2016, 50)9. 
As the literature review already outlined, the focus of IR’s understanding of power shifted 
during the second half of the 20th century from a dominance of power to towards the idea 
of power over, and thereby “from a property concept of power to a relational one” (Baldwin 
2013, 275). The former conception is most clearly embodied in the elements of national 
power-approach, and thereby in the idea that the possession of certain resources and capa-
bilities itself equates power. Yet this understanding of power suffers from various problems: 
it is difficult to imagine how the mere possession of resources can translate into power if 
the utilization of these resources fails; and whereas resources such as nuclear bombs might 
                                                     
9 This argument was largely rejected in a response by Moriss who still perceives power to and power 
over as distinct and each of them useful in its own right. Even in a situation where they refer to the 
same social facts, they do so in different ways, as he argues (Morriss 2012, 93). 
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be enormously powerful in some situations, they are largely useless in many other situa-
tions (Baldwin 2013, 277–78; Ringmar 2007, 191–92).  
Today, the conception of power as power over therefore plays an important role in IR, just 
as the social sciences as a whole emphasize this conception (Kreisberg 1992, 35; Morriss 
2002, 34). At the same time this focus on power over has been criticized and is being re-
jected for a variety of reasons. As was mentioned above, the principal criticism against this 
understanding is that power to has to logically precede any power over, and that any anal-
ysis with an exclusive focus on the latter is therefore problematic. But even within the realm 
of the power over there are a number of disagreements among scholars, chiefly about 
whether the exercise of this form of power is necessarily deliberate10 and whether it de-
scribes only the power relations among actors or also among structures and actors. 
The first of these points of dispute is linked to the criticism that the concept of power over 
tends to understand power as a mere causal influence. To pick but one example for this 
problem: if one follows Dahl’s (1957, 202–3) influential definition that power is exercised 
when one actor gets another actor to do something that this actor would otherwise not do, 
then many acts would be considered as exercises of power that we usually would merely 
describe as an influence. If actor A buys the last ticket for a theater performance, which is 
why actor B is unable to see the performance and has to make other plans for the evening, 
then – according to Dahl’s definition – actor A exercised power over actor B. Yet we would 
usually not describe this production of collateral effects as an exercise of power; we would 
rather label it an influence (Baldwin 2016, 74; Morriss 2002, 34; J. B. Murphy 2011, 88, 
92; Ringmar 2007, 190) or simply as luck (Dowding 2016, 70).  
                                                     
10 The terms “deliberate” and “intentional” are used as synonyms for each other here 
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For this reason, Dowding (1991, 48) adds to his definition of power over that its exercise 
takes place in a deliberate way and serves to bring about a particular outcome. The same is 
implied by Russel who defines power as “the production of intended effects” (B. Russell 
2004, 23). 
In the afore-mentioned example, actor A’s influence over actor B’s evening plans would 
therefore not be considered an exercise of power as actor A did not deliberately strive to 
change actor B’s evening plans. Other authors, too, make intentions part of their definition 
of power. Weber, for example, stipulates that power describes the probability that one actor 
comes into “a position to carry out his own will despite resistance” (Weber 1964, 152). 
Others again question or reject the inclusion of intentions: Lukes raises the question 
whether one can “exercise power without deliberatively seeking to do so, in routine or un-
considered ways” (Lukes 1986, 1). The question whether intentionality should be part of 
how power is defined remains therefore unresolved. 
The second point of dispute concerns the role that structures (and other forces that cannot 
be characterized as actors) play in the exercise of power over. As Lukes argues, power is 
not only exercised by actors with a discernible behavior, it also the product of the “the bias 
of the system” and “the socially structured and culturally patterned behaviour of groups, 
and practices of institutions” (Lukes 2005, 26)11. To an even greater degree, Foucault does 
ascribe the exercise of power over not to the actions of individuals but to “permanent, ex-
haustive, omnipresent surveillance”, to “a faceless gaze” (Foucault 1995, 214) and the 
“great anonymous” (Foucault 1978, 95). This disciplinary power, as he calls it, influences 
                                                     
11 Although Lukes criticized the behavioral focus of other conceptions of power, his own approach 
has equally been criticized for not giving the appropriate attention to structural forces. As Groarke 
concluded, he provides “a useful critique of those who have come before him in the power debate” 
but does “fail to develop a concept of power with room for institutional and structural power” 
(Groarke 1993, 31–32). 
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each and every individual through subtle means, for example processes of socialization and 
shared conceptions of what counts as truth. Power is therefore not only the result of indi-
vidual behavior; it is also the result of structures to which one can hardly ascribe agency. 
In contrast to that, Dowden rejects the approaches of Lukes and Foucault and their inclusion 
of structural (or disciplinary) forces into the concept of power over. As he argues, by doing 
so power “simply becomes a term that denotes the fact that we respond to our environment” 
(Dowding 2016, 9). These environmental influences can be sufficiently well described 
without references to power, as he argues. Structural forces differ from what we usually 
understand as a wielder of power in that they cannot choose to not exercise power. Dow-
ding therefore bases his understanding of power on the assumption that “Only actors can 
have power. Structures cannot have power” (Dowding 2003, 306, see also 1991, 48). Thus, 
just like different authors come to different conclusions about whether the power over de-
scribes only deliberate processes or not, so do they disagree about whether structural forces 
can exercise the power over.  
In summary, the power literature therefore distinguishes between the power to and the 
power over, with numerous authors arguing that the latter is a subset of the former. Within 
the concept of the power over, there is disagreement about whether this form of power 
should be understood as deliberate, and whether it can be exercised only by actors or also 
by structures (as well as about numerous other issues which are not taken into account here). 
In the face of these disagreements, ambiguities and contradictions, the notion of power over 
and its wide-spread adaption have therefore been depicted as the reason for “much sloppy 
thinking in the social and human sciences” (J. B. Murphy 2011, 95), “academic confusion” 
and even “pernicious political consequences” (Morriss 2002, 33). What is power to one 
observer is merely an influence or even luck to another observer; and where one observer 
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sees complex webs of structural power, another observer does not see anything at all that 
deserves to be labeled as power. 
Nevertheless, this study concerns itself primarily with power over. This choice was made 
for two principal reasons. First, and as was elaborated above, the social sciences in general 
and the IR field in particular emphasize the understanding of power over compared to the 
concept of power to (or any other conception of power). One of the goals of this study is to 
connect with the existing literature on power in IR, hence the mainstream’s focus on power 
over is retained. Secondly, the goal of this study is to illuminate the role of emotions within 
existing frameworks of power, and thereby to extend and improve our understanding of 
power in international relations, not to re-conceptualize power itself. In terms of how power 
is defined, this study does therefore not strive to go beyond the existing works of the IR 
mainstream.  
As has to be emphasized, the choice to focus on this particular conception of power neces-
sarily excludes other understandings of what power is. Left out are, for example, feminist 
conceptions of power which emphasize that power does not only happen on the level of 
elites and nation states but also through bottom-up processes (Enloe 2004, 42, 2014), and 
that power can also express itself through cooperation and empowerment (Allen 1998; 
Haugaard 2011; Miller 1992, 241; Tickner 1988, 438). These conceptions would certainly 
open up additional perspectives on the interplay of power and emotions and possibly help 
to re-conceptualize power on a more fundamental level, but as feminist approaches usually 
position themselves in explicit opposition to the mainstream and are anything but parsimo-
nious in their variety, they lie beyond the scope of this project and are therefore not taken 
into account here. 
 Power defined 
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For the purpose of this study, a specific definition of power over was chosen. This defini-
tion is not meant to provide a universal answer to the question of what power over actually 
is and to settle the various debates surrounding the definition of power. Rather, it is meant 
to provide an intuitive, comprehensive and clear definition of the concept. These criteria 
are meant to ensure that the argument made in this study about power and emotions is not 
confined to an overtly narrow or specific conception of power, thereby limiting the scope 
of the argument. In other words, the definition of power utilized here is meant to ensure 
that this study can showcase how emotions matter for an understanding of power that is 
intuitively relevant for international relations. 
Power is therefore defined as the process through which actor A deliberately makes actor 
B behave in accordance with A’s preferences. In other words, A makes B behave the way 
A wants B to. 
This definition rests on several basic assumptions. First, and as was mentioned at the be-
ginning of this chapter, it defines power as an inherently social phenomenon that always 
involves the interaction of actors with each other. This interaction can take place between 
individuals, but also involve collective actors made up of individuals, such as states, organ-
izations and companies. Following Dahl, this social interaction has a number of features. 
The existence of a social interaction implies that some sort of connection between A and B 
exists. They may be distant from each other in space or even in time, yet a causal link 
between the two is implied here. The social interaction between A and B is characterized 
by a time lag between the beginning and the end of the power process. The exercise of 
power by A precedes the reaction by B. Otherwise, it would be impossible for A to actually 
exercise power over B (Dahl 1957, 204).  
The second basic assumption is that power describes a process. In this regard, the definition 
utilized here fits the idea of power over. While it stands to reason that A’s exercise of power 
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over B requires A to have some sort of capacity, and thus the power to exercise that power 
over, this capacity is not what this study focuses on. A capacity may be necessary to exer-
cise power, yet it is not sufficient to speak of an exercise of power. Following this logic, a 
robber with a gun has the capacity to exercise power over the employees of a bank by 
owning a gun, and by being able and willing to use that gun. But unless the gun is actually 
used to influence the behavior of the bank employees, this setup is not of interest for this 
study as no power over is actually exercised. This definition of power is therefore limited 
to the understanding of the term of power over and does not concern itself with conceptions 
such as power to. 
A third assumption underlying the definition of power utilized here concerns the outcome 
of this process: the goal of power is always to manipulate behavior. The exercise of power 
can certainly target perceptions, beliefs, opinions, desires, preferences and – crucially for 
this study – emotions. But, at the end of the day, power is always meant to manipulate the 
behavior of another actor. The targeting of perceptions, beliefs, opinions, and so on is only 
a means to manipulate behavior but not an end in itself. This does not mean that exercises 
of power never aim to change, for example, opinions and preferences. But it is hard to 
imagine why any actor would want to exercise power over the opinions or preferences of 
another actor without at least implicitly aiming to manipulate that actor’s behavior. The 
same is true for emotions: their manipulation can be a pathway for one actor to manipulate 
the behavior of another actor. 
To say the exercise of power always aims to manipulate behavior does not necessarily mean 
that A changes the behavior of B. Power can also be exercised by ensuring that the way in 
which B currently behaves continues when it would otherwise change. This also includes 
non-behavior: actor A can manipulate actor B through the exercise of power to stay inactive 
when B would otherwise engage in an activity. In other words, the product of power is 
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behavior that would not occur without the exercise of power. Power therefore has to make 
a difference in terms of behavior. If the behavior of B changes in accordance with the pref-
erences of A, but would have done so regardless of any interaction with A, then A did not 
actually exercise power over B. In this case, A could simply be described as lucky.  
The fourth assumption, too, concerns itself with the outcome of the power process. Not 
only is the goal of power to influence the behavior of B, but to influence it in a way that 
fits the preferences of A. If A influences B’s behavior in a way that does not suit the pref-
erences of A, this does not represent an exercise of power. A bank robber may be successful 
in influencing how people in a bank behave during a robbery – but if this results in these 
people resisting the robber, this outcome does not represent an exercise of power as it 
clearly does not suit the robber’s preferences. The outcome of the power process has there-
fore to be in A’s interest.  
It is worth emphasizing that this does not imply that the resulting behavior goes against the 
desires of B. The exercise of power does not depend on a clash of preferences and can result 
in behavior that suits the desires of both A and B. An example provided by Baldwin illus-
trates this: 
Shouting ‘Watch out!’ to a person about to step into an open manhole is likely 
to cause the person to shift course, but this change in behavior is not likely to 
be contrary to the person’s preferences or desires. (Baldwin 2016, 36) 
A fifth and last assumption is that the exercise of power happens in an active and intentional 
fashion. This assumption is a matter of debate in the literature on power, as was described 
above. It is certainly possible to define power in a way that involves passive as well as 
unintentional influences – and, ultimately, probably “a matter of taste and intuition rather 
than one of substance” (Zimmerling 2005, 145) how one incorporates intentionality into a 
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definition of power. But in order to provide an intuitive and clear-cut understanding of what 
power is, the concept is defined here as describing an active and intentional process. This 
implies that A actually has a conscious preference about the behavior of B and makes an 
effort to impose it on B. It is therefore not sufficient for B’s behavior to suit A’s preferences 
without A actively and intentionally working towards this goal. In this case, an exercise of 
power is not taking place, even if B’s behavior or thinking suits the preferences of A. In-
stead of an exercise of power, this result merely represents luck. 
Yet it is not always straightforward to determine whether an exercise of power counts as 
active and intentional. In some cases, this is easy: a robber who threatens employees of a 
bank in order to make them hand over money clearly acts in an active and intentional fash-
ion. In other cases, it is more difficult to determine whether power is being exercised in 
accordance with this study’s definition. Consider how the behavior of individuals belong-
ing to privileged groups, such as white men in corporate America, influences the behavior 
of less privileged groups, for example by preventing minority women from speaking up 
about discrimination. The members of the first group may exercise power over members 
of the second group through their intentional behavior and in ways that clearly serve their 
interests. At the same time, they might not actually be aware of the social climate this con-
tributes to. This example can therefore be interpreted as individuals actively and intention-
ally contributing to an exercise of power; or rather as a structural form of power that can 
hardly be described as active and intentional. 
This study’s definition of power and the assumptions it is based on are therefore not free 
from ambiguities – a caveat that applies probably to every definition of power. Neverthe-
less, I believe that this definition serves the purposes of this study as the ambiguities men-
tioned above are of little relevance here. In summary, this study’s definition of power there-
fore rests on five assumptions: 
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1. Power is a social phenomenon and describes interactions among people. 
2. Power is a process, not a capacity, even if it requires a capacity. 
3. Power aims to produce behavior that would otherwise not occur. 
4. Power aims to produce behavior that suits the preferences of A. 
5. Power requires activity and intentionality. 
This definition focuses on the behavior of actors; it does not concern itself with social 
structures that exercise power. As was mentioned above, it is a matter of debate whether 
social structures can actually exercise power. I believe that it would certainly have been 
insightful to explore how social structures exercise power by influencing emotions, yet they 
are not taken into account here for practical reasons. This study assumes that power in-
volves agency and intentionality in order to clearly distinguish between processes that rep-
resent an exercise of power from processes that merely represent a form of influence or 
luck. It is difficult to argue that power can be intentional and structural at the same time, 
even though authors like Foucault make this claim. In order to avoid this problem and the 
complexities it involves, the definition of power that underpins this study excludes struc-
tural forms of power, even though their inclusion would have certainly opened up an inter-
esting perspective on power and emotions. 
As was mentioned before, this definition and the assumptions that underpin it are more 
specific and narrower than other conceptions of power. Consider, for example, the defini-
tion by Robert Dahl. In his seminal article from 1957 he proposed an “intuitive idea” (Dahl 
1957, 202) of power that captures what people commonly understand the term to mean. It 
is meant to capture the basic idea that underpins not only our understanding of power, but 
also concepts such as influence, authority and control. The core of Dahl’s definition: “A 
has power over B to the extent that he can get B to do something that B would not otherwise 
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do” (Dahl 1957, 202–3; emphasis in original)12. The first three of the five assumptions that 
were provided above are consistent with this definition. The last two of these assumptions, 
on the other hand, make the definition of power utilized here more specific than Dahl’s 
concept. His definition is silent on whether power has to serve the preferences of A and 
whether power has to be exercised in an active and intentional fashion.  
In a schematic fashion, this understanding of power and the process of exercising power 
can be illustrated as shown in figure 1. It depicts power as a process of social interaction 
between actor A on the one side and actor B on the other side. The former, through their 
behavior, exercises power over B by making B behave in ways that suit the preferences of 
A. This, of course, implies that A has preferences about the behavior of B and that A in-
tentionally tries to influence B. The way in which this causal effect is achieved is referred 
to a power mechanism. Following the logic of this schema, the behavior of A is the inde-
pendent variable in the power process. Actor B’s behavior is the dependent variable.  
 
                                                     
12 Since the publication of his 1957 article, Dahl has clarified a number of elements of this definition. 
Most importantly, Dahl and Stinebrickner wrote more than four decades later that power is “a rela-
tion among human actors such that the wants, desires, preferences, or intentions of one or more 
actors affect the actions, or predispositions to act, of one or more actors in a direction consistent 
with - and not contrary to - the wants, preferences, or intentions of the influence-wielders” (Dahl 
and Stinebrickner 2002, 17). This extended definition does not actually – or at least not explicitly - 
apply to power but only to “influence”. Yet it has repeatedly been pointed out that power and influ-
ence are interchangeable terms for Dahl. This is consistent with Dahl’s article from 1957 in which 
he argues that his definition of power also incorporates related concepts such as influence (Dahl 
1957, 202; Stinebrickner 2015, 194–95). 
Figure 1: Power process 
Desire and activity to 
change B’s behavior 
Behavior in accordance 
with A’s preferences 




The power mechanism at the center of figure 1 describes whatever method that A employs 
to make B act in accordance with A’s preferences. The definition of power utilized here 
leaves largely open the mechanisms through which this happens. Based on this study’s 
underlying assumptions about power that are spelled out above, it merely assumes that this 
mechanism is employed in an active and intentional manner. This mechanism can take a 
variety of forms, from coercion and the threat of violence to persuasion through convincing 
arguments. What unites all mechanisms: they are “analytical constructs that tell in detail 
how the two components of an explanation are related - that is, how the explanans produces 
the explanandum” (Maldonado 2011, 410) – or, in other words, how the independent vari-
able produces the dependent variable, and how actor A exercises power over actor B. 
In the literature on power, the idea of a “mechanism” that describes the way in which power 
is exercised is not an established concept. In fact, different authors refer to different things 
when they speak of mechanisms. Parsons, for example, considers power itself as a “specific 
mechanism operating to bring about changes in the action of other units” (Parsons 1963, 
232; emphasis in original). This implies that there are other mechanisms to produce the 
same result, apart from power. In contrast to that, Lukes understands a mechanism as a 
description of the process through which an exercise of power unfolds. There are, thus, 
different mechanisms through which power can be exercised and the idea of mechanisms 
is a subset of the concept of power (Lukes 2005, 64, 87, 124). Other authors are even more 
specific in their understanding of mechanisms and refer to the influence of Adam Smith’s 
invisible hand as well as the Marxist concept of surplus value, or the bandwagon effect and 
the idea of a self-fulfilling prophecy (Alves 2011; Maldonado 2011). 
This study’s understanding of power mechanisms resembles Lukes’ who considers differ-
ent mechanisms as pathways through which power can be exercised. Power is therefore an 
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umbrella term that encompasses various mechanisms. The definition of these power mech-
anisms is difficult and has to deal with confusing terminology. For example, whether “per-
suasion” and “convincing” or “coercion” and “compulsion” describe the same mechanisms 
or different mechanisms is anything but clear. For the purpose of this study, the number of 
power mechanisms one can imagine, their precise definition and the ways in which they 
differ are of little importance. The point made here is rather that one actor’s exercise of 
power over another actor’s behavior can take a variety of forms. It is therefore helpful to 
briefly introduce and discuss on the following pages a number of mechanisms that are 
prominent in the literature on power. 
 Mechanisms of Power 
One starting point for illustrating these mechanisms is the framework of the faces of power. 
Framework, in this context, does not refer to a formalized and monolithic concept but to a 
debate of multiple scholars who proposed different conceptions of power in reaction to 
each other and over the course of several decades. Each of these conceptions represents a 
different understanding of how the power over can be exercised. In other words: each face 
describes a different power mechanism. These four faces were first outlined by Dahl in his 
afore-mentioned article from 1957, by Bachrach and Baratz in an article from 1962, by 
Lukes in a book from 1974 and by Digeser in an article from 1992. While the authors 
reference each other’s works, not all of them speak of “faces of power” but rather use a 
confusing variety of terms13. And while they disagree on a number of issues and criticize 
                                                     
13 Dahl labeled what came later to be known as the first face simply as a “concept of power”. 
Bachrach and Baratz spoke of a second “face” in the title of their article and used the term as a 
synonym for “concept”. Lukes spoke of these faces as different “views” on power. Digeser, finally, 
titled the article containing his contribution to the debate “The Fourth Face of Power”, yet he also 
used terms such as “conception” and “conceptualization” as further synonyms. Whether one can 
assume that all these terms carry the same meaning is up for debate. Baldwin, for example, argues 
that “faces” and “concepts” refer to different things. According to him, the first three faces of power 
merely represent variants of the same underlying concept of power, not different concepts (Baldwin 
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each other’s contributions to the debate, the power mechanisms they describe are widely 
interpreted as different ideas about what forms the exercise of power can take14. 
In the context of this study and its definition of power, these faces of power represent dif-
ferent mechanisms through which power can be exercised. Yet it should be noted that the 
authors who originally conceptualized these faces do not necessarily share this definition 
of what power is. For example, Steve Lukes wrote in the book that first outlined the third 
face of power that the exercise of power manipulates an actor in ways that run contrary to 
that actor’s interests (although he changed his mind later on) (Lukes 1974, 37). This as-
sumption about power is different from what this study’s definition of the term argues: that 
the exercise of power can produce results that serve the interests of all actors involved. 
Nevertheless, the faces of power are useful to outline various mechanisms through which 
power can be exercised. 
The origins of the debate on the faces of power lie in the wider field of political science, 
yet the framework is of relevance beyond that and plays a prominent role in the IR literature 
on power. Where the dominant understandings of power in IR and different conceptions of 
power to are explained, the four faces are oftentimes used as examples (see Baldwin 2013, 
                                                     
2013, 276). Other authors have introduced even more labels: Berenskoetter and Haugaard refer to 
the faces of power as “dimensions” and Nye labels them as “aspects” of relational power (Ber-
enskoetter 2007, 4–12; Haugaard 2011; Nye 2011b, 14). Nevertheless, the reference to “faces” has 
established itself and been used for numerous discussions of the topic, for example in book titles 
(see Boulding 1990; Isaac 1987 for examples).  
14 Whether the original authors of the faces agree with this interpretation is not entirely clear. In their 
writings, they tend to introduce their own contribution to the debate as alternative or even superior 
ideas. Bachrach and Baratz, who conceptualized the second face of power, merely call for “a recog-
nition of the two faces of power” (Bachrach and Baratz 1962, 952). This implies that these faces can 
co-exist and are complementary. In contrast to that, Digeser in his article outlining the fourth face 
of power speaks not of complementary but rather “competing ideas” (Digeser 1992, 979). And Lukes 
considers his own conception of power, which is generally referred to as the third face, as explicitly 
superior to the first two faces as it allows for “deeper and more satisfactory analysis” (Lukes 2005, 
16). At the same time, it is noteworthy that Lukes (2005, 14, 124) describes the understanding of 
power advocated by himself also as a mechanism, which implies that power can take various forms. 
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276; Berenskoetter 2007, 3–12; Mattern Bially 2008 for examples). Other authors use the 
debate at least as a reference point in their writings on power in IR (see Barnett and Duvall 
2005, 43; Gallarotti 2010, 25–30; Nye 2011b, 10–18; Robinson 2006). 
A first mechanism through which power can be exercised is visible in the first face of power. 
It is based on Dahl’s above-mentioned definition: “A has power over B to the extent that 
he can get B to do something that B would not otherwise do” (Dahl 1957, 202–3; emphasis 
in original). The mechanism at play here is usually assumed to be compulsion or coercion15. 
Power, then, describes a social relationship in which A causes B to do something that B 
would otherwise not do – and, crucially, that B does not actually want to do. A thereby 
imposes its own preferences about B’s behavior on B and ignores or overrules B’s prefer-
ences. Following Barnett and Duval, this implies that “there must be a conflict of desires” 
as well as that “A and B want different outcomes, and B loses” (Barnett and Duvall 2005, 
49). Berenskoetter, too, speaks of “conflicting preferences” and the question of “who wins 
a conflict of preferences” (Berenskoetter 2007, 5, 7). The common interpretation of Dahl’s 
definition of power is therefore one of “overt conflict” (Mattern Bially 2008, 693).  
This conception of power as compulsion has been prominent – and maybe even dominant 
- in the IR discourse about power. As was mentioned before, IR has traditionally focused 
                                                     
15 In his analysis of Dahl’s definition of power, Baldwin rejects this interpretation. As he points out, 
Dahl does not make any statement about the preferences of actor B and whether these necessarily 
run counter to the behavior (or the predispositions to act) that are caused by actor A. Accordingly, 
power can also be exercised in situations where the preferences of A do not run in opposition to the 
preferences of B or in which they are neutral towards them; power it is not necessarily conflictual. 
Baldwin also rejects the idea that the first face of power necessarily relies on compulsion. As he 
argues, nothing in Dahl’s writings indicates that power can take exclusively this form, just as it does 
not necessarily involve conflicting interests. Its scope is therefore not restricted to means that involve 
compulsion. Rather, it also can be exercised via charisma, persuasion, mentorship and various other 
forms of influence (Baldwin 2016). The interpretation of the first face of power here as being based 
on compulsion as its mechanism is therefore merely representing the common understanding of the 




on the understanding of power as power to, whereas the mechanism visible in the first face 
of power describes the power over. Yet these two approaches to power are closely related, 
and this is most visible in the perception of power as a process of compulsion. It relies on 
the imposition of preferences by making resistance an unfeasible option. In IR’s main-
stream, and especially the Realist literature, this form of power is commonly equated with 
hallmarks of national power, such as economic and military capabilities, and thereby with 
the power to (Barnett and Duvall 2005, 49–51; Berenskoetter 2007, 4–7). With this in mind, 
a focus on compulsion as the mechanism through which A makes B behave in accordance 
with A’s preferences has long been at the center of IR’s approaches to power. 
A second mechanism through which power can be exercised can be found in the second 
face of power. It describes a mechanism through which A is “creating or reinforcing social 
and political values and institutional practices that limit the scope of the political process” 
(Bachrach and Baratz 1962, 948). As a result, the preferences of B are shut out of decision 
making processes. In the words of Bachrach and Baratz: 
To the extent that A succeeds in doing this, B is prevented, for all practical 
purposes, from bringing to the fore any issues that might in their resolution be 
seriously detrimental to A’s set of preferences. (Bachrach and Baratz 1962, 
948) 
This second mechanism can therefore be described as agenda-setting. Just like the first 
mechanism, it assumes that actor A and actor B have conflicting interests that prevail 
throughout the process of exercising power. The crucial difference between the two mech-
anisms: whereas the first one assumes that A exercises power in an overt fashion, the sec-
ond face understands the exercise of power as a covert process. It takes place through the 
shaping of rules, values, norms and institutions; it keeps conflictual issues off the agenda 
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and avoids open conflict. This mechanism therefore highlights processes through which 
decisions are not made, conflicts that not fought out, and the status quo is maintained. 
Bachrach and Baratz illustrate this mechanism through the example of a university profes-
sor who is dissatisfied with a department policy. He decides to openly attack this policy at 
a faculty meeting – but “when the moment of truth is at hand he sits frozen in silence” 
(Bachrach and Baratz 1962, 949). In this example, his behavior is the result of social bar-
riers created and sustained by other faculty members, and thereby an exercise of power’s 
second face. The professor may be unwilling to speak up because he fears that this might 
be interpreted as an expression of disloyalty towards the department, that it might put him 
into a situation in which his opinion stands against that of all other faculty members, or that 
it might remove the solutions he was about to propose permanently from consideration. 
Power is therefore exercised over him by those who create and control social norms that 
discourage the airing of preferences. In other words, and in contrast to the first face of 
power, power is exercised in this example in a covert way.  
In IR, this mechanism is commonly seen in institutions, regimes and organizations, as well 
as the power relations that create and control them. As Berenskoetter has argued, the second 
face of power goes beyond the first mechanism not only in regards to its analytical focus, 
but also with an eye on the participants in power processes and their resources. Whereas 
the first face usually involves a focus on states as the wielders of power, the concept of 
Bachrach and Baratz also takes into account how social movements, the global media and 
even consumers exercise power in global affairs. And whereas the first face is primarily 
about the resources that help states to win wars, the second face also takes into account 
factors such as authority and the access to as well as control over information (Berenskoet-
ter 2007, 7–9). As a result, the second face of power illuminates a mechanism through 
which the power over is exercised that is subtler than the first mechanism. 
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A third mechanism and a third face of power are commonly associated with Lukes and the 
book he first published in 1974. It represents a direct response to the first two mechanisms 
and argues that they are inadequate for understanding the actual scope of what power can 
be. Following Lukes, the first and second mechanism fall short on three accounts. First, 
they ignore that not all forms of power can easily be tied to human behavior and decisions, 
for example the power that is exercised by cultural traditions. Second, they tie power to 
situations of conflict. This ignores that power can also underpin situations of consensus, 
and that power can manipulate preferences and desires so as to produce consensus. And 
third, they assume that power involves grievances and dissatisfaction on the side of those 
who are subject to power. Yet power can also be exercised to make those subject to power 
accept their situation (Lukes 2005, 25–28). 
The second one of these three points deserves special emphasis. Lukes rejects the underly-
ing assumption of Dahl, Bachrach and Baratz about power involving conflict. As he argues, 
this understanding imposes an unnecessary restriction on our understanding of power as it 
ignores situations of consensus. These are by no means free of power relations. In fact, they 
can even be the product of power. After all, power can shape desires and preferences, pro-
ducing compliance and consensus through this mechanism. As Lukes asks: 
[I]s it not the supreme and most insidious exercise of power to prevent people, 
to whatever degree, from having grievances by shaping their perceptions, cog-
nitions and preferences in such a way that they accept their role in the existing 
order of things, either because they can see or imagine no alternative to it, or 
because they see it as natural and unchangeable, or because they value it as 
divinely ordained and beneficial? (Lukes 2005, 28) 
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The mechanism described by the third face of power is therefore one of changing prefer-
ences16. Through this process, A makes B behave in a way that suits A’s preferences. What 
differentiates this mechanism from the first two mechanisms introduced here is that the 
former does not describe the exercise of power through conflictual means, such as compul-
sion and agenda-setting, but through the shaping of preferences and production of consen-
sus.  
In the context of IR, the third face of power has received increasing attention during the 
past decades. Berenskoetter labeled its meaning and significance for the discipline there-
fore “a story in the making” (Berenskoetter 2007, 11). So far, its most popular and influen-
tial embodiment in IR has been Nye’s concept of soft power. As he argues, power can not 
                                                     
16 As Lukes wrote in the first edition of his 1974 book, this process has to take place “in a manner 
contrary to B’s interests” (Lukes 2005, 37). This implies that A produces preferences in B that run 
counter to B’s actual interests, and that B is not aware of their actual interests and the discrepancy 
from their currently held ones. The third face of power therefore describes situations of an overt yet 
false consensus and an absence of grievances. Simultaneously, it also describes situations of latent 
conflict: there would be a conflict between A and B if only B were aware of their actual preferences. 
For the purpose of this study, this differentiation between „actual preferences” and „false prefer-
ences“ is not of relevance; the definition of power utilized here considers either outcome an exercise 
of power. Yet it is worth pointing out that this element of Luke’s conception has been a matter of 
great debate. The assumption that power is exercised contrary to B’s actual interests, as well as the 
assumption that there is something like an actual interest (and that it is evident to outside observers 
yet not the person in question), have been the most contentious part of the third face of power ever 
since the publication of Luke’s book. In a second edition that was published in 2005 and contains 
several new chapters, this caveat about “contrary to B’s interests” was subsequently abandoned my 
Lukes. As he writes there, it “was a mistake” (Lukes 2005, 12) to define power in this way. Power, 
as conceptualized by the third face, can also shape B’s interests in ways that serve B’s actual interests 
and promote their freedom. Examples are many positive forms of paternalism, for example the legal 
requirement to wear seatbelts, as well as parenting, therapies and teaching that utilize manipulative 
methods for the good of the subject (Lukes 2005, 84–85). Another contentious element of Luke’s 
conception is the degree to which it overcomes the behaviorist focus of the first and second face. 
His intention was to step away from “the study of overt and actual behaviour - and specifically 
concrete decisions” (Lukes 2005, 153). The focus of the third face of power was supposed to lie on 
institutionalized or culturally determined patterns of behavior. Yet the conceptualization provided 
by Lukes never reaches this goal: his explanations and examples largely remain rooted in the vocab-
ulary of “A influences B” and utilize concrete decisions. Contrary to what it was meant to achieve, 
the third face of power therefore remains rooted in the idea of power as a product of agency and 
behavior (see Groarke 1993 for similar criticism). 
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only be exercised on the basis of “hard” resources such as economic and military capacities 
and through coercion. It can also take a “soft” form that relies on cooptation on the basis 
of resources such as an attractive culture, appealing values and diplomatic outreach. 
Through this form of power, other actors get to “want what you want” (Nye 2004, 5) – or, 
perhaps more precisely, to “want what you want them to want” (Hall 2010, 206). This 
conception therefore emphasizes the absence of conflict and the creation of consensus, and 
the shaping of preferences. 
The third face of power and the mechanism of changing preferences is visible in numerous 
other areas of the discipline. Next to soft power, the idea of civilian power illustrates how 
attractiveness can be the foundation of power. The concept was introduced in the 1990s by 
Maull who used it to characterize Germany and Japan as “prototypes of a promising future” 
(Maull 1990, 93) in which states commit to multilateral cooperation, invest in supranational 
institutions and refrain from utilizing military force. In proximity to this idea, the concept 
of normative power was developed which describes the “ability to shape conceptions of 
‘normal’ in international relations” (Manners 2002, 239). It has been illustrated with the 
case of the European Union which – through its very existence and the example it provides 
– has been able to promote certain norms and behaviors on the international stage, for ex-
ample the abolishment of the death penalty. 
As was outlined above, this study assumes that the exercise of power always makes a dif-
ference in terms of behavior, and that behavior can be manipulated by targeting perceptions, 
opinions, beliefs, preferences, and so on. By looking at one of these concepts – preferences 
– the differences between these three faces of power can further illuminated. For this pur-
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pose, it is useful to differentiate between first order preferences and second order prefer-
ences17. The former describe whatever preferences an actor has in a given situation. The 
later describe an actor’s preferences about first order preferences. A man who orders a 
burger in a restaurant supposedly acts upon the first order preference to eat a burger. But if 
we assume that this man is on a diet and strives to avoid high calorie meals, his second 
order preference might be to not eat burgers and to not have the first order preference to 
eat a burger. In this case, his second order preference would be to have a different first 
order preference. 
The exercise of power through compulsion and as described by the first face of power 
manipulates first order preferences but does not change second order preferences. Actor B 
therefore behaves based on preferences they would rather not have. The same is true for 
the second face of power. Its exercise takes place through agenda setting and the mainte-
nance of the status quo. The third face of power, in contrast to that, describes the exercise 
of power through the creation of corresponding first and second order preferences. Actor 
B therefore follows first order preferences that suit their second order preferences. For this 
reason, the first two faces of power describe a situation of conflict and disagreement. After 
all, actor A and actor B have different preferences about what first order preferences B 
should have. The third face describes a situation of consensus in which A and B are in 
agreement about the first order preferences that B should have. 
Beyond the work by Dahl, Bachrach and Baratz, and Lukes, the debate on the faces of 
power includes one more argument. This fourth face of power does not fit this study’s 
                                                     
17To the best of my knowledge, the literature on power generally does not utilize the differentiation 
between first and second order preferences. The concept has rather been deployed in the field of 
philosophy (see, for example, Bruckner 2010). A number of authors trace the origins of this differ-
entiation back to a 1971 paper by Harry Frankfurt (1971) who argued that second order preferences 
(or desires, as he called them) are a unique trait of humans that differentiate them from other beings. 
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definition of power and is therefore of comparatively little relevance here. It describes the 
exercise of power through the social constitution of actors, and thereby a power mechanism 
that is more fundamental than what this study is about: the exercise of power through the 
intentional behavior of actors. Nevertheless, it is useful to briefly introduce this mechanism 
here as it illuminates one of the limitations of this study’s approach to power. 
The fourth face of power was conceptualized by Digeser in a 1992 article. He saw a restric-
tive commonality in the existing three faces: they leave open “the possibility for human 
relationships not to be mediated by power” (Digeser 1992, 981). Following the work of 
Michel Foucault on power, the fourth face therefore characterizes power as an omnipresent 
background phenomenon that constitutes subjects and practices, values and norms – which, 
in turn, convey power. Power is thereby not only exercised when the behavior of actors is 
manipulated, as is the case in the first three faces of power. It constitutes actors in the first 
place and is conveyed through knowledge, conceptions of truth, processes of socialization 
and notions of what counts as normal. Power, according to this conception, is not neces-
sarily the result of particular acts of behavior and cannot be easily identified; it is a result 
of “the myriad and infinitesimal mechanisms of our social practices and discourses” (Di-
geser 1992, 985). The mechanism at play here is therefore social constitution. 
The most significant difference to the preceding three mechanisms is the absence of an 
active subject that is in control behind exercises of power. As Foucault writes, his concep-
tion of power does “not concern itself with power at the level of conscious intention or 
decision” (Foucault 1980, 97). Instead, it describes the continuous processes that control 
the behavior and thought of individuals through subliminal means. His term for the fourth 
face of power is therefore disciplinary power. Beyond this disciplining effect, the power 
Foucault describes “is never localised here or there, never in anybody's hands, never ap-
propriated as a commodity or piece of wealth” (Foucault 1980, 98). Power rather exists in 
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the entirety of social interactions whereby individuals are never only the wielder or target 
of power but “in the position of simultaneously undergoing and exercising this power” 
(Foucault 1980, 98).  
In contrast to the first three faces of power, Foucault and Digeser thereby reject the reliance 
on an actor behind the exercise of power, may it be an actual person, a political or economic 
group, an organization, a government or a class. As Foucault writes about the nature of 
power systems: 
[T]he logic is perfectly clear, the aims decipherable, and yet it is often the case 
that no one is there to have invented them, and few who can be said to have 
formulated them: an implicit characteristic of the great anonymous, almost 
unspoken strategies which coordinate the loquacious tactics whose “inventors” 
or decisionmakers are often without hypocrisy. (Foucault 1978, 95) 
Foucault and Digeser, thus, do not speak in terms of actor A exercising power over actor 
B. Their conception of power rather describes the constitution of individuals and their eve-
ryday interactions through power – and the reproduction of this power through individuals 
and their everyday interactions. On the one hand, this form of power is therefore indiscreet 
as it disciplines everywhere and always. As Foucault writes, “it leaves no zone of shade 
and constantly supervises the very individuals who are entrusted with the task of supervis-
ing” (Foucault 1995, 177). On the other hand, this form of power is discreet as it disciplines 
in silence and invisible. Hence, Foucault describes it as a “permanent, exhaustive, omni-
present surveillance” that “remain[s] invisible […] like a faceless gaze” (Foucault 1995, 
214). While disciplinary power therefore affects all of us, we usually do not take notice of 
how we are shaped by it and how we reproduce it. 
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The fourth face of power has received comparatively little attention in IR. In Power in 
World Politics by Berenskoetter and Williams, neither the existence of a fourth face nor 
Digeser’s article are referred to. One of the book’s chapters introduces various conceptions 
of power in political science and devotes several pages to the first three faces of power but 
does not mention the fourth one (Berenskoetter 2007). The same is true for Power and 
International Relations by Baldwin on the concept of power in IR as well as his chapter in 
the 2013 edition of the Handbook of International Relations on the same topic, even though 
the former lists Digeser’s article among its references (Baldwin 2016, 2013). This is not to 
say that the fourth face of power is generally absent from the discipline: a number of authors 
who wrote about power in the discipline in a less generalist way refer to it (see Barnett and 
Duvall 2005, 43; Mattern Bially 2008, 693–94). 
Even though this part of the debate on the faces of power is not as prominent in IR schol-
arship as the other three faces, the underlying conception of power by Foucault has been 
utilized by a variety of authors. It was, in particular, a prominent influence on poststructur-
alist as well as constructivist works, the study of discourses and critical approaches towards 
the mainstream of the discipline. It has also sparked investigations of the power relations 
that constitute the discipline and that infuse with numerous biases its approaches to inter-
national affairs, both as a practice as well as an object of study, as well as towards power 
itself (Fournier 2014; Richmond 2010). 
Numerous other works of IR scholarship follow the spirit of Foucault and build on his 
approach, even though this conception of power is not always explicitly referenced. One 
example is Jackson’s account of the discursive shifts that established the language of a 
“Western Civilization” and of how the West came to be imagined as one civilization along-
side others instead of as part of one universal civilization. This rhetorical construct has 
become commonplace and is powerful in shaping thought about international affairs; yet it 
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came about “in an almost wholly unintended manner” (Jackson 2006, 74). Another exam-
ple is Doty’s work about the practices that constitute North-South relations and produce 
dualities such as first world and third world, developed and underdeveloped, core and pe-
riphery, and industrialized and developing (Doty 1996). 
Foucault’s understanding of power is also visible in how IR scholars conceptualize power. 
It is the basis of what Barnett and Duvall have described as productive power in their matrix 
of power concepts (Barnett and Duvall 2005, 55–57); and it is visible in the idea of norma-
tive power which describes “the ability to define what passes for ‘normal’ in world politics” 
(Manners 2002, 253). Although the mechanism of social constitution is therefore less prev-
alent in the IR literature than the previous three mechanisms, it has informed the disci-
pline’s discourse on power. 
These four mechanisms – or, as structural power is not taken into account here, the first 
three of them – illustrate what forms the exercise of power can take according to the defi-
nition of the term utilized here. As was emphasized in the beginning, these four examples 
are by no means exhaustive. Compulsion, agenda setting, the changing of preferences and 
social constitution represent merely four mechanisms that have received significant atten-
tion in the political science and IR literature on power. And for the purpose of this study, 
only the first three of these mechanisms are actually of relevance. With these examples in 
mind, the figure depicting the power process according to the definition used here can be 
updated as shown in figure 2. As should be noted, the fourth box under the three mecha-
nisms of power that are of interest here emphasizes that there are potentially indefinite other 







There are myriad other mechanisms of power that could be added to this figure. Many – if 
not most of them – overlap with the four mechanisms presented here, yet they usually add 
a unique perspective on what forms the exercise of power can take. Consider the example 
of “communication power” as conceptualized by Castells. It describes the ability “to build 
consent, or at least to instill fear and resignation via-à-vis the existing order” which is “es-
sential to enforce the rules that govern the institutions and organizations of society” (Cas-
tells 2013, 3). The mechanism at play here resembles that of social constitution, but Castells 
emphasizes that communication power is not merely reproduced through social interaction, 
but usually wielded by the state. It also resembles the mechanisms of setting agendas and 
changing preferences, yet Castells does not only concern himself with the shaping of agen-
das and preferences, but with that of the human mind on a more fundamental level. The 
mechanism he writes about could therefore be labeled “norm setting”. 
Another example for a mechanism that could be added to the figure is “attraction”. It is 
commonly seen as the process through which soft power is exercised and has therefore 
been referred to as the mechanism underpinning the concept (T. Solomon 2014, 721). At 
the same time, the process through which soft power is exercised has been linked to various 
other mechanisms of power: to the setting of agendas and the second face of power (Nye 
2011b, 13, 2011a, 14), to the changing of preferences and the third face of power (Baldwin 
Figure 2: Power process with different power mechanisms 
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2013, 276; Berenskoetter 2007, 11; Gallarotti 2010, 25–26; Lukes 2007, 90), to both at the 
same time (Nye 2011b, 16), and to the idea of social constitution and the forth face of power 
(Y. W. Lee 2011; T. Solomon 2014) – or to all of these at the same time (Hayden 2012, 
33). It is therefore anything but clear whether attraction would constitute a mechanism in 
its own right or merely a specific form of one or multiple mechanisms already part of the 
figure.  
2. Emotions: Appraisal Theory and Intergroup Emotions 
The second concept at the center of this study is that of emotions. For the purpose of this 
study, and as was mentioned before, three assumptions about emotions will be established. 
First, that the emotions of individuals affect their cognition, thinking, judgment and behav-
ior. Second, that the emotions of individuals can be manipulated by others. And third, that 
these effects of emotions as well as their manipulation can take place on the individual as 
well as the collective level. On this foundation, it will be argued in the following section of 
this study that the manipulation of others’ emotions plays an important role in power mech-
anisms and enables the exercise of power over the behavior of others. 
It is probably fair to speak of a general agreement – not only among laypeople but also 
among scholars - that emotions shape human life and human interaction. Yet there is con-
siderable disagreement about the importance of this influence of emotions and its relevance 
for research, and especially so in the social sciences. The past decades, if not centuries, 
have seen the dominance of a rationalist approach that has systematically neglected, down-
played or even rejected the influence of emotions (Izard 1991, 1–2; Scheff 1992, 101). 
More recently, and as already described in the literature review, various scientific subfields 
have seen an “emotional turn” that led to a growing recognition of the role of emotions.  
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To pick but one example: whereas it was for the longest time a prominent assumption in 
the social sciences that individuals make decisions by rationally comparing the expected 
utility of the choices available to them, a growing number of researchers now speak of a 
decisive impact of emotions on this process (Loewenstein and Lerner 2003; McDermott 
2004; N. Schwarz 2000). This increasing appreciation of emotions has, nevertheless, not 
produced a consensus about their general nature and impact. Yet it can be argued that they 
have widely come to be considered as having significant influence on human behavior and 
interaction - even though certainly not every scholar agrees with bold assertions such as 
that “of all major psychological processes, emotions are of prime importance” (Zajonc as 
quoted in MacMullen 2003, 54) or that they “constitute the primary motivational system 
for human beings” (Izard 1977, 3).  
Independent of the importance one assigns to emotions, there is no consensus on what 
emotions actually are and how to define them (Frijda 2016, 610; J. A. Russell 2012). In this 
regard, emotions mirror what was already shown for power: agreement on the relevance of 
the concept; a lack of agreement on how to define it. The research on emotions disagrees 
even about fundamental questions, for example about whether the concept itself is scien-
tifically useful, and references to emotion frequently mean very different things (LeDoux 
1995, 209–10; Roddy Cowie, Sussman, and Ben-Ze’ev 2011). There is even disagreement 
about the necessity of a definition: whereas Mulligan and Scherer (2012) argue that the 
absence of a definition leads to fruitless debates and hampers research, Deigh (2012) calls 
into question the usefulness of any definition without an underlying agreement among re-
searchers about what emotions are in the first place. Frijda goes so far as to argue that a 
definition of emotion “indeed is not to be found, and is not to be searched for” (Frijda 2016, 
618) as the term merely describes a group of phenomena that are bundled together without 
obvious selection criteria.  
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Nevertheless, various researchers have attempted to aggregate conceptualizations of what 
emotions are from various sources and to seek out commonalities. Kleinginna and 
Kleinginna (1981) have done so on the basis of 92 existing definitions; Izard (2010) asked 
almost three dozen researchers who have done significant work on emotions about how 
they understand the concept. He latter concluded that, even though there are common ele-
ments to researchers’ definitions, none of them is generally accepted and most research 
relies on operational definitions or other narrow approaches to the term. Of over-arching 
definitions, as proposed by Kleinginna and Kleinginna and Mulligan and Scherer, none has 
found wide-spread adoption. 
 Appraisal Theory and Emotions as Action Tendencies 
This study therefore adopts one particular definition of emotion without assuming that it is 
intrinsically superior to other definitions, universal in its applicability or representative of 
the field of emotion research as a whole. The definition employed here was brought forward 
by Nico H. Frijda in the 1986 standard work “The Emotions”. In the wider field of emotion 
research, his approach is probably the most prominent representative of the “central” or 
“mental” approach to emotions which follows the basic assumption that emotions are, first 
and foremost, a psychological process resulting from phenomena such as cognition. This 
approach is usually contrasted with the “peripheral” or “organic” approach which assumes 
that the psychological manifestations of emotions are the result of physical processes. The 
latter school had initially dominated the field but has since then become less influential 
(Coppin and Sander 2011; Mandler 2003). 
While the mental approach emphasizes the psychological aspects of emotions, it does not 
deny their physiological manifestations. These physiological aspects of emotions include 
changes to hormone levels, heart rate, blood pressure, respiration, the functioning of mus-
79 
 
cles as well as internal organs, the composition of body fluids and overt movement. Differ-
ent emotions produce different physiological responses, even though it is not possible to 
align distinct physiological patterns with particular emotions.  
On the most basic level, Frijda defines emotion as “changes in action readiness” (Frijda 
1986, 466). The term therefore describes the output of a process through which an individ-
ual’s readiness towards certain actions is created, modified or deactivated. This readiness 
describes “the inner disposition (and its absence) for performing actions and achieving re-
lational change” (Frijda 1986, 469). It can concern actual behavior, cognition and the di-
rection of attention and various ways in which an individual’s relation to its environment 
can be altered. These inner dispositions manifest themselves in various modes of action 
readiness, for example the dispositions of an individual to accept, reject, facilitate or end 
an interaction with another person (Frijda 2016, 614–15). 
It is worth emphasizing that the emotion process causes changes in action readiness but 
does not necessarily cause or predetermine action. As Frijda writes, the “link between emo-
tion and action is intimate; yet it is weak” (Frijda 2004, 162). While emotions may result 
in tendencies towards behaviors like crying or screaming, as well as in physiological 
changes such as an increased heart rate, these tendencies are oftentimes suppressed or ig-
nored by the individual because they are not deemed important enough or socially accepta-
ble, or because no appropriate and meaningful action is available (e.g. because the costs of 
acting in accordance with the action tendency would be too high). Nevertheless, emotions 
can also translate directly into behavior, for example through impulsive reactions. 
Just like there is no general agreement on what emotions are, so is there no agreement on 
what different emotions there are. The literature in the field is characterized by a long-
running debate about whether there is a set of basic emotions, according to which all out-
comes of the emotion process can be classified, and about how these basic emotions can be 
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defined. The variety of approaches illustrates the lack of consensus: Izard (1977, 83–84) 
conceptualized ten basic emotions, Tomkins (1962, 337) nine basic affects, Ekman (1992) 
six basic emotions, and Oatley and Johnson-Laird (1987) five basic emotions. On this basis, 
a range of studies have furthermore examined whether basic emotions occur and are rec-
ognized across different cultures (Sauter et al. 2010) and whether the same emotions are 
experienced and expressed in a different fashion across cultures (Eid and Diener 2001). 
Other scholars reject, in contrast to that, the concept of basic emotions as not rooted in 
theoretical or empirical realities (Ortony and Turner 1990).  
Frijda, too, is critical of the concept of basic emotions. He argues that no general principle 
exists through which basic emotions can be defined and distinguished from one another. 
Instead, he proposes a number of fundamental action tendencies that are based on distinct 
patterns of behavior and facial expression. These tendencies usually correspond to certain 
emotions, for example “avoidance” to fear and “inhibition” to anxiety (Frijda 1986, 88). 
For the purposes of this study, these categorizations are of no particular relevance. The 
emotions that are taken into focus in this study, and in particular fear and anger, appear on 
every single of the afore-mentioned lists of basic emotions. It can therefore be assumed that 
the phenomena in the focus of this study have all the hallmarks that are generally associated 
with emotions. 
To return to the emotion process: as was described above, the output of the process are 
changes in action readiness. The input of this process are stimuli18. These stimuli can be of 
an external nature (e.g. a threatening event or cold weather) or internal nature (e.g. hunger 
                                                     
18 As Frijda argues, it might be more appropriate to speak of “events” or “situations” rather than 
“stimuli” in order to emphasize that stimuli usually do not occur in isolation and depend on their 
context. He writes: “Being alone is not the same as being alone after one’s partner died; no food is 
different from no food when food was expected; threat when there is a way of escape is different 
from that when there isn’t” (Frijda 1986, 268). 
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and pain) and become relevant for the individual primarily through cognition processes. In 
order to initiate the emotion process, stimuli have to fulfil two conditions. First, they have 
to arrive in the proper format. One example is that the loss of a loved one in itself is not a 
stimulus that elicits grief. This loss has to become apparent for the individual in a particular 
form, for example through the experience of arriving at an empty house (Frijda 1986, 329). 
Secondly, a stimulus has to be relevant to an individual’s concerns in order to initiate the 
emotion process. Otherwise an individual may well be aware of a stimulus but without any 
emotional reaction to it. 
Following Frijda’s logic, concerns therefore underlie emotions. A concern is “a disposition 
to desire occurrence or nonoccurrence of a given kind of situation” (Frijda 1986, 335)19 – 
or, in other words, whatever an individual cares about. Many concerns are “dormant de-
mons” (Frijda 1986, 336) that come into play only when a stimulus becomes relevant for 
their satisfaction or safeguarding. Our all concern for our physical safety, for example, 
remains dormant unless a stimulus leads us to actually worry about our physical safety. 
Some of these concerns are tied to basic needs and desires, such as physical security, curi-
osity and sexual satisfaction. Other concerns are the result of experiences and socialization 
and relate to specific environments, other individuals, personal values and goals. It is as-
sumed that the strength of a concerns correlates with the strength of the emotion and change 
in action tendency it can cause (Frijda 1986, 340). 
What the presence of concerns in the emotion process emphasizes is that there is no linear 
and predetermined relationship that connects stimuli via cognition to emotion. To empha-
size that stimuli become relevant in relation to concerns and factors such as an individual’s 
                                                     
19 Frijda emphasizes his preference for the term “concern” over supposedly similar terms such as 
“motive” or “goal”. As he argues, neither one of these alternatives is suitable to describe the emotion 
process as they imply a level of awareness and activity that cannot always be found in this context.  
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mood and physical state, emotion researchers prefer to speak of “appraisal” rather than 
“cognition” (Frijda 1986, 269)20. Appraisals evaluate the relevance and meaning of stimuli 
for an individual’s concerns by taking into account various criteria, for example novelty, 
whether a stimulus has a positive or negative valence, the extent to which the individual is 
certain about what is happening and the extent to which the individual is in control of the 
situation (Moors et al. 2013, 120).  
As a result, the same stimulus can lead to different appraisals in different individuals or 
even in the same individual depending on the situation. At the same time, the same apprais-
als usually lead to the same emotion and different appraisals lead to different emotions. In 
other words: stimuli do not determine emotions; the appraisals of stimuli do (Frijda 1986, 
195; Moors et al. 2013, 121). 
Emotions have a clear function: “They serve concern satisfaction; they do so by monitoring 
the relevance of events and by modulating or instigating action accordingly” (Frijda 1986, 
475). Although Frijda admits that this functional heuristic is not necessarily able to explain 
all emotions, he maintains that even those that seem distracting, without a clear purpose or 
outright irrational can oftentimes be interpreted through this lens. What makes oftentimes 
little sense is not the emotion process itself but rather the concerns that underpin it. Addi-
tionally, some nonfunctional emotions can be explained by processes that value gains in 
the short-term over those that occur in the long-term or represent emergency measures that 
prioritize a fast reaction. Thus, emotions are assumed to generally be functional even 
                                                     
20 Frijda’s theory therefore belongs to the tradition of “appraisal theories” that go back to the work 
of Arnold and Lazarus and are among the dominant approaches in the field of emotion research 
(Arnold 1960; Lazarus 1966) They try to differentiate themselves from other theories that merely 
posit a vague and unspecified role of cognition in the emotion process by specifying how different 
emotions are created (Coppin and Sander 2011; Moors et al. 2013, 120). 
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though there are exceptions that can be difficult to describe in terms of utility, for example 
sadness (Frijda 1986, 475–76)21. 
Emotions, therefore, stand in line with other reactions through which the bodies and minds 
of individuals regulate themselves and the relationships towards their environment. Among 
these reactions are basic reflexes as well as reactions to pain and pleasure. What sets emo-
tions apart from most of these reactions is merely that they are “the most visible and com-
plex part of a tall edifice of biological regulation” (Damasio 2004, 56). 
As Frijda argues, emotions furthermore set themselves apart from other reaction mecha-
nisms in that the involvement of passion is their core characteristic. As a result, emotions 
involve a sense of urgency and desire and an interest in a stimulus that “one has to do 
something with or about” (Frijda 2007, 26; emphasis in original). Among the characteris-
tics of emotions are therefore their orientation towards a desired future state and their ten-
dency to take control precedence: to interrupt other processes, draw attention and overrule 
other interests.   
This conception of what an emotion is differs from the everyday understanding of the term 
in at least two important ways. A first difference is that emotion here does not describe a 
physical or psychological state but rather a process. Frijda labels this emotion process as a 
form of “information processing” (Frijda 1986, 453) that appraises stimuli in relation to 
concerns and produces corresponding changes in action readiness. This appraisal process 
                                                     
21 The difficulty of explaining what function positive emotions and their action tendencies serve is 
among the criticisms leveled against Frijda’s theory of emotions. While it suggests itself to connect 
fear with a tendency to flee and anger with a tendency to attack, it is anything but clear what tenden-
cies are the result of joy or contentment. In fact, positive emotions can be interpreted as an actual 
lack of action tendencies and clear urges (Fredrickson 1998; Fredrickson and Levenson 1998, 192). 
Other authors see a clear function in positive emotions, for example as an indicator that things are 
going better than necessary and that attention and energy can be shifted to other domains in order to 
utilize opportunities there (Carver 2003). 
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can take a variety of forms which Frijda describes as “situational meaning structures” 
(Frijda 1986, 195). When we refer to emotions such as fear, anger or joy, we therefore 
describe particular situational meaning structures that are characterized by specific ap-
praisal processes and action tendencies (even though understandings of what exactly cer-
tain terms describe oftentimes differ).  
A second difference to everyday references to emotion is that “emotion” here is clearly 
distinct from “feeling”. The former describes changes in action tendencies that can manifest 
themselves in a psychological as well as physiological manner. The latter refers to an “ex-
perienced action tendency or experienced state of action readiness” (Frijda 2004, 161). 
Feelings are products of emotions and the mental awareness of the emotion process. Thus, 
feelings are “the mental representation of the physiologic changes that occur during an 
emotion” (Damasio 2004, 52)22. Feelings are therefore a possible result of the emotion pro-
cess; but as emotion can occur unconsciously, feelings do not always accompany this pro-
cess. The purpose of feelings: to create mental awareness of the underlying emotions and 
to enable learning experiences (Damasio 2004, 56–57). 
Other terms, too, can be located in relation to emotions. “Moods” are in principle similar 
to emotions and not clearly distinguishable from them. They, too, establish a particular kind 
of action readiness and tendencies within an individual. What differentiates moods from 
emotions is that they are not linked to the presence of a particular stimulus or object but of 
a less directional and more continuous nature (Clore and Gasper 2000, 11; Frijda 1986, 59). 
                                                     
22 Frijda elaborates on what this means by emphasizing that feelings are usually not “experiences of” 
but “experiences that”. The experience of having a particular feeling is usually related to particularly 
objects and action tendencies, not merely to abstract concepts such as fear or anger. As he explains 
with the example of depression, it is “not just described as pain, apathy, and heaviness in the limbs, 
nor is first of all labeled ‘sadness’ or ‘depression’. Rather, it is described as feeling to be living in 
hell, from which there is no escaping, or of being faced with one’s utter worthlessness” (Frijda 2007, 
199–200; emphasis in original). 
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Another term that frequently appears in the research on emotions is that of “passions”. It is 
oftentimes used interchangeably with “emotions” as well as “sentiments” (Frijda 1986, 
103). As was mentioned before, Frijda equates emotions with passions (Frijda 2008, 72) 
and describes passion as “the core characteristic of emotions” (Frijda 2007, 26)23.  
To return to the influence of emotions: while the concept of action readiness is helpful to 
explain the behavior of individuals who experience emotions, it is less suitable to analyze 
individual’s social and political behavior. After all, anger or happiness about social or po-
litical events usually does not translate into immediate changes in behavior. Of interest in 
this context is rather how emotions influence the perceptions, preferences and beliefs of 
individuals that might subsequently shape social and political processes. All these elements 
of mental activity are shaped by emotions, which is why a distinct mode of emotion-steered 
thought can be conceptualized. According to Frijda and Mesquita (2000, 64–68), it is char-
acterized by four features: 
(1) Instrumentality: thinking under the influence of emotions serves the dispositions 
and desires that characterize emotion. Cognition and attention, the creation of be-
liefs as well as their modification therefore are functional for the purpose of reach-
ing certain goals. In this context, thinking can also serve emotions by shaping an 
individual’s self-perception, for example by inducing a feeling of powerfulness 
and superiority. 
(2) Motivational force: the passion and urge inherent to emotions also characterize the 
corresponding mode of thinking – which is why driven individuals are oftentimes 
described as passionate. The motivations and thoughts that spring from emotion 
                                                     
23 In his earlier writings, Frijda also provides a vague definition for passions that distinguishes the 
term from emotions. According to this definition, passions are events that are – like emotions - based 
on a discrepancy between what an individual desires and what it experiences but without the result-
ing action tendencies that characterize the emotion process (Frijda 1986, 101–2). 
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are therefore highly present on the mind and usually resistant to change as this 
might undermine an individual’s action readiness.  
(3) Control of the scope of thought: emotions influence the direction of attention as 
well as the information that comes into focus. The ability to interrupt mental pro-
cesses and behavior has therefore been described as the essential purpose of emo-
tions (Simon 1967, 36). In line with the functionality of thinking under emotions, 
this helps to allocate the available mental resources and prevents unrelated, irrele-
vant issues from interfering. The result can be circular: emotion directs attention 
towards goal-relevant information and makes it seem more important, thus inten-
sifying emotion and increasing the directionality of attention (Clore and Gasper 
2000, 11, 34–35).  
(4) Motivated bias: emotions influence not only what comes to mind, but also how it 
is evaluated, for example when judging the credibility of information. The con-
struction and maintenance of beliefs is biased in ways that support the dispositions 
and desires that are created by emotions. Beliefs that do not fit what emotions in-
dicate are thus oftentimes adjusted accordingly. Emotions and moods can thereby 
be a source of information based on which judgments are made – or, in other words, 
they can function as evidence in their own right (Clore and Gasper 2000, 12, 25). 
On this foundation, emotions can result in the construction of new beliefs, the revision of 
existing beliefs and the increase or decrease of the strength with which beliefs are held. 
This strength of beliefs is determined by multiple factors. Of primary relevance is the de-
gree to which these beliefs matter for concerns. In fact, both the intensity of emotions as 
well as the strength of beliefs depend on their relevance for concerns. In addition, the in-
tensity of emotions in itself strengthens beliefs. Lastly, the anticipation of emotions can 
influence the strength of beliefs: if the prospect of abandoning a belief is assumed to result 
in unpleasant feelings, this only adds to the strength of that belief (Frijda and Mesquita 
2000, 45, 61–63).   
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Emotion can therefore shape the cognition, thinking, judgment and the beliefs of individu-
als in ways that defy appeals to logic and evidence, and especially so when important con-
cerns are involved. As Frijda, Manstead and Bem argue: “When it comes to issues of emo-
tional importance, convincing someone to change his or her existing beliefs appears to be 
a virtually hopeless undertaking” (Frijda, Manstead, and Bem 2000, 3). Emotions also have 
the potential to not only influence but fully determine moral judgments. While these are 
commonly assumed to be the result of rationalist reasoning, it has been proposed that they 
originate from fast and automatically occurring intuitions. The moral reasoning is then 
added as a post hoc construction. Following this logic, moral judgments represent an “Emo-
tional Dog and Its Rational Tail”, as Haidt (2001) put it in the title of a book24. 
Just like emotions can occur without awareness, so can these influences on cognition, think-
ing and beliefs occur without the individual necessarily taking notice. Even without any 
conscious cognition or the presence of notable feelings can emotions influence the creation 
of judgments, preferences, attitudes and beliefs (Clore and Gasper 2000, 13; S. T. Murphy 
and Zajonc 1993; Zajonc 1980). For example, studies that exposed their participants with-
out their awareness to faces with a positive or negative expression could thereby influence 
participants’ judgments of how pleasant or unpleasant they perceived Chinese characters 
which they were shown afterwards. The same effect has been demonstrated in a study for 
                                                     
24 An example given by Haidt for this pattern is incest. Even for the hypothetical case of incest that 
takes place voluntarily, without the chance of producing offspring (as contraceptives are used), of 
posing a danger to the participants (again because of contraceptives), and without any emotional 
harm done (as both parties perceive the experience as positive), most people would judge this be-
havior as wrong. Only after this moral evaluation are reasons for this judgment sought. Similar pat-
terns for moral evaluations that are driven by intuitions and affective reasoning, not by the benefits 
and harms that would occur, have been found for other actions that can be perceived as wrong yet 
are free of harm, for example homosexual intercourse, unusual forms of masturbation, the eating of 
dead pets and the cleaning of toilet bowls with national flags (Haidt 2001, 814, 817). 
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how beverages are evaluated (Dannlowski and Suslow 2006; Winkielman, Berridge, and 
Wilbarger 2005). 
It is tempting to conclude that emotions are a great source of irrationality. In fact, the idea 
that emotions and passions on the one side, and reason and rationality on the other side 
oppose each other has a long history in the social sciences and philosophy (Elster 2004). 
More recent research points towards a more complicated relationship between emotions 
and rationality. Most famously, Damasio has shown that individuals with brain damage 
that prevents them from having emotions and feelings have problems arriving at rational 
thought and behavior (Damasio 1994). They are intelligent, in possession of a working 
memory as well as capable of logical thought and sustained attention – yet they continu-
ously act in violation of what would be considered advantageous to them and socially ex-
pected.  
Damasio concluded that emotions support reasoning and “may be an indispensable foun-
dation for rationality” (Damasio 1994, 200), even though they can also interfere with ra-
tional thought. Emotions help the mind to figure out what is of relevance and to narrow 
down the available options based on past experiences and the emotions linked to them. A 
similar argument was made by de Sousa who perceives emotions as a mechanism to control 
“what would otherwise be an unmanageable plethora of objects of attention, interpretation, 
and strategies of inference and conduct” (De Sousa 1990, xv). These conclusions have been 
taken up elsewhere: political scientists have described emotion as, “inescapably, an essen-
tial component of rationality” (McDermott 2013, 699) and refer to a “consensus that emo-
tion is important to rationality” (Mercer 2010, 3). 
Other scholars are more critical of arguments that link emotions and rationality. As Elster 
has argued in response to Damasio’s claim that rational behavior is impossible without 
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emotions, the absence of emotions and difficulties in behaving rationally may occur in tan-
dem but are not necessarily related to each other (Elster 1999a, 291–92). There is also little 
disagreement that some behaviors are the outcome of emotional urges and violate what a 
rational cost-benefit analysis would dictate. Examples are social norms and expectations 
that impose costs on individuals that lead to no gains in utility (Elster 2004, 43), the moral 
judgments about issues such as incest that were mentioned before (Haidt 2001) as well as 
impulsive reactions to overwhelming emotions such as fear. The answer to the question of 
how emotions relate to rationality is therefore anything but obvious. 
The possible implications of how emotions influence human thought for IR have been out-
lined by Mercer (2010, 210). He follows the argument that rational thought depends on 
emotions and argues that emotions help to constitute and shape our beliefs, that they deter-
mine the strength of our beliefs and provide evidence for what we believe. As a conse-
quence, he argues that all beliefs are “emotional beliefs” and depend on emotions, just as 
products of beliefs do, such as trust and credibility. Many of the core concepts of IR have 
therefore an emotional component, for example deterrence and the underlying evaluations 
of information and assessments of risk. 
In summary, the previous pages have established the first assumption about emotions that 
underpins this study: that they affect the cognition, thinking, judgment and behavior of 
individuals. Emotions do so in reaction to stimuli and in relation to the concerns of an 
individual, the satisfaction of which is the function of emotions. As a result of this process, 
emotions produce tendencies towards certain actions, either consciously or unconsciously. 
These action tendencies are the hallmark of emotions. Following the appraisal approach of 
Frijda, the influence on cognition, thinking, judgment and behavior is not merely a product 
of emotions; it is emotion. 
 Emotion Regulation 
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None of this implies that emotions invariably dominate human cognition, thinking, judg-
ment and behavior. In most situations, emotional responses are “dampened, graded, and 
monitored” (Frijda 1986, 406) to at least some degree through what psychologists describe 
as the regulation of emotion25. This process usually targets either the magnitude or the du-
ration of emotional experiences. As a rule of thumb, individuals strive to produce and in-
crease their positive emotions and try to avoid and decrease their negative emotions (Gross 
2013b; Koole 2009, 14). Yet there are also examples for the opposite. Sometimes, individ-
uals attempt to intentionally create emotions in themselves that would otherwise be con-
sidered negative. One example is the thrill of fear sought on rollercoasters, another one the 
controlled anger that athletes perceive as beneficial for their competitive performance 
(Robazza and Bortoli 2007; Tamir 2009).  
The regulation of emotions can take various forms, can be intrinsic or extrinsic, intentional 
or unintentional as well as conscious or unconscious. It can affect all elements of the emo-
tion process: it can target stimuli by avoiding, seeking as well as modifying situations; it 
can target cognition and appraisal through the focusing of attention and the elicitation or 
avoiding of certain thoughts; and it can target emotional responses, for example by sup-
pressing them until they disappear. The incentive for emotion regulation can furthermore 
come from the inside, as is the case for the human tendency to avoid fear, or the outside, 
for example in the form of social expectations. Even the regulation itself can have outside 
sources, for example social company that helps to avoid specific stimuli or to handle certain 
action tendencies (Frijda 1986, 414–15; Gross 2013a).  
                                                     
25 As is the case for the concept of emotions itself, so is there no general agreement on the meaning 
of emotion regulation. The expanding research on the topic has therefore been criticized for not 
clearly defining what emotion regulation actually is and for struggling to distinguish it from other 
concepts such as emotional reactivity and emotional sensitivity (Koole 2009, 8; A. R. Lewis, Zin-
barg, and Durbin 2009, 86; R. A. Thompson 1994, 27; Zimbarg and Mineka 2007). 
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As emotions shape cognition, thinking, judgment and behavior, it is no surprise that the 
regulation of emotions equally has an influence on these processes. For example, research-
ers have explored the different consequences of suppressing emotions versus reappraising 
situations during the emotion process. One study indicates that people who tend to suppress 
their emotions have social relations that are less close and showcase lower self-esteem and 
a lower satisfaction with their lives than people who try to reappraise situations (Gross and 
John 2003). Another study involving romantic couples indicates that individuals who sup-
press their emotions in conflictual conversations with their partner have a worse memory 
of the conversation’s content than those who reappraise the situation by recalling the posi-
tive aspects of their relationship (Richards, Butler, and Gross 2003). 
Most of the literature on emotion regulation concerns itself with how individuals manage 
their own emotions, and therefore with self-regulation. In the case of this study, the focus 
lies on extrinsic emotion regulation and thereby on the ways in which individuals and 
groups of individuals regulate the emotions of other individuals and groups26. This extrinsic 
regulation of emotions can take numerous forms – in fact, Niven et al. speak of almost 400 
distinct strategies (Niven, Totterdell, and Holman 2009). The academic literature from var-
ious fields has dealt with extrinsic emotion regulation, for example in the context of lead-
ership in organizations (J. M. George 2000), the interactions of parents and children (Ekas 
et al. 2011), of doctors and patients (Francis, Monahan, and Berger 1999), and of prisoners 
and prison staff members (Niven, Totterdell, and Holman 2007). 
                                                     
26 The literature refers to these processes not only as “extrinsic” but also as “interpersonal” emotion 
regulation. As this study concerns itself not only with how individuals regulate each other’s emo-
tions, but also with the ways in which collective actors such as nation states regulate emotions, the 
term “extrinsic” is used instead of “interpersonal”. Beyond that, the term “affect regulation” is at 
times used instead of “emotion regulation”. As most of the literature that is relevant for this study 
speaks of emotions instead of affect, the latter term is employed here. 
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It is therefore not surprising that emotion regulation has been described as a frequently 
occurring phenomenon in political contexts. As Maor and Gross argue: “Politicians regu-
late emotions in order to influence perceptions, preferences, and vote choices, as well as to 
exercise public authority to achieve substantive ends” (Maor and Gross 2015, 10). These 
attempts at regulating emotions can target various elements of the emotion process and take, 
for example, the form of emotional appeals in political campaigns that are meant to influ-
ence the formation of judgments and opinions (Brader 2006; Kühne et al. 2011; Wetter-
grena and Jansson 2013). 
But not only do individuals and groups of individuals influence each other’s emotions; the 
same can be said for social structures (even though they are not taken into account in this 
study). They regulate, primarily through norms and sanctions, which emotions an individ-
ual should value, experience and showcase in specific situations. For example, judges in 
court are expected to subdue their emotions in order to appear rational and impartial, even 
when other people present in court express strong emotions (Bergman Blix, Stina and Wet-
tergren, Åsa 2016). Companies, too, require their employees to engage in what sociologists 
refer to as “emotional labor” and impose rules on them regarding the emotions appropriate 
and necessary on the job (Grandey 2000). On a larger scale, these processes have been 
examined under labels such as “emotional regimes”. The ways in which these emotional 
regimes develop and work have been explored for examples such France during its revolu-
tionary period (Reddy 2001) and for “emotional communities” in the early middle ages 
(Rosenwein 2006).    
For the purpose of this study, the extrinsic regulation of emotions is treated as a means of 
exercising power. This marks a departure from the approach in the existing literature where 
the extrinsic regulation of emotions is usually seen as a means of creating positive or avoid-
ing negative emotion for hedonistic reasons and the sake of itself (Niven, Totterdell, and 
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Holman 2009; Tamir, Mitchell, and Gross 2008). Following the argument advanced by 
Tamir (2009), this study steps away from the focus on hedonistic motivations and, instead, 
concerns itself primarily with instrumentalist motivations. Emotions, then, are not regu-
lated for the sake of creating positive or avoiding negative emotions as a goal in and of 
itself, but to serve a greater cause: the exercise of power.  
What is thereby established is the second assumption that underpins this study: that emo-
tions can be regulated, either intrinsically by the individual that is experiencing the emotion 
or extrinsically by other actors and structural forces. Of particular interest in this context is 
the extrinsic regulation of emotions in an instrumental (instead of hedonistic) fashion, and 
therefore for the sake of exercising power over the individual experiencing this emotion. 
This form of emotion regulation is referred to here as manipulation.  
 Intergroup Emotions Theory 
The two assumptions introduced so far in this study as well as the research on emotions 
and emotion regulation overwhelmingly speak of emotions as a process that takes place on 
the level of the individual. Yet politics in general and international relations in particular 
usually involve the interactions of individuals that organize in groups, may it be as mem-
bers of small elite circles or of large nation states. The third assumption underpinning this 
study is therefore that emotions and emotion regulation can be of relevance not only on the 
level of individuals, but also on the social level of groups.  
This third assumption is necessary as the conception of emotion as a phenomenon that takes 
place purely on the individual level provides little help to understand two facets of our 
social life. For one, this individual-centered approach can hardly explain emotional reac-
tions to situations that are of little relevance for individuals. Why do soccer fans react with 
positive and negative emotions to the success or failure of their team, and correspondingly 
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behave different, even though the events on the pitch can hardly be said to affect their lives 
beyond the stadium (Jones et al. 2012; Kerr et al. 2005)? Why did Americans all over the 
country showcase post-traumatic stress symptoms in the aftermath of the September 11 
terrorist attacks even though the great majority of them was not personally affected (Schus-
ter et al. 2001; Silver et al. 2002)?  
Secondly, to what extent do common references to the emotions of groups actually describe 
a psychological reality? In the media reporting as well as academic discourses it is common 
to refer to states and other collectives as if they have emotions. Examples are media head-
lines that state how “China reacts with anger” (Reuters 2017) to the South Korean deploy-
ment of anti-missile batteries or that “Israel [is] afraid of a few boats” (Munayyer 2017) on 
the way to Palestine with humanitarian supplies. In order to explore whether these attribu-
tions of emotions to collective actors such as nation states describe an actual reality or are 
mere figures of speech, it is helpful to explore the collective dimension of emotions and 
emotion regulation. 
One way of approaching these questions is through the framework of Intergroup Emotions 
Theory (IET). It was developed, first and foremost, by Diane M. Mackie and Eliot R. Smith. 
In the context of this study, IET was chosen for several reasons. First, the framework ap-
proaches emotions from an appraisal-perspective and therefore utilizes many of the as-
sumptions as well as the terminology of Frijda’s conception of emotions. Secondly, IET 
and its assumptions about collective emotions are backed up by the results of numerous 
empirical studies and experiments (Devos et al. 2002, 116–17; Smith, Seger, and Mackie 
2007; Smith and Mackie 2008, 433–34). And thirdly, other authors have already used IET 
to approach issues relating to international affairs and thereby help to inform this study 
(Brewer and Alexander 2002; E. Halperin 2013; E. Halperin and Gross 2011; Sasley 2011). 
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IET is based on the so-called social identity approach towards groups of individuals. This 
approach, in turn, is informed by insights from two other psychological frameworks which 
were developed since the 1970s: Social Identity Theory and Self-Categorization Theory. 
Social Identity Theory posits that individuals not only have an individual identity but also 
social identities through which they consider themselves as members of various groups. 
These groups can be small, for example a family, as well as large, such the nation that an 
individual perceives itself as part of. This self-identification shapes the cognition, thinking, 
judgment and behavior of individuals, for example through favoritism towards one’s own 
group. Individuals strive to maintain a positive social identity, which is why they try to see 
the groups they consider themselves as members of in a positive light. They are furthermore 
receptive to social identity threats, for example when a group they consider themselves part 
of is not recognized or when their own membership to a group is not acknowledged. This 
desire can result in conflict with other groups, especially if status differences between 
groups are seen as illegitimate (Hogg 2010, 797)27.  
The second element of the social identity approach is Self-Categorization Theory, which 
builds upon Social Identity Theory. It takes up the notion that individuals have multiple 
personal as well as social identities and specifies how they become relevant depending on 
the context. Through a process of depersonalization, individuals “come to see themselves 
more as the interchangeable exemplars of a social category than as unique personalities 
defined by their differences from others” (Turner et al. 1987, 50). This process applies to 
                                                     
27 Importantly, these behaviors and especially favoritism for the in-group do not rely on meaningful 
differences between groups. In experiments it has been shown that even group membership based 
on t-shirt colors, coin flips or preferences for specific painters is sufficient to lead to in-group favor-
itism, for example in the evaluation of information and the allocation of benefits. This indicates that 
the mere act of categorizing individuals into groups can be sufficient to create social identities (Billig 
and Tajfel 1973; Dunham, Baron, and Carey 2011; Tajfel 1970). 
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the self-perception of individuals as well as that of others. Which social identities are ap-
plied in this process depends on how easily they are available to the individual and on how 
they fit the situation as well as the relevant social expectations as perceived by the individ-
ual (Hornsey 2008, 207–8).  
What Social Identity Theory and Self-Categorization Theory thereby emphasize: people 
perceive and treat themselves as well as others not only as unique individuals, but also as 
members of groups, and beyond that as stereotypical members of groups. These groups can 
range from formal organizations, such as companies and sports clubs, to lose social identi-
ties like that of a particular ethnicity, nationality or gender. The membership in a group 
becomes part of an individual’s identity; oneself, other individuals, groups and events are 
seen through that lens and in terms of what they mean for the group.  
IET applies this logic to the realm of emotions. Accordingly, the salient social identities of 
an individual are of relevance for the emotions which an individual experiences. Through 
the identification with a group, individuals perceive and appraise situations in ways that 
are different from how they would perceive and appraise the same situations based purely 
on their personal identities. As a result, individuals experience emotions based on how they 
matter to the group, not only to the individual. Intergroup emotions are therefore distinct 
from individual-level emotions as they relate to group-based identities, concerns and ap-
praisals instead of personal identities, concerns and appraisals.  
Beyond this crucial difference, individual-level emotions and intergroup emotions refer to 
identical phenomena that “feel pretty much the same” (Mackie, Smith, and Ray 2008, 1873) 
for the individual experiencing them and cause comparable changes in action readiness. 
Thus, individual emotions and intergroup emotions are broadly similar in their effects and 
function: they regulate individual cognition, thinking, judgment and behavior. The more an 
individual identifies with a group, the stronger the emotions it experiences on the basis of 
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this social identity, and the stronger the effects of these emotions (Mackie, Devos, and 
Smith 2000; Mackie, Smith, and Ray 2008, 1873–74; Maitner, Mackie, and Smith 2006; 
Smith, Seger, and Mackie 2007; Smith and Mackie 2008, 428–29; Yzerbyt et al. 2003). 
What establishes the connection between social identities and intergroup emotions are two 
processes. One is the appraisal of stimuli from the perspective of the group instead of the 
individual. Situations that have positive implications for the group or its members are there-
fore appraised as positive whereas those with negative implications receive a negative ap-
praisal. This process can even lead to a positive evaluation of events that profit the group 
but harm the individual, or vice versa (Mackie, Smith, and Ray 2008, 1870–71).  
The second process is the self-stereotyping of individuals as a group member. The identi-
fication with a particular group leads individuals to experience certain emotions purely 
because of this social identity and based on emotions associated with this group. When 
individuals are asked to consider themselves as members of a particular nationality, they 
might therefore report higher levels of fear than when they consider themselves as individ-
uals. And supporters of one sports team might get angry when encountering supporters of 
another team simply because this emotion has become habitually associated with this social 
identity (Mackie, Smith, and Ray 2008, 1872). 
It deserves emphasis that these intergroup emotions are mentally and physically experi-
enced by individuals who identify with a group, not by some hypothetical group conscious-
ness. Even if all individuals who share a social identity experience the same emotions at 
the same time, these processes take place strictly at the level of the individual. Intergroup 
emotions are therefore collective in that they are based on the identification with a collec-
tive, but they do not describe a phenomenon that transcends the experiences on the level of 
the individual (Ray, Mackie, and Smith 2014, 248). Nevertheless, research suggests that 
the emotions felt by members of a group tend to converge and that intergroup emotions are 
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not only based on group membership but also shared among group members (Smith, Seger, 
and Mackie 2007, 433). 
Intergroup emotions therefore fit the definition of what has been described elsewhere as 
“group-based emotions”. Both intergroup emotions and group-based emotions describe 
emotions on the level of the individual that are based on the self-identification as a member 
of a group. This phenomenon has been contrasted from so-called “group emotions” which 
“occur in and are shared within a collective of interacting individuals at a moment in time” 
(Niedenthal and Ric 2017, 223). Following this definition, the principal difference is that 
group emotions, in contrast to group-based emotions, are not dependent on a social identity 
as a group member. They can occur without the involvement of any identity, for example 
in the form of contagious joy among people who do not consider themselves as part of the 
same group (but just happen to be in the same place at the same time and experience the 
same emotion)28. 
To return to the two questions brought up at the beginning of this section: when we see 
Americans all over the country in shock after the events of September 11 and soccer fans 
in ecstasy after their team scores a goal, these emotions are not (or at least not primarily) 
the result of what the events mean for the individual. Rather, they are a result of what the 
                                                     
28 The precise differences between group-based and group emotions have been defined in various 
ways. According to Niedenthal and Brauer, group emotions refer to an experience that results from 
a shared situation with a degree of interaction among the participants (Niedenthal and Brauer 2012, 
269). Elsewhere, it has been proposed that group emotions differ from group-based emotions in that 
the latter are emotions that individuals feel on behalf of a group whereas group emotions are felt 
about belonging to a group. An example for this kind of group emotion can be the joy one experi-
ences about belonging to a group that is held in high esteem by others or has become associated with 
positive emotional experiences in the past, as Kuppens and Yzerbyt (2014, 1576) argue. Lastly, 
group-based emotions also differ from phenomena such as emotional contagion, and therefore the 
tendency of people interacting with each other to synchronize their emotions, and empathy. Accord-
ing to Hogg, these concepts describe motion processes that take place in an individual because of 
other people’s emotions, not because of the individuals’ shared identity as a members of the same 
group (Hogg 2010, 473). 
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events imply for a group that these individuals consider themselves past of29. Even suppos-
edly mundane situation such as athletic victories that have no tangible effect on the fate of 
other individuals can therefore elicit powerful emotions based on what they imply for a 
group, for example as a foundation for pride.   
In the same vein, when we state that “China reacts with anger” towards South Korea or that 
“Israel is afraid” of approaching ships, this does not refer to emotions that occur in some 
sort of collective consciousness, but to emotions that individual members of these nations 
experience, presumable based on their social identities and not their individual concerns.  
This does not imply that each and every Chinese or Israeli citizen is experiencing these 
emotions. Rather, it assumes that a significant number of individuals showcase this emotion. 
What constitutes a significant number depends heavily on the context and is not necessarily 
based on numbers: when a hundred farmers in rural China are angry at South Korea, this is 
hardly significant; but when all 25 members of the Politburo of the Communist Party of 
China are angry, this is certainly significant and implies that China as an actor in interna-
tional relations does in fact experience anger. 
Beyond the parallels in how emotions based on individual as well as social identities are 
produced, these different kinds of emotions are also similar in that they can be manipulated 
in a variety of ways. The regulation of intergroup emotions can take place in an intrinsic 
                                                     
29 It should be emphasized that this understanding of emotions is based strictly on what situations 
mean for the group that an individual considers itself a member of, not on effects such as emotional 
contagion, sympathy or empathy. Group-based emotions are not felt because of how other group 
members feel but because of what they mean for the group and its members (even though processes 
such as emotional contagion can certainly occur at the same time). For the case of joy in response 
to athletic victories this means: “When our national team wins an Olympic medal, we do not feel 
happy because the individual members of the team are feeling happy and we empathize with them 
as individuals. Rather, we feel happy because the victory is a positive event for our national ingroup, 
a group that helps define our own self” (Smith and Mackie 2010, 473). 
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fashion, when individuals regulate their own group-based emotions, as well as in an extrin-
sic manner, when individuals regulate the group-based emotions of others. Apart from that, 
these processes can be deliberate and targeted as well as without intent and even uncon-
scious.  
Of particular interest in the context of international relations is how emotion regulation has 
been described as a potential strategy to aid the resolution of emotionally charged, often 
intractable intergroup conflicts. For this purpose, “collective fear and hatred must be re-
duced” and “collective hope, trust, and mutual acceptance must be actively fostered” (Bar-
Tal and Rosen 2009, 568). While individuals may be personally affected by these conflicts, 
it stands to reason that many of the emotions at play are actually group-based. As Halperin 
(2013) has argued, the regulation of these emotions can be attempted either through direct 
strategies that aim for a change of the emotions at play, for example through cognitive 
reappraisal, or through indirect strategies that try to change the appraisals that underpin 
these emotions. 
A number of studies provide examples for the direct approach to emotion regulation. Dur-
ing the Gaza War of 2008 and 2009, one study investigated the influence that cognitive 
reappraisal has on the attitudes of Israeli individuals towards Palestinians. Participants of 
the study who reported to frequently deal with negative emotions by changing the way they 
look at a situation also showcased a propensity to be more hopeful about a better future and 
to support humanitarian aid for innocent Palestinians (E. Halperin and Gross 2011). In an-
other study, Israeli participants who had received training in cognitive reappraisal show-
cased a tendency to support more conciliatory policies towards Palestinians than those who 
had not received the training, both in laboratory setting as well as during periods of real-
world diplomatic strive between the two groups (E. Halperin et al. 2013). 
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Other studies have attempted to affect change through the creation of emotions. One ex-
periment in Rwanda measured the effects of a radio soap opera that addresses the lasting 
legacies of the country’s genocide. It tells the story of two fictional communities in Rwanda, 
thereby educating about the roots of prejudice and violence, and the paths to healing in the 
aftermath. While the program had little effect on the personal beliefs of listeners, the sym-
pathy and empathy it sparked in its audience have been associated with more sympathetic 
and empathetic perceptions of particular groups of other Rwandans, such as prisoners, gen-
ocide survivors and politicians (Paluck 2009).  
The indirect approach to emotion regulation with its focus on regulating appraisals, too, 
has been illustrated by a number of studies. Several of them tested the effect of self-affir-
mation on attitudes towards other groups that were previously harmed by individuals’ own 
group. Israeli and Serbian participants were given the opportunity to write about values 
important to them and events that made them proud. This process of self-affirmation led to 
a decreased tendency to react defensively to information that reflects negatively on them-
selves. Crucially, it also resulted in an increased tendency to acknowledge how the partic-
ipants’ respective groups had wronged others (here: Palestinians and, respectively, Bosni-
ans), as well as feelings of guilt and support for reparations. The self-affirmation of indi-
viduals can therefore be utilized to create feelings of guilt and, in turn, allow for reconcili-
ation (Cehajić-Clancy et al. 2011). 
A similar study was conducted in the context of the persistent ethnic conflict in Cyprus. 
The participating Turkish Cypriots were asked to read either a psychological article about 
the aggressive nature of social groups being fixed and unchangeable or an article about this 
aggressive nature being malleable. Afterwards, the levels of anxiety that both groups of 
Turkish Cypriots held towards Greek Cypriots were analyzed. The results showed signifi-
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cantly lower levels of anxiety and an increased willingness to engage with the Greek Cyp-
riots among those Turkish Cypriots who had received information about the potential of 
social groups to change for the better. Again, this result has been interpreted as evidence 
for the potential of emotion regulation – here: the regulation of anxiety - to help solve 
intractable conflicts (E. Halperin et al. 2012). 
Particular attention has furthermore been paid by researchers to the regulation of group-
based emotions among members of a group. For example, the participants in popular pro-
tests against disadvantagement have been described as “passionate economists” who not 
only strive to further their individual interest but also act in response to group-based anger. 
This implies that one pathway to collective mobilization leads through emotion regulation 
and, for example, the creation of anger in fellow group members (Van Zomeren, Leach, 
and Spears 2012). On a more general level, Jasper has argued about the regulation of emo-
tions in groups that: 
Leaders construct situations in part to suggest or allow certain reactive emo-
tions among participants; certain situations demand certain feelings; and a 
central part of sharing cultural meanings is to share feelings. Organizers have 
also done a great deal of work to construct background emotions that shape 
reflex emotions of the moment. Foremost among these background emotions 
are reciprocal feelings among group members. (Jasper 2014, 352) 
What is substantiated by all these examples and theoretical considerations is the third as-
sumption that underpins this study: that emotions and their regulation are of relevance not 
only on the level of individuals, but also on the level of groups. As Intergroup Emotion 
Theory explains, emotion processes take place not only on the basis of individual identities 
but also through group identities. Emotions can therefore be group-based and collective in 
nature, even though they take place on the level of the individual. And just like individual 
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emotions can be regulated, so can group-based emotions be manipulated in a variety of 
ways and in an intrinsic as well as extrinsic fashion. 
In summary, this study bases its understanding of emotions on Frijda’s conception of them 
as a process that evaluates situations in relation to an individual’s concern and produces 
tendencies to react in particular ways. Emotions can be manipulated and regulated by the 
individual that is experiencing them as well as by others, for example by other individuals 
or even groups of individuals. While emotions are assumed to occur strictly on the level of 
the individual, they can – as Intergroup Emotions Theory argues – not only relate to what 
matters to the individual, but also to what matters to the individual as a member of a social 
group. In this case, they are based on group identities. These group-based emotions, too, 
can be manipulated and regulated. 
3. Power and Emotions in IR 
So far, power and emotions have been introduced as separate and independent concepts. 
But as this study concerns itself with the interplay of the two, the ways in which power and 
emotions interact and the relevance of the two concepts for each other still have to be elab-
orated on. As was mentioned before, the conception of power that underpins this study is 
that of a process through which one actor makes another actor behave in accordance with 
the first actor’s preferences. How exactly this process unfolds and what mechanism leads 
to this outcome is largely left open (although four mechanisms were explained above: com-
pulsion, agenda setting, the changing of preferences and social constitution). This process 
was already illustrated through the following figure. 
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Figure 3: Power process 
 
What is crucial in the context of this study: the power mechanism at the center of this 
process can utilize the manipulation of B’s emotions to make B behave in accordance with 
A’s preferences. This is not meant to say that the exercise of power over always involves 
the manipulation of actor B’s emotions and that emotions are always present as an inter-
vening variable30. Rather, this conception of how the power over can be exercised is meant 
to draw attention to one particular form that A’s exercise of power over B can take. While 
means such as economic incentives and threats of violence have received plenty of attention 
in the IR literature, little attention has been given to the role that the manipulation of emo-
tions can play in this context. And even where emotions are likely to have played a role in 
the exercise of power, other explanations were usually given precedence.  
The emotions created, stoked or alleviated through this process can determine B’s behavior 
in two ways. First, emotions themselves can shape behavior. Fear or anger, to pick but two 
examples, can be action tendencies in their own right and override other action tendencies, 
thereby producing specific behavior. Second, emotions can affect cognition, thinking and 
judgment, for example by producing a motivated bias, as was explained in the chapter on 
emotions. As a result, emotions not only produce certain behavior on their own; they can 
                                                     
30 At the same time, one can certainly ask whether all exercises of power over involve emotions in 
one way or another. Although the facts that human beings are inescapably emotional and human 
decision-making and behavior are hardly ever free of emotional influences point in this direction, 
this argument is not made here. One of the few authors who has taken steps in this direction is 
Haeney who has argued that emotions are “even more fundamental to power-over” (Heaney 2011, 
271; emphasis in original) than they are for power to. 
Desire and activity to 
change B’s behavior 
 
Behavior in accordance 
with A’s preferences 
Actor A Actor B 
Power Mechanism  
105 
 
also affect various processes that help to determine the incentivizes an actor faces, for ex-
ample information processing and the judgment of situations. In these cases, one would 
probably not say that behavior was driven by certain emotions, but that emotions played a 
role in the determinants of behavior, such as cognition, thinking and judgment. 
Consequently, one way for actor A to make actor B behave in accordance with A’s prefer-
ences is to manipulate B’s emotions. This is illustrated in figure 4 where the emotions of 
actor B were added as another element in the power process. Between the independent 
variable of this process on the left and the dependent variable on the right, they represent 
an intervening variable that can be necessary to understand the power process. This variable 
has received little attention in the IR scholarship so far (though, as was mentioned before, 
this does not mean that it plays a role in all exercises of power or is always the sole deter-
minant in exercises of power that involve the manipulation of emotions). 
Figure 4: Power process involving emotions 
 
This focus on emotions within the power process can be linked to the examples for power 
mechanisms that were presented above. Three of them will be looked at in more detail here: 
compulsion, the changing of preferences and social constitution. Another one – agenda 
setting - does not receive specific attention as it, arguably, difficult to link this mechanism 
to the manipulation of emotions. 
The first mechanism, compulsion, describes the process of A making B act according to 
A’s preferences and against B’s will. Once emotions are taken into account, this mechanism 
describes A’s manipulation of B’s emotions in a fashion that gets B to act in a way it would 
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prefer not to. At the core of this process lie emotions that can have a compulsive effect on 
behavior. This process is easier to imagine for negative emotions, such as fear, than for 
positive emotions31. A robber who threatens a victim with a weapon changes the victim’s 
first order preference about whether to acquiesce to the robber’s demands yet not the sec-
ond-order preference about which first order preference to have. In other words: through 
fear the victim is forced to act in a way they would rather not act in.  
The idea that emotions can exert a compulsive influence over the behavior of individuals 
is well-established. Frijda refers to this phenomenon as the “control precedence” of emo-
tions, for example over the direction of attention, cognitive processes, the interpretation of 
information and behavior. To him, this control precedence is “the hallmark of passion” 
(Frijda 2007, 28) and gives emotions an “imperative character” (Frijda 2013, 5). It does not 
necessarily manifest itself in an urgency to act; it can also lead to inaction, for example 
through stiffness in the face of a threat. And it even applies to emotions that do not involve 
the pressure to act, to become inactive or some other kind of urgency. One example that 
Frijda provides is nostalgia: it may not result in action, but it may overcome a person 
through a sudden rush and fully occupy the mind (Frijda 2013, 6). 
In extreme situations, the control precedence of emotions can lead to behavior that is the 
result of compulsive short-term preferences. It is intentional, but only in a narrow way. For 
example, a person driven by fear away from a threat does act intentional, but only in regards 
to the immediate goal of escaping the threat, yet possibly without any intention as to where 
safety might be sought. Elster describes this mode of behavior as “action without choice” 
and “intentional but not guided by consequences” (Elster 1999b, 155). Fear is only one of 
                                                     
31 The closest term available to describe compulsive positive emotions might be that of seduction. 
The term implies actor A getting actor B to behave in ways that actor B would otherwise not desire 
to; and while the connotation of seduction is generally negative, it generally involves an emotional 
component and a form of attraction.  
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numerous emotions that can have this effect. Anger, pain, the desire for revenge, shame 
and sexual arousal can exert a compulsive control precedence. In all these cases, it is im-
aginable that the individual experiencing these emotions would rather not have the inten-
tions that result from them. 
A similar argument about the role of emotions – and their manipulation – can be made for 
another power mechanism: the changing of preferences. Especially the fields of consumer 
science and marketing have produced a variety of studies about changing preferences 
through the manipulation of emotions. One focal point has been the question how consum-
ers can be brought into a positive emotional state in order to improve product perceptions 
and produce intended behavior, for example purchasing decisions. Among the means that 
have been researched for this purpose are ambient odors in shopping malls (Chebat and 
Michon 2003), the availability of premium services such as VIP areas (Pullman and Gross 
2004), the importance of aesthetics and usability for online stores (Porat and Tractinsky 
2012), music during waiting periods in service environments (Hui, Dube, and Chebat 1997), 
and music and its relation to the perception of shopping times (Yalch and Spanenberg 2000).  
More complex is the link between the exercise of power through social constitution on the 
basis of influencing emotions32. One approach to this process can be found in the idea of 
emotional regimes. This concept has been utilized by a number of sociologists, historians 
and anthropologists and is, at its most basic, defined as “the social expectations regarding 
adequate emotional expression in any given context” (Gonzalez 2012, 1). Most prominent 
                                                     
32 In the context of Foucault’s conception of power, the fourth face of power and the idea that power 
can constitute individuals, it makes sense to speak of “influencing emotions” instead of “manipulat-
ing emotions”. As was explained earlier, this form of power focuses on structures, not actors. 
Against this backdrop, it is difficult to speak of “manipulating” emotions as this implies some form 




in the literature on emotional regimes are the writings of Reddy who emphasizes that emo-
tional regimes may differ in their content and degree of strictness, but always regulate 
which emotions can and cannot be expressed in certain situations. Emotional regimes are 
therefore normative and prescriptive; they demand conformity and sanction defiance 
(Reddy 2001, 125, 129)33.  
His analysis centers on the emotional regimes in France during the 18th and 19th century, 
on the emotional suffering they caused and on the ways in which they underpinned the 
political regimes of the time. Prior to the French Revolution in 1789, a new sentimentalism 
and an “enthusiasm for emotional expression and intimacy” (Reddy 2001, 146) clashed 
with the existing emotional as well as political regime. The result was a revolution in both 
the political as well as the emotional sphere. Yet the new regimes of political and emotional 
freedom equally led to suffering and collapsed in failure. Subsequently, another emotional 
regime was established around 1794 which was characterized by a “new pessimism about 
the role of emotions in human life” (Reddy 2001, 147). 
As Reddy writes, emotional regimes usually coincide with political regimes, and leaders 
“must display mastery of this style; those who fail to conform may be marginalized or 
                                                     
33 The concept stands in a wider discourse on the social regulation of emotions. A similar concept 
was developed later on by Rosenwein under the title of “emotional communities”. She criticized 
Reddy’s notion of emotional regimes for its inability to account for the simultaneous existence of 
multiple emotional rulesets as well as its reliance on modern constructs such as the nation state. 
From Rosenwein’s perspective, the idea of an emotional regime is therefore not appropriate to ana-
lyze the emotional standards of earlier time periods and their multitude in any given context (Rosen-
wein 2016, 10–11). But as pointed out elsewhere, this criticism might be based on a narrow reading 
of Reddy’s work. Additionally, and as pointed out by Boddice, the concept of emotional regimes 
“essentially does the same job as the emotional community, but with a stronger focus on the power 
dynamic that gives emotional prescriptions within a given community their necessary weight” (Bod-
dice 2016, 22). For these reasons, Reddy’s idea of emotional regimes was chosen for this analysis 
instead of Rosenwein’s concept of emotional communities. Independent of that, the differences are 
probably neglectable for the purposes of this study, just as the various terms used in the literature – 
emotional community, emotional regime, and emotional style – can be seen as overlapping and hav-
ing no fixed definitions (Gammerl 2012). 
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severely sanctioned” (Reddy 2001, 121). This idea hints at the potential for exploring emo-
tional regimes in IR. Obviously, there is no singular political regime on the international 
level that is comparable to the structures of nation states. At the same time, the idea of an 
international community or international society that regulates itself through rules and 
norms is widely established – which may hint at the existence of an international emotional 
regime that shapes behavior on the international stage. 
Little research has been done in this area, but it is easy to imagine situations in which the 
emotional regime of the international society could become visible. For example, natural 
disasters in one country routinely result in expressions of compassion and condolences by 
politicians in other countries. In the same vein, terrorist attacks in one country are com-
monly answered by expressions of shock, grief and resolve. The absence of these emotional 
reactions – or the expression of other emotions, such as joy in the face of natural disasters 
– would go against this regime and most likely be sanctioned by the international commu-
nity. Of course, one could easily dismiss these expressions of compassion or grief as noth-
ing but diplomatic routine and not representative of any underlying emotions. But as Hall 
has already argued, there are equally good reasons to assume that this form of “emotional 
diplomacy” does actually involve real emotions (Hall 2015, 17). 
Many of the mechanisms through which the power over can be exercised can therefore 
utilize the manipulation of emotions, as was shown here for compulsion, the changing of 
preferences and social constitution. It is straightforward to see how this process unfolds on 
the level of individuals and the emotions they experience. It has also been explained, on 
the foundation of Intergroup Emotions Theory, how the same logic applies to groups of 
individuals who experience emotions based on their social identities. The target of the ma-
nipulation of emotions and the power process can therefore be a single individual as well 
as groups of individuals. 
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 Group-Based Emotions and IR 
Yet it is not yet clear how the link from group-based emotions to nation states, the main 
object of study in IR, can be made. After all, states are usually not described as mere groups 
of people. At the same time, they are collective actors – and in that sense they are, at the 
most basic level, groups of people. It is therefore worth pondering whether concepts such 
as group-based emotions can easily be applied to states. One approach to dealing with the 
collective nature of nation states has been outlined by Sasley. He, too, approached the issue 
of emotions in IR on the basis of Social Identity Theory and Intergroup Emotions Theory. 
As he argues for the leap from groups to states: 
A state is of course a large and complex entity. But it is still a group. As such, 
the sense of belonging to the state means that citizens of the state, including 
decision makers, share in their psychological–emotional identification with 
the group enough to react as a group to an event or development. In turn, this 
impacts on foreign policies. (Sasley 2011, 465) 
Following this logic, the state is simply a very large group. What applies to the group-based 
emotions of soccer fans and their emotions therefore also applies to nation states. This has 
been echoed in the example of “China reacts with anger” in the previous section: once a 
significant number of individuals who consider themselves as members of the Chinese 
group react with anger, the state as a whole can be said to react with anger. The emotions 
of states can, according to this conceptualization, be found in their members. They do not 
transcend them, even if they are based on the social identities of group members and not 
on their individual identities. And once a significant number of the individuals who make 




As Sasley continues, we can expect this to hold true in particular whenever a group clearly 
distinguishes itself from another group, for example in situations of conflict. And we can 
expect that the leaders or decision makers within a group are especially likely to be so-
called high identifiers with that group: individuals with a strong social identity as members 
of that group. These lead, act and react in the name of the state, they represent the state 
within the group as well as towards the outside, and they are particularly often in contact 
with the representatives of other groups. But while they may differ from other group mem-
bers (and the wider public) in terms of their position and function as well as their likelihood 
to be high identifiers, they still hold the same social identity and experience the same group-
based emotions.  
Following this model of the state as a group, it is possible to examine the emotions of a 
state by looking at its leaders and decision makers. Not only do they have a high likelihood 
to experience these group-based emotions, they are also the most relevant group members 
for the purpose of analyzing how emotions affect state behavior and policy making. Sas-
ley’s conclusion is therefore that “researchers need not examine the emotions and behavior 
of every member of the group—they can focus on these state leaders” (Sasley 2011, 468). 
This focus on a few members does not imply that they are the only group members who 
experience group-based emotions or that only their emotions matter; it rather assumes that 
state leaders reproduce the emotions of the state as a group through the statements and 
policy decisions they make. In that sense, the number of individuals that are significant for 
examining a state’s emotions can be relatively small (Sasley 2013)34. 
                                                     
34 While Sasley states that the analytical focus of his approach lies exclusively on leaders and deci-
sion makers, some of his other writings imply that the analysis of the larger group and society as a 
whole also has its place. He distinguishes his approach clearly from those that focus exclusively on 
decision makers and argues in the same text that “it requires a study of society as well as of the 
individual leaders who decide for it” (Sasley 2013). It is not entirely clear whether his statement 
about the analytical focus on state leaders is thereby invalidated. 
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This conception of state emotions is only one among several. As Sasley himself outlines, 
there are at least two alternative answers to the question of where we can locate and analyze 
the emotions of states (Sasley 2013). One of them follows the approach of Foreign Policy 
Analysis and the assumption that the behavior of states is best understood by looking at 
decision makers as well as the organizational processes that surround them. Hand in hand 
with that goes attention to the personalities and emotional experiences of the relevant indi-
viduals (Breuning 2007, 46). The emotions of a state are thereby equated with the emotions 
that its elites experience or display. They are not only seen as representatives of emotions 
in the larger group, as is the case in Sasley’s own approach, but as the only group members 
whose emotions are of interest. The group members not part of elite and decision making 
circles are assigned little or no relevance at all.  
One example for this approach can be seen in Hymans’ work on nuclear proliferation. He 
explains the decisions of countries to indigenously develop nuclear weapons on the basis 
of their leaders’ national identity conceptions, and especially so in relation to other states 
of particular relevance for these leaders. These national identity conceptions spawn specific 
emotions, some of which – and in particular the combination of fear and pride – can induce 
“emotional impulsions” (Hymans 2006, 35) that motivate the decision to acquire nuclear 
weapons. For Hymans, the most relevant variable in this process are the national identity 
conceptions and emotions of leaders; the larger public and the collective emotions outside 
of elite circles receive little attention (Hymans 2006, 45–46). 
Another variant of this leadership-centric approach is on display in Hall’s works on emo-
tions in international relations. He focuses on the display of emotions by states and con-
ceptualized them as the result of “politically sophisticated actors operating in strategically 
oriented, institutionalized decision-making environments” (Hall 2015, 9). When we see, 
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for example, a display of anger by the Chinese government, this is a coordinated perfor-
mance of foreign policy elites in Beijing, for example in the form of official statements and 
policy decisions. This display can be motivated by genuine emotions of the participating 
individuals, but it does not have to be. In the case of anger, to pick but one example, the 
purpose of this display is to signal to other actors that that a violation of norms and accepta-
ble behavior has occurred (Hall 2011). 
Both Sasley’s group-centric approach as well as the decision maker-centric approach of 
Hymans and Hall conceptualize the emotions of states as a phenomenon that takes place 
on the level of individuals, even if they are members of larger collectives. The third ap-
proach to the emotions of states takes a different path. It conceives the emotions of a state 
not as an experience of individual members of that state, but as a collective phenomenon 
that transcends individuals. This path was taken by Mercer who argues that the emotions 
of a state “cannot be reduced to the individual experience of emotion” (Mercer 2014, 516). 
He speaks therefore of group emotions (not just group-based emotions) that can be causally 
attributed to individuals but have an ontological existence of their own. In this regard, emo-
tions are similar to norms and culture: they are “neither identical to, nor wholly autonomous 
from, the individuals who constitute them” (Mercer 2014, 521). 
The title of the article in which Mercer advances this idea – “Feeling like a state” – thus 
ascribes a collective personhood to states. This aligns with Wendt’s (2004) observation that 
we, which includes both the public as well as the academic discourse, commonly refer to 
the state as if it were a person. This includes the attribution of various human characteristics 
to states, from identities to goals and emotions. On this basis, Wendt reasons about the 
possibility of understanding the state as a collective organism with a collective conscious-
ness. This conception of the state and its emotions is obviously different from the previous 
two approaches. Hall, for example, rejects this approach: “Because states are collective, 
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institutional actors, one cannot claim that they feel angry—again, they do not have a co-
herent body capable of feeling anything” (Hall 2011, 532). 
The research presented here roughly follows the first approach as outlined by Sasley: it 
perceives the state as a group of individuals which harbor the same – or at least a similar – 
social identity and thereby experience collective emotions. These collective, group-based 
emotions are what is referred to as the emotions of the state. Where this study diverges 
from Sasley’s approach is in the analytical focus. Instead of paying attention exclusively to 
state leaders, as he proposes, it is assumed that relevant emotions can also exist beyond the 
elites. The collective emotions within the group become state emotions once they are sig-
nificant for the state’s behavior, independent of where they occur. If collective emotions 
do not translate into state behavior, they cannot be state emotions; the state, after all (and 
in contrast to what Mercer and Wendt propose) does not have a consciousness that could 
produce them independent of individuals. 
The rejection of the state leader-centric approach (and from Sasley’s focus on analyzing 
them) has two reasons. For one, it is assumed that the collective emotions within a state 
can become relevant even if state leaders do not share them. Once again, the example of 
the Franco-Prussian war illustrates this: the French government was urged to declare war 
on Prussia by public outrage, yet the decision makers did not necessarily share this outrage. 
In the words of Emperor Napoleon III: “even if we had no admissible excuse for war, we 
should be obliged none the less to make up our minds to it, in order to comply with the will 
of the country” (as quoted in Olliver 1914, 321). Secondly, the manipulation of emotions 
for the purpose of exercising power can not only target decision makers but also the public. 
While a focus on state leaders may therefore be warranted in many situations, it is most 
likely not always sufficient to comprehend the emotions of a state and their link to state 
behavior and the exercise of power. 
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Also rejected here is the conception of state emotions as a phenomenon that transcends 
individuals and is not only group-based but takes place on the level of the group. The prob-
lem of this approach: it is largely speculative, provides us with little guidance on how and 
where to look for the collective emotions of the state as a person, and has (to the knowledge 
of the author) so far not been employed for any empirical studies that truly seek emotions 
on a level that transcends individuals. 
In summary, this study therefore understands states as groups of individuals. These indi-
viduals experience emotions not only as individuals, but also on the basis of their social 
identities and the identification with a state. Once these group-based emotions are experi-
enced by individuals who are significant for the behavior of a state, we can say that this 
state is experiencing emotions. These emotions shape the cognition, thinking, judgment 
and behavior of the individuals that experience them – and, subsequently, of the state. The 
focus of this study lies on how these state emotions are manipulated by other states in order 




IV. Methodology & Case Study Selection 
On the foundations laid in the previous chapter, the link between the exercise of power and 
the manipulation of emotions in IR will be illustrated through several case studies. The goal 
of each of these case studies is to showcase through the analysis of a historical episode how 
the manipulation of an actor’s emotions plays a role in changing that actor’s behavior, and 
thereby in the exercise of power. As has to be emphasized upfront, these case studies are 
each linked but not necessarily limited to a particular emotion. Many real-world events can 
be interpreted as involving various emotions at the same time. The case studies are meant 
to single out one emotion that is assumed to have been particularly relevant in the respective 
context.  
The selection of the historical episodes that underpin the case studies was guided by the 
ambition to find examples in which the role of emotions in the process of exercising power 
is distinctively visible, and where empirical evidence suggests that the manipulation of 
emotions played a causal role in this process. The underlying ambition is not to prove the 
existing narratives and explanations of these events wrong - a task that would go beyond 
the scope of this study. The case studies merely aim to shine a light on an aspect of the 
events in question that receives little or no attention at all in the existing literature, and to 
make a case for its relevance. Against this background, the historical episodes that underpin 
these case studies were chosen with several criteria in mind. 
First, all case studies focus on the exercise of power by one nation state over another nation 
state. The reason for this focus on nation states is straightforward: they are commonly as-
sumed to be the primary actors in international relations. This provides the easiest way to 
engage with the IR mainstream. A second criterium for the selection of the case studies 
was the intentional exercise of power. There is, as was explained in the previous chapter, 
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not general agreement about whether the concept of power over should describe only in-
tentional exercises of power or also include the unintentional exercise of power. Yet the 
understanding of power in this study as well as the case studies conceptualize power as a 
process driven by intentional actions. This focus on intentional exercises of power ensures 
the selection of historical episodes in which the link between power and emotions cannot 
easily rejected as a collateral consequence or simply luck.  
The last criterium based on which the case studies were selected is the ambition to illustrate 
the relevance of a diverse set of emotions for exercises of power. The historical episodes 
in focus were therefore chosen with the ambition to present different emotions. The fol-
lowing case studies therefore deal with relatively intuitive emotions, such as fear and anger, 
but also with more complex phenomena that involve emotions, such as shock. Through 
these choices, this study aims to deal with emotions that already feature in the IR literature, 
such as fear, but also with phenomena that have not yet received much attention. 
The examination of these cases does not restrict itself to a single level of analysis. As the 
afore-mentioned case of Bismarck’s provocation of a war with France illustrates, the exer-
cise of power through the manipulation of emotions can take place on several levels sim-
ultaneously, and the processes on these levels can influence one another. Whereas the ex-
ample of the Franco-Prussian War in 1870 was set in motion by Bismarck as an individual, 
it incited French public opinion, and therefore unfolded its influence on the collective level. 
Neither the general argument made here nor the specific case studies are therefore tied to a 
single of the levels of analysis as they are commonly used in IR scholarship. 
Similar to Hall’s (2015) case studies on displays of emotional diplomacy, the case studies 
will rely on a descriptive-interpretive approach that aims at the triangulation of evidence 
from various sources. These will include second-hand accounts from the academic litera-
ture and, where possible, first-hand accounts of the involved actors (biographies, reports, 
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speeches, memorandums, etc.). The goal is to provide a narrative that goes beyond what 
has been presented in the work of authors such as Petersen (2011) whose formalized treat-
ment of power and emotions in a game-theoretical model was criticized for neglecting the 
“ideological and discursive schemas” behind the events and “the constant feedback among 
emotion, belief, and action” (Wertheim 2012).  
At the same time, this approach does not claim the ability to provide absolute proof for the 
existence of specific exercises of power and the causal relevance of specific emotions. Nei-
ther power nor emotions and their effects on cognition, thinking, judgment and behavior 
are visible to the naked eye, after all. The goal of the case studies is therefore not to provide 
an objective, positivist account of the events in question, but merely – and like all interpre-
tive inquiry – one that is “worthy of trust and written up convincingly” yet remains “open 
to alternate or more expansive interpretations” (Angen 2000, 392). This process inevitably 
goes beyond what is visible in historical records and relies on interpretation. 
In this sense, the approach taken in this study represents the notion of heuristic research. 
As Diesing defines the term, it describes a “loosely systematic procedure for investigation 
or inquiry that gives good results eventually and on the whole, but does not guarantee them 
in any particular case and certainly cannot promise 'optimum' results” (Diesing 2017, 15). 
This form of research cannot always rely on guiding rules as the descriptions of power and 
emotions inevitably rely on interpretations on the side of the researcher. What counts as 
evidence, what conclusions are drawn and what is considered as truth “ultimately can be 
accredited only on the ground of personal knowledge and judgment” (Moustakas 1990, 33).  
At the bottom of this methodological approach lies the assumption that the emotions rele-
vant in a given situation – and regardless of whether they are of an individual or collective 
nature – are accessible for outside observers. While emotions per se may be invisible, they 
are among the factors that shape decisions and become thereby discernable in behavior. 
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This approach follows the logics of Classical Pragmatism and Symbolic Interactionism, 
and the assumption that the ideas that motivate behavior become accessible by focusing on 
their practical consequences. In other words: emotions cause behavior, and as different 
emotions cause different behavioral patterns, the observation and interpretation of behavior 
allows for inferences about the underlying emotions (Fields, Copp, and Kleinman 2006, 
173–74; Hochschild 2012, 28–29; Zeelenberg and Pieters 2006).   
120 
 
V. Shock  
1. Shock to Surrender: The US and Japan 
The first case study concerns itself with the shock created by the two nuclear bombs 
dropped by the United States on Japan during the last days of World War II in August 1945. 
A few months earlier, in May of that year, Nazi Germany had surrendered to the Allied 
powers. The focus of the war therefore shifted to the Pacific theater and the struggle against 
Japan. At the Potsdam Conference in July and August, representatives of the United States, 
the United Kingdom and the Republic of China presented the Japanese government with a 
choice: to accept “unconditional surrender” or to face “prompt and utter destruction” (Na-
tional Diet Library of Japan 2003)35. The Japanese government ignored this ultimatum and 
issued no official response. For US President Truman this was not a surprise. He did not 
expect the Japanese to accept the offer, as he wrote in his diary the day before. The decla-
ration was merely a final chance for the Japanese to change course – and a final warning 
that would justify the use of nuclear weapons (Truman 1945a). 
Eleven days after the Potsdam Declaration, on August 6 the United States dropped a nuclear 
bomb on Hiroshima. Three days later, another and even more destructive nuclear bomb 
                                                     
35 Although among the victorious powers of the Second World War, the Soviet Union did not sign 
the Potsdam Declaration, as the message to Japan became known as. Formally, the country was still 
bound to the neutrality act it had signed with Japan in 1941. Signing the declaration would therefore 
represented a declaration of war. Historical records suggest that the Soviet delegation to the Potsdam 
Conference was willing to take this step and participate in a declaration demanding unconditional 
surrender from Japan. Yet the signatories of the Potsdam Declaration did not involve the Soviet 
delegation in the drafting process of the document and did not seek its signature. This was driven by 
strategic considerations on the American side: keeping the Soviet Union out of the loop would allow 
the US to issue a final warning to Japan, acquire a justification for dropping a nuclear bomb and 
allow it to end the war against Japan on its own terms before the Soviet Union would even declare 
war (Hasegawa 2005, 156, 161). 
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was dropped on Nagasaki. Less than a week after this second explosion, the Japanese gov-
ernment announced its surrender and acceptance of the conditions set out in the Potsdam 
Declaration (with some reservations regarding the future of the Japanese monarchy). This 
decision was, at least in part, the result of the destructiveness on display36. Ever since, 
nuclear bombs have therefore become a symbol of ultimate material power. Yet this focus 
on the damage done by the bombs, the hundreds of thousands of casualties they caused and 
the devastation they left in Hiroshima and Nagasaki leaves little space for another aspect 
of these weapons: their emotional impact.  
This is not to say that this psychological dimension has not been taken into account by 
established narratives about the events in August 1945. Numerous authors have argued that 
the effect of the two nuclear bombs was just as much of a psychological nature as it was 
material (Asada 1998), and that American decision makers were intent on maximizing this 
psychological impact, even at the cost of the bombs’ material effect (Alperovitz 1995, 523–
24; McNelly 2000). These arguments are usually made without explicit reference to emo-
tions, yet the relevance of emotions is implied in phrases such as that the atomic bombs 
were meant “to shock them to surrender” (Rhodes 1986, 697) and that they “succeeded in 
[…] shocking Japan into surrender” (Freedman and Dockrill 2004, 80). This study there-
fore takes these accounts as a starting point for a more extensive exploration of and em-
phasis on the role that the manipulation of emotions played during this exercise of power. 
In theoretical terms, the dropping of the nuclear bombs represents an exercise of power by 
the United States over Japan. It was intentional, successful and achieved the American goal 
                                                     
36 It is a matter of ongoing dispute whether the nuclear bombs or the Soviet declaration of war against 
Japan on August 8th – and therefore between the detonations of the two nuclear bombs - was the 
decisive reason for the decision to surrender. This study follows the more common narrative accord-
ing to which the nuclear bombs provided the decisive impulse. The dispute about this question will 
be briefly elaborated on at the end of this chapter. 
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of making Japan do something it would otherwise not have done: surrender. The mecha-
nism at play was that of compulsion. Not only did Japan do something it would otherwise 
not have done, it did so against its will and because the consequences of non-compliance 
were seen as not bearable. And as this case study illustrates, this compulsion took place on 
the basis of creating a particular emotion: shock. 
The focus of this case study lies therefore on the concept of shock. In its common use, the 
term is usually not understood as describing an emotion. Yet various scholars have referred 
to shock as an emotion, among them Frijda who links it to the action tendency of “inter-
ruption” and considers “reorientation” the purpose of shock (Frijda 1986, 88; TenHouten 
2007, 89; Zammuner and Frijda 1994). Even under the assumption that shock is not an 
emotion in itself, it is telling that the term is usually defined through terms that either de-
scribe emotions or emphasize the emotional nature of shock. One example is the definition 
of shock as “a sudden emotional disturbance” (R. C. Solomon 2008, 205) or “affective 
reaction” (TenHouten 2017, 98), another one the idea that shock simply describes the com-
bination of surprise and disgust (TenHouten 2007, 89–90).  
Apart from the reference to shock as an emotion or an emotional phenomenon, what unites 
many definitions of the term is that they refer to it as a reaction to something that is not 
only unanticipated but also negative. TenHouten has therefore described shock as a reaction 
to an event that is “unacceptable, even disgusting, and which diminishes one's personal 
and/or social identity” (TenHouten 2017, 98) or to “violations of one's territorial domain 
or of one's sociomoral boundaries” (TenHouten 2013, 21). Yet there are also exceptions to 
the idea that shock refers only to events that are undesirable. Frijda, for example, refers to 
shock simply as the “response to something sudden” (Frijda 1986, 79), independent 
whether it is positive or negative. 
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The terminology surrounding shock is anything but clear. Most authors consider surprise 
an element of shock; others see shock and surprise as different outcomes of a similar pro-
cess. Following this logic, Ortony et al. describe both shock and surprise as the result of an 
unanticipated event. If this event is undesirable, the result is shock; if it is desirable, the 
result is surprise (Ortony, Clore, and Collins 1990, 126). Lastly, shock has also been de-
scribed as a phenomenon that produces and stimulates emotions, either positive or negative, 
but does not describe an emotional phenomenon in its own right. In the words of TenHouten, 
shock represents therefore a disturbance of emotions and it is possible to “shock the emo-
tions” (TenHouten 2007, 90, 2013, 21). 
Shock has also been linked to a number of other emotions. Disgust was already mentioned 
above as a potential foundation of shock. Two other emotions that have been linked to 
shock are fright and fear. As Casimir argues, the former is the immediate reaction to the 
shock of a dangerous situation and usually results in either startlement or flight. If the 
source of danger and cause of the initial shock persist, the outcome can be fear (Casimir 
2009, 60). Another emotion that has been presented as a product of shock is resentment. 
As TenHouten theorizes, resentment occurs in reaction to shocking violations of social and 
moral standards. Yet shock alone is not sufficient as a foundation for resentment; it also 
requires contempt and outrage (TenHouten 2013, 21–22). 
Against the backdrop of these disagreements, this study strives to follow an intuitive un-
derstanding of shock. It considers shock as an emotion that occurs in reaction to an unan-
ticipated event which is perceived to be negative. Following Frijda’s conception of shock, 
the immediate effect of shock is the interruption of a present state. The purpose and the end 
result of shock are “reorientation” and an adaptation to the shock-producing circumstances 
(Frijda 1986, 88). Shock can go hand in hand with other emotions, such as disgust, fear and 
resentment, but a universal and clear causal link is not assumed here. 
124 
 
With this conception of shock as an emotion in mind, this case study is intended to show-
case how American decision-makers intended to exercise power over Japan by creating the 
greatest possible shock; and how the shock of the atomic bombs played a role in convincing 
the Japanese leadership to accept and admit defeat (even though this shock it not necessarily 
the only factor that led to the Japanese surrender). Support for this argument can be found 
both in American considerations prior to the dropping of the bombs as well as in the Japa-
nese reactions afterwards. 
That the nuclear bombs were intended to have not only a material impact but also an emo-
tional effect is visible in various documents and statements detailing the preparations of the 
atomic bombs’ use in the United States. As Leslie Groves, the director of the Manhattan 
Project, outlines in his biography, the primary target of the atomic bomb was meant to be 
“the will of the Japanese people to continue the war” (Groves 1962, 267). The effect on the 
country’s military capacity was only a secondary consideration. Alperovitz (1995, 165) and 
Strong (2005, 17) equally made the argument that Japan’s military situation was perceived 
as so desolate and the American public so war-weary by decision makers in Washington, 
D.C. that a massive shock was perceived as both urgently necessary and sufficient to push 
the country into surrender. 
Memorandums from meetings of the committee tasked with selecting potential targets for 
the bombs in Spring and Summer 1945 illustrate this argument. Both military officers and 
scientists working on the Manhattan Project took part there. As the notes from a meeting 
on May 11 and 12 show, the potential psychological impact of dropping the bombs on 
various cities was given “great importance”, with “the greatest psychological effect against 
Japan” and the image created in the international public being important considerations. 
The detonations had to be “sufficiently spectacular” (National Security Archive 1945d, 6). 
Among the possible destinations for the atomic bomb, Kyoto stood therefore at the top of 
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the list of potential targets as of May 1945 due to the effect that the city’s devastation was 
assumed to have on the Japanese elites and decision-makers (National Security Archive 
1945d, 5). The city was seen as the country’s intellectual center with people “being more 
highly intelligent and hence better able to appreciate the significance of the weapon” (Na-
tional Security Archive 1945d, 6)37.  
Similar considerations were made in a meeting on May 31 of the so-called Interim Com-
mittee, which followed up on the target selection committee and was run by Henry L. Stim-
son, the Secretary of War. As the memorandum states, the participants concluded that “we 
should seek to make a profound psychological impression on as many inhabitants [of Japan] 
as possible” (National Security Archive 1945c, 14). In the same meeting, Robert Oppen-
heimer, the head of the Los Alamos Laboratory which ran the Manhattan Project, “stated 
that the visual effect of an atomic bomb would be tremendous”. It “would be accompanied 
by a brilliant luminescence which would rise to a height of 10,000 to 20,000 feet” (National 
Security Archive 1945c, 13). At the same time, it was emphasized in the meeting that the 
bomb’s effect on Japan’s military capabilities would “not be much different” (National 
Security Archive 1945c, 13–14) from the damages the ongoing air campaigns with con-
ventional weapons were already causing.  
The American perception at the time was that a further extension of conventional warfare 
would be insufficient to force Japan into surrender. As General George C. Marshall, at the 
time the Army’s Chief of Staff, was quoted: “It destroyed the Japanese cities, yes, but their 
morale was not affected as far as we could tell, not at all” (as quoted in Mosley 1982, 337). 
                                                     
37 Ultimately, Kyoto was not chosen as a target for the atomic bombs. Various explanations for this 
decision focus on the lack of military targets in Kyoto. These accounts have been called into question 
as the bomb’s ultimate destinations in Hiroshima and Nagasaki were equally large civilian centers. 
An alternative explanation is that Henry L. Stimson, Secretary of War at the time, took Kyoto off 
the list due to personal sentimentalities for a city he had visited several times himself, possible even 
for his honeymoon (Wellerstein 2014). 
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As even large-scale material destruction did not yield the intended results, the need for a 
different approach became apparent in order to destroy Japanese morale and evoke a 
change of stance. To Marshall, “it seemed quite necessary, if we could, to shock them into 
action” (as quoted in Mosley 1982, 337).  
As the reasoning behind the selection of Kyoto as a potential target already implies, the 
target of these shocks was, first and foremost, the Japanese elite. Stimson therefore wrote 
of a “shock on the Japanese ruling oligarchy” with the goal of “strengthening the position 
of those who wished peace” (Stimson 1947, 105). The goal was to create a window of 
opportunity for the liberal forces among Japan’s elites to push for surrender – a position 
that was markedly different from Stimson’s perception of Nazi Germany where he did not 
even see a liberal element among those in power that could be targeted (Winters 2009, 106).  
These ambitions had practical implications in the weeks before the atomic bombs were 
dropped in August 1945. Several meetings of the Interim Committee concluded that the 
Japanese could not be given any warning prior to the deployment of the bomb (National 
Security Archive 1945c, 14, 1945a, 1). Furthermore, there should be “no revelation to Rus-
sia or anyone else [...] until the first bomb had been successfully laid on Japan” (National 
Security Archive 1945b, 2), as Stimson argued in front of President Truman. In the run-up 
to the deployment of the atomic bombs, even the dropping of leaflets with warnings over 
Japanese cities was stopped in order to maximize the surprise of the explosions (McNelly 
2000, 138). Stimson explained in a meeting with Truman also his worries about the large-
scale bombardment of the cities designated as potential targets for the atomic bomb with 
conventional weapons. As he worried, too much destruction might rob the bomb of a “fair 
background to show its strength” (National Security Archive 1945b, 3).  
It is noteworthy that during the process leading up to the deployment of the atomic bombs 
all kinds of other considerations were made about how to maximize their psychological 
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impact. Among these was the idea to drop multiple bombs simultaneously on different tar-
gets, which ultimately was not feasible (Strong 2005, 3). Another idea implied by Oppen-
heimer in a phone call with Groves was to emphasize the bomb’s visual effect by dropping 
it at night, which was “very desirable” but “unfortunately” not possible to ensure the safety 
of the plane carrying the bomb (as quoted in Reed 2013, 394). Even the palace of the Jap-
anese Emperor was taken into consideration as a target. It had “a greater fame than any 
other target” (National Security Archive 1945d, 6), yet there was little strategic value to 
bombing it. This idea never made it beyond the target selection committee.  
With an eye on these assumptions made on the American side, Freedman therefore speaks 
of a strategy of shock. During their deliberations on “the most effective use of the bomb”, 
policy makers and generals concluded that its deployment should not aim for a maximiza-
tion of destruction but rather be “aimed at maximizing its shock value” (Freedman 1978, 
77). As Stimson concluded two years later, “the atomic bomb was more than a weapon of 
terrible destruction; it was a psychological weapon” (Stimson 1947, 103). His Assistant 
Secretary of War, John J. McCloy, made the same argument in hindsight. He emphasized 
the element of surprise as an integral part of the bomb’s effect and concluded that there 
“has never been a surprise to equal it since the Trojan horse” (as quoted in Newman 1995, 
103). 
This is not to say that no other considerations were made about the nuclear bombs, aside 
from their emotional impact. Among the targets taken into consideration were also several 
that had, first and foremost, strategic value. Among those were Yokohama as an industrial 
area, the Kokura arsenal which produced heavy weapons, and Niigata with its large port 
(National Security Archive 1945d, 5). Yet urban centers were at the top of the list of po-
tential targets. Rather oddly, President Truman wrote in his diary about the desire to avoid 
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civilian casualties. Ten days before the first bomb was dropped, he penned down that the 
target “will be a purely military one” (Truman 1945a)38.  
Nevertheless, the statements, documents and recollections above indicate that American 
policy makers, scientists and generals perceived the atomic bomb as a weapon that would 
have its effect not only on the material level but also in the realm of emotions. The core 
ingredients of shock, that is: surprise and the evocation of fear and terror, are visible in the 
American considerations about the deployment of the bomb. Obviously, this is only the 
American perspective. Whether the atomic bomb actually had the intended effect on the 
Japanese side is another question.  
Statements by some of those who were present when the decision to surrender was made 
indicate that the atomic bomb had a psychological impact on the policy makers in Tokyo. 
Obviously, there was no physical impact to expect as both Hiroshima and Nagasaki are 
several hundred kilometers away from Tokyo. Yet the statements of the decision makers in 
the Japanese capital about their memories are indicative. In an interview conducted in No-
vember 1945, the Emperor’s closest advisor Kōichi Kido spoke of a “psychological mo-
ment” and a “psychological shock” (as quoted in Asada 1998, 498) that enabled the push 
for surrender, against the intentions of the military leadership. This surprise and shock are 
also visible in other statements. Kawabe Torashiro, at the time the Japanese Army’s Deputy 
Chief, reminisced that a “surprise attack with this new weapon was beyond our wildest 
dreams” (as quoted in Asada 1998, 504–5). 
                                                     
38 Even after tens of thousands of civilians in Hiroshima had died, he announced to the American 
public in a radio speech on August 9th that “the first atomic bomb was dropped on Hiroshima, a 
military base” and that “we wished in this first attack to avoid, insofar as possible, the killing of 
civilians” (Truman 1945b). 
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The element of surprise is equally emphasized by historians. While Japan was aware of the 
possibility and potential of nuclear fission, even scientists tasked with the development of 
new weapons were unaware that the United States had developed and was in possession of 
atomic bombs (De Groot 2004, 92–93). The effect of the Manhattan Project’s extensive 
secrecy was therefore that the atomic explosions came as a complete surprise to the Japa-
nese people and leadership39. While the entry of the Soviet Union into the Pacific War was 
seen in Tokyo as a possibility that could turn the tide against Japan, nuclear warfare was 
not among the factors taken into consideration in Tokyo (Hatano 2007, 95; Asada 1998, 
504). 
With the factional conflicts within Japan’s political and military leadership in mind, Butow 
has made the argument that the shock of the atomic bombs enabled one faction among 
Japan’s decision makers to overrule the other and thereby to push for surrender: 
The real significance of the explosions over Hiroshima and Nagasaki and the 
Soviet clash into Manchuria was that these events produced a shock great 
enough to [...] force everyone [...] to acknowledge a fact which could no 
longer be denied. It was not that the military men had suddenly become rea-
sonable [...] it was rather that they, like the machinery of government with 
which they had been tinkering, had momentarily been caught off balance. (Bu-
tow 1954, 180) 
                                                     
39 While the history and unfolding of the Manhattan Project are not per se part of the decision-
making process behind the atomic bombs’ deployment, they are nevertheless instructive for how the 
United States intended to use them. As Groves wrote in his memoirs, among the overarching goals 
of the Manhattan Project’s secrecy was “to ensure a complete surprise when the bomb was first used 
in combat“ (Groves 1962, 141). 
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Similar words were chosen by Freedman and Dockrill to characterize the impact of the 
atomic bombs on Japan’s decision makers. They were “caught off guard by the news of 
Hiroshima and […] never recovered their balance” (Freedman and Dockrill 2004, 66).  
These metaphors have to be interpreted in the context of how the military leadership what 
perceiving the country’s situation vis-à-vis the United States. As Kantarō Suzuki, at the 
time Prime Minister of Japan, explained during interrogations in late 1945, the decision 
makers “did not believe that Japan could be beaten by air attack alone” (as quoted in Kort 
1998, 358). Consequently, the military was expecting an American invasion of the Japanese 
mainland and preparing with all means available. When the nuclear bomb was dropped, 
this calculus about air attacks was proven to be wrong. And once it was obvious that the 
United States “need not land when it had such a weapon” (as quoted in Kort 1998, 358), 
the military’s strategy for defending Japan fell apart. 
A similar point was made in the report by the United States Strategic Bombing Survey 
(USSBS), a panel of experts tasked with (among other things) evaluating the effects of the 
atomic bombs on Japan. As one of the reports produced by the USSBS argues, the bombs 
were able “to break the deadlock within the government over acceptance of the Potsdam 
terms” (United States Strategic Bombing Survey Morale Division 1946, 28). Among the 
reasons cited is that the superiority of the American forces on display allowed the Japanese 
government to surrender without embarrassing its military leadership. As Hisatsune Sa-
komizu, at the time the Prime Minister’s chief secretary, is quoted in the report: “Without 
the atomic bomb it would be impossible for any country to defend itself against a nation 
which had the weapon” (as quoted in United States Strategic Bombing Survey Morale Di-
vision 1947, 99), thus making it pointless to continue to fight.  
Apart from the military leadership, which voiced opposition to surrendering and accepting 
the Potsdam terms until the very end, the atomic bomb’s effect among the elites is primarily 
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linked to Emperor Hirohito. While Japan’s head of state had for centuries taken a passive 
role in Japan’s political dealings, he actively intervened twice during the last days of the 
war, urging the cabinet of Prime Minister Suzuki to surrender. This step has been inter-
preted as decisive for overcoming the military leadership’s resistance (see Winters 2009, 
107) – and as highly unusual. In the words of Edwin O. Reischauer, it represented “the one 
clear expression of a Japanese Emperor’s will since ancient times” (as quoted in Butow 
1954, vi).  
The decision by the Emperor to leave behind the traditional political passivity of his office, 
to speak out and to oppose the military leadership has been linked by historians to the shock 
of the atomic bombing. In the words of Large, they created – together with the Soviet Un-
ion’s entry into the Pacific War - “the extreme national emergency that made it possible 
for the Emperor to intervene effectively on behalf of surrender” (Large 1992, 125). Or, in 
the more prosaic words of Winters:  
The sudden transformation of this conservative emperor into a revolutionary 
leader, seizing the entire nation’s power, as well as its fate, in his own unac-
customed hands, had been effected by the shock of the American display of 
unraveling the tiny atom of uranium. (Winters 2009, 121) 
The atomic bombs, obviously, not only affected the elites in Tokyo but, first and foremost, 
the civilian residents of Hiroshima and Nagasaki and the surrounding areas. While the vic-
tims were not part of the decision-making process that led to Japanese surrender, their re-
actions are nevertheless illustrative for understanding the effects of the bombs. In the con-
text of the USSBS, several hundred interviews were conducted in the affected areas in late 
1945. Beyond the physical damage and suffering caused by the bombs, the panel’s final 
report describes the primary reaction of survivors as “uncontrolled terror” and “sheer horror” 
(United States Strategic Bombing Survey Morale Division 1946, 23) – but, curiously, also 
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admiration of the science underlying the technology of the bombs (United States Strategic 
Bombing Survey Morale Division 1947, 93–94).  
Opinion surveys conducted before and after the dropping of the nuclear bombs in Hiro-
shima and Nagasaki furthermore indicate that they affected public opinion and morale, 
helping to convince significant parts of the affected populations that defeat was inevitable 
(United States Strategic Bombing Survey Morale Division 1946, 24). It is noteworthy that 
these effects on morale and public perceptions were most pronounced in Hiroshima and 
Nagasaki, and that they were significantly weaker as the distance to the two cities increased. 
The bomb’s psychological impact was “subordinate to other demoralizing experiences” in 
areas not directly affected by the bombs, for example bombing with conventional weapons 
and deprivation (United States Strategic Bombing Survey Morale Division 1946, 27). As 
the authors of the report argue, this can be explained with the already low morale in Japan 
at the time, the lack of understanding of the bomb’s impact and the limited access to mass 
media (United States Strategic Bombing Survey Morale Division 1946, 26–27)40. 
Among the weapons available at the time, the nuclear bombs were therefore in a league of 
their own, chiefly because of the shock and fear they caused. The damage they caused in 
Hiroshima and Nagasaki was devastating yet did not add much that could not be achieved 
with conventional weapons, just as the American decision-makers had expected. Compared 
to the several dozen Japanese cities that experienced heavy air raids during the summer of 
1945, Hiroshima and Nagasaki trail behind others in terms of civilian lives lost and in terms 
                                                     
40 At the same time, it has to be kept in mind that Japan surrendered a mere nine days after the first 
atomic bomb was dropped on Japan. Had this decision come later, the bombs’ effects on the public 
morale might have been stronger as the information could have spread further (United States Stra-
tegic Bombing Survey Morale Division 1947, 100). 
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of square miles as well percentage of city area destroyed. The material damage of the nu-
clear bombs therefore is not in a league of its own, as for example Wilson (2013) empha-
sizes, yet the psychological impact the bombs had on the Japanese elites was.  
One can therefore wonder whether this emotional impact could have been achieved without 
the material damage of the nuclear bombs. A demonstration of the technology’s power over 
uninhabited territory or even the ocean could have been sufficiently shocking to have a 
similar effect on the Japanese leadership. This idea was proposed two months before the 
detonations, in June 1945, by a group of nuclear scientists in the so-called Franck Report. 
It argued against the use of nuclear weapons against Japan as this would damage the stand-
ing of the United States, make any regulation of the technology and its spread more difficult 
and potentially escalate into an arms race. Instead, it argued for a demonstration of the 
weapon “before the eyes of representatives of all United Nations, on the desert or a barren 
island” (Federation of American Scientists 1945), thereby sending a clear and ultimate 
warning towards Japan. This recommendation was ignored by the government. 
The shock caused by the two nuclear bombs shaped American considerations about nuclear 
weapons and military strategy for years, and especially during the early years of the Cold 
War. In 1947, the government prepared a list of targets within the Soviet Union for atomic 
bombs in the Joint Outline Emergency War Plan BROILER. The selection of these targets 
was driven by the ambition to create “the maximum psychological effect of the atomic 
bomb” (as quoted in Herken 1988, 228). As the thinking behind the plan went, the shock, 
fear and hopelessness evoked by a nuclear explosion could quickly overwhelm Soviet mo-
rale. It was considered “logical to anticipate that this psychological effect, properly ex-
ploited, could become an important factor in the timing of … the cessation of hostilities” 
(as quoted in Herken 1988, 228). 
134 
 
The following plan, finalized in 1948 under the name HALFMOON (also known as 
FLEETWOOD), followed the same logic. Through the “destructive and psychological 
power of atomic weapons” (Herken 1988, 266) it was assumed that the Soviet Union could 
be dealt a sudden, decisive blow that would make protracted warfare with conventional 
weapons unnecessary41.  
Even after the end of the Cold War, when nuclear weapons and their threat lost much of 
their immediate relevance, the lessons learned from the shock imposed on Japan remained 
relevant. In 1996, a number of scholars proposed the concept of “shock and awe” as a 
doctrine for American military operations in the 21st century. The doctrine’s goal is the 
establishment of what the authors refer to as rapid dominance through a fast and over-
whelming display of military power. The mechanism of shock and awe: to “paralyze or so 
overload an adversary’s perceptions and understanding of events so that the enemy would 
be incapable of resistance at tactical and strategic levels”. This approach was clearly in-
spired by the events in 1945. As the authors argue, shock and awe aims to impose “the non-
nuclear equivalent of the impact that the atomic weapons dropped on Hiroshima and Na-
gasaki had on the Japanese” (Ullman and Wade, Jr. 1996, xxv–xxvi). 
The concept received wide-spread attention during the runup and the early days of Amer-
ica’s invasion of Iraq in 2003. While the government didn’t explicitly speak of shock and 
awe, many statements by officials left the impression that a similar approach was being 
followed. Much of the media’s reporting on the events in Iraq therefore used shock and 
awe as a catchphrase for the American strategy. In hindsight, this was probably not a correct 
                                                     
41 These assumptions were not without critics: a report by General Hubert R. Harmon in 1949 cast 
doubt on the possible psychological effect of nuclear bombs on the Soviet Union and cautioned that, 
instead of destroying the Soviet morale, they might play into Moscow’s propaganda and unify the 
people of the Soviet Union in opposition to the United States (Herken 1988, 294). Nevertheless, the 
BROILER and HALFMOON plans illustrate that the American government saw enormous psycho-
logical potential in nuclear weapons based on the experiences made in 1945. 
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assessment: whereas shock and awe calls for comprehensive and instantaneous strikes, the 
American invasion was largely sparing infrastructure and unfolded over a comparatively 
longer period of time. And just like the invasion did not live up to the concept’s promise of 
a swift victory, it is doubtful whether the strategy of the United States caused either shock 
or awe (Correll 2003). 
In conclusion, these historical episodes point towards the compulsive force that the evoca-
tion of shock can have in international affairs. As the example of the events in August 1945 
shows, the atomic bombs dropped on Japan were an exercise of American power that took 
place not only through material destruction, but also through the manipulation of emotions. 
This psychological effect and the emotions it caused were an intended effect of the bombs, 
and they played a role in coercing the Japanese leadership into accepting defeat and sur-
render. The American deployment of the atomic bombs thereby created emotions on the 
Japanese side that made the country act in a way that America wanted it to, but that Japan 
itself did not want to. The mechanism at play in this exercise was therefore compulsion; it 
changed the first order preferences of the Japanese decision makers, but without changing 
their second order preferences; and the emotion at play was shock.  
As has to be emphasized, this study does not make the claim that the atomic bombs were 
decisive in pushing Japan to surrender, but merely that they played a part. How the effect 
of the explosions over Hiroshima and Nagasaki compares to the effect of the Soviet Un-
ion’s entry into the Pacific War is a matter of dispute. Many historians perceive both events 
as factors that contributed to the surrender (see, for example, Hatano 2007). A number of 
revisionist voices dispute this account and point towards the decisive effect of the Soviet 
Union’s declaration of war or argue that Japan would have surrendered soon anyway 
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(Alperovitz 1995; Hasegawa 2005; Wilson 2013). This case study sides with the main-
stream account that perceives the atomic bombs as relevant for explaining Japan’s surren-




1. Stirring Fear: The US and West Germany 
The second case study focuses on the emotion of fear – and, more specifically, the fear of 
abandonment – through which the United States dissuaded West Germany during the 1950s 
and 1960s from developing a nuclear deterrent of its own. While the German government 
saw the acquisition of nuclear weapons as necessary to ensure the country’s security, it was 
perceived as potentially destabilizing for regional and even global stability in Washington, 
D. C. The administrations of John F. Kennedy and Lyndon B. Johnson therefore utilized 
the institutional position of the United States in the security alliance with West Germany, 
which was in a situation of military dependency. By threatening to withdraw from the re-
gion, American diplomats stoked the German fear of abandonment, thereby producing a 
change of first order preferences in Bonn42. This example, too, represents the mechanism 
of compulsion at work.   
This case study follows the argument made by Gerzhoy (2015) who utilized the example 
America’s opposition to West Germany’s nuclear ambitions to illustrate the concept of 
alliance coercion. His article utilizes neither the vocabulary of power nor emotions but 
implicitly references both. Especially the decisive role of emotions is evident in that the 
United States was able to exercise power by “manipulating the client’s underlying fear of 
abandonment” (Gerzhoy 2015, 102), with West Germany being the client in this case. As 
Gerzhoy emphasizes, coercion – or, to use a different word: compulsion - was only part of 
a larger policy effort: the United States had to also “provide assurances that threats of aban-
                                                     
42 At the time of the events described in this case study, Bonn was the capital of West Germany. 
Berlin became the capital of Germany only after reunification in 1990. 
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donment are conditional on the client’s nuclear choices” (Gerzhoy 2015, 102). Neverthe-
less, the manipulation of emotions and the creation of fear on the German side were a nec-
essary element for the exercise of power in this case. 
The historical context of the events is the period of German occupation by the Allied pow-
ers and the country’s rearmament after World War II. Immediately after the surrender of 
Nazi Germany in May 1945, the occupation powers pursued a policy of complete demili-
tarization. This included the disbanding of all German military units and the dismantlement 
of much of its arms industry. But as the Cold War began to pick up steam and under the 
impression of events such as the Korean War (1950-1953), the Allied powers began the 
process of gradually rearming Germany.  
In May 1955, the Paris Accords went into force which ended the occupation, gave West 
Germany “the full authority of a sovereign State over its internal and external affairs” 
(CVCE 1952, 57), and made the country a member of the Western European Union as well 
as NATO. West Germany established its own armed forces and introduced military con-
scription, albeit the Paris agreements limited the size of the West German armed forces to 
500.000 men. Furthermore, Germany agreed to not develop any nuclear, chemical or bio-
logical weapons on its territory. Importantly, this did not rule out the acquisition of these 
weapons from other states, their development outside its territory as well as their use.  
The decade after German independence saw the Cold War heating up, most prominently 
through the Berlin Crisis of 1961 and the Cuban Missile Crisis in 1962. West Germany, at 
the time, lay at the frontline between the two blocks and saw itself as militarily dependent 
on the United States. From the 1950s on and for several decades, it therefore hosted a quar-
ter of a million American soldiers as well as American nuclear weapons (Kane 2005a; Na-
tional Security Archive 1975c, 33). On the other side of the inner-German border, the So-
viet Union tied together its satellite states in the military alliance of the Warsaw Pact in 
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1955. From this time on, around half a million Soviet soldiers as well as Soviet nuclear 
weapons were stationed in East Germany (Kowalczuk and Wolle 2010, 116; Uhl 2015, 
143).  
The conflictual relations of the great powers as well as the military situation at its border 
ignited the West German fear of abandonment. This feeling was stoked, in addition, when 
details about internal debates within the American government about massive troop reduc-
tions in Europe were reported in the press in 1956. As the argument went, a focus on nuclear 
weapons instead of large numbers of conventional troops would be cheaper to sustain and 
provide larger firepower. NATO estimates projected that, in case of warfare under these 
conditions, hundreds of nukes would be dropped on Germany, large parts of the country 
devastated and millions killed. The implication as seen in Bonn: “Germany might be aban-
doned if the strategy were not carried out, and destroyed if it were” (Schake 2004, 236; see 
also Bierling 2005, 113). 
Chancellor Konrad Adenauer thus reminisced in his memoirs that these plans called into 
question whether the United States was a reliable partner. As he wrote, the presence of 
American troops was not only valuable from a military perspective. It was also a guarantee 
that the United States would live up to its alliance obligations. Any attack on West Germany 
would also hit American troops, thus drawing the United States into the conflict (Adenauer 
1967, 199). He emphasized his worries in a conversation with the head of the CIA from 
which he quotes in his memoirs: “Die NATO wird schlecht behandelt” (NATO is being 
treated badly), “wird senil” (is growing senile) and “die Aussichten für die Zukunft sind 
schrecklich” (the prospects for the future are terrible) (Adenauer 1967, 213; translated from 
German by the author). Ultimately, the American plans to withdraw hundreds of thousands 
of soldiers were scrapped, yet the damage was done. 
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A core issue for Adenauer was that West Germany had little control over its own destiny. 
As he explained at a meeting of the national executive board of the Christian Social Union 
(CSU), the party he was heading, in September 1956, he came away from meetings with 
American officials with the impression that the United States cares exclusively about its 
own defense, not the defense of other countries. In this context, he described as “uner-
träglich” (unbearable) (Buchstab 1990, 1029; translated from German by the author) a sit-
uation in which only two countries control nuclear weapons and therefore the fate of all 
nations. To him, America was not reliable as a guarantor of West German safety – and if 
West Germany wanted to ensure its safety and gain control over its own fate, it would have 
to acquire nuclear forces of its own (Trachtenberg 1999, 232).  
The fear of American abandonment was therefore a driving force at the top of the West 
German government. Adenauer declared in the same meeting of the CSU national execu-
tive board that it is wrong to believe that the United States would never abandon Europe 
(Buchstab 1990, 1030). One of his closest confidants, Heinrich Krone, equally argued that 
relations with the United States are currently good – but cautioned that this should not be 
taken for granted. America, after all, is far away from Germany and has interests that go 
beyond Europe (Buchstab 1990, 1034). Beneath these worries lay the insight that West 
Germany and its fate occupied neither a central nor a permanent spot in America’s national 
interest. As Graniere writes about an extended tour abroad by the German chancellor in 
1960: 
As a man from the generation that still viewed Europe as the center of world 
affairs, the leader of a state at the heart of a divided Europe, Adenauer was 
unsettled by what he learned. Close relations with the US were supposed to 
guarantee West German stability and security. After more than ten years, how-
ever, that stability seemed as far off as ever. The world had gotten bigger, and 
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the Americans appeared to be losing interest in German concerns. (Graniere 
2003, 111) 
In this context, the question arises whether the fear of abandonment visible here actually 
describes an emotional phenomenon or merely strategic calculations. It has been argued, 
for example, that Adenauer exaggerated the perception of American unreliability in order 
to secure foreign goodwill for German rearmament (Trachtenberg 1999, 234).  
At the same time, there are indications that these fears went beyond mere calculation and 
had an emotional component. Franz Josef Strauß, Adenauer’s Minister for Nuclear Energy 
and later Defense Minister, ascribes the chancellor a “geradezu existentielle Angst” (pretty 
much existential fear) (Strauß 2015, 168; translated from German by the author) of Com-
munist invasion and American abandonment, and especially so after the outbreak Korean 
War. He equally wrote of a “tiefeingewurzelte Angst” (deep-rooted fear) (Strauß 2015, 254; 
translated from German by the author) in Adenauer that the victors of the Second World 
War could engage in great power dealings that would degrade West Germany to a mere 
pawn. 
This “fear of an agreement among the Four Powers at Germany’s expense” (H.-P. Schwarz 
1995, 6) has been labeled by Hans-Peter Schwarz, his foremost biographer, as an essential 
force behind Adenauer’s foreign policy. In the same vein, the chancellor’s attitude towards 
the isolationist tendencies in American politics (H.-P. Schwarz 1995, 37) and towards 
French nationalism at the cost of NATO (H.-P. Schwarz 1995, 358) have been described 
by Schwarz as marked by fear. Other authors have equally argued that Adenauer’s judg-
ment was at times shaped by “shock, fear, and anger” about signs of American disinterest 
in or even abandonment of West Germany (Brady 2009, 186). 
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These fears were also observed on the American side. As Dean Acheson – who served as 
Secretary of State under President Truman - recalled later on in an interview when speaking 
about a conversation with Adenauer in Bonn in April 1961, the German chancellor seemed 
“worried to death--just completely worried” (JFK Library 1964, 17) about America’s in-
tentions towards the situation in Europe. Just before the West German chancellor visited 
Washington later during the same year, a memo by Henry Kissinger for President Kennedy 
spoke of Adenauer having largely irrational and “vague fears of being abandoned” (as 
quoted in Rueger 2011, 105). The briefing prepared by the State Department for the same 
meeting equally ascribed Adenauer “an almost pathological fear” (as quoted in Rueger 
2011, 106) that the United States could come to an agreement at the expense of Germany.  
Based on his lack of trust in the United States and NATO, and the subsequent fear of aban-
donment, the West German government therefore began to voice its belief that the country 
should acquire nuclear weapons. In December 1956, Adenauer described these as “drin-
gend erforderlich” (urgently necessary) (Bundesarchiv 1988c; translated from German by 
the author) in a cabinet meeting. His reasoning was shaped by mistrust in West Germany’s 
security alliances. As he saw it, the use of American nuclear weapons or those of other 
NATO allies against a potential enemy would require approval by the American Congress 
or unanimity within NATO, neither of which was assured in case of an emergency. Earlier 
that year, in a cabinet meeting in July 1956, Strauß had already used similar rhetoric and 
declared that a nation which does not produce nuclear weapons on its own is outclassed 
(Bundesarchiv 1988a).  
Beyond the immediate security concerns, Adenauer and Strauß also described the acquisi-
tion of nuclear weapons as a means for West Germany to regain control over its own fate 
– and to overcome its status as an inferior power next to its neighbors and NATO allies. 
The chancellor, for example, went so far as to label the country as a “nuclear protectorate” 
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(as quoted in H.-P. Schwarz 1997, 239). Strauß, in his memoirs, equally spoke of a nation 
without access to nuclear weapons as being reduced to the status of a “Kolonialarmee” 
(colonial army) and a “militärischen Flohzirkus” (military flea circus), and of nuclear 
weapons as a “entscheidendes Merkmal der Souveränität” (decisive element of sovereignty) 
in the nuclear age. They were, therefore, a means of reclaiming German independence 
(Strauß 2015, 382, 404, 530; translated from German by the author). The mere prospect of 
West Germany acquiring or building them was seen as a bargaining chip in negotiations 
with other NATO members (Küntzel 1992, 27).  
Towards the outside, the government chose a more ambiguous language. It thereby took 
into account that assertive rhetoric about West German nuclear weapons would provoke 
opposition abroad as well as at home, and especially so with an eye on the national elections 
in September 1957. In January 1957, after a lengthy conversation, the government therefore 
left a group of German scientists with the impression that no acquisition of nuclear weapons 
was desired (von Weizsäcker 1957, 284). A few weeks later, Strauß explained in a state-
ment that West Germany has no immediate plans to build or acquire nuclear weapons, 
carefully remaining silent on the government’s desire to do so (Die Zeit 1957). In other 
public statements, references to nuclear weapons were embellished and trivialized, for ex-
ample by referring to them as small or light or clean nuclear weapons, or simply as “die 
modernsten Waffen” (the most modern weaponry) (Wengeler 1992, 200; translated from 
German by the author).  
In October 1956, Adenauer voiced in a cabinet meeting the idea of producing nuclear weap-
ons through the European Atomic Energy Community (Bundesarchiv 1988b). This already 
indicates what would characterize the West German desire for nuclear weapons during the 
following years: their development on German territory was never seriously taken into con-
sideration. This would have required a revision of the Paris Accords, might have provoked 
144 
 
the Soviet Union and upset relations with the NATO allies that West Germany was depend-
ent on, and certainly have fueled the domestic opposition against nuclear weapons. The 
idea of a homegrown nuclear weapons program, similar to that of the United Kingdom at 
the time, was therefore foregone because it was not feasible, not for a lack of interest (H.-
P. Schwarz 1989, 576–77).  
Following this approach, West Germany in November 1957 signed treaties with France 
and Italy for a trilateral arms development program. The conventional part of the program 
was public knowledge; that it also involved the development of nuclear weapons was kept 
secret. France expected to profit from the financial and technical assistance of its neighbors, 
and to free itself from what was perceived as an Anglo-Saxon monopoly on nuclear weap-
ons within NATO. Under the agreement, Germany would not have become the owner of 
nuclear warheads but gotten guaranteed access to warheads stored in France. Yet this nu-
clear weapons program never made it far: when Charles de Gaulle became French Prime 
Minister in June 1958, he withdrew from the program (Kocs 1995, 20–21; Küntzel 1992, 
29–30).  
It is noteworthy that this program was initiated regardless of American concessions and 
even support regarding nuclear weapons in European hands. From 1957, the Eisenhower 
administration intended to support the British and French nuclear programs. And in order 
to empower its European allies to defend itself, it not only stationed nuclear weapons on 
their territory but gave them effective control over their deployment. The American capa-
bility to control their use was severely limited – and West Germany thereby became a “de-
facto nuclear power, at least in a limited sense” (Kocs 1995, 27; see also Trachtenberg 1999, 
193–94). As Eisenhower himself argued during a meeting in March 1960: “we cannot deny 
to our allies those weapons which most assuredly our enemies have” (Digital National Se-
curity Archive 1960, 1). 
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As Gerzhoy points out, one would expect that this approach of the Eisenhower administra-
tion would have given West Germany confidence in the American commitment and dis-
suaded it from pursuing nuclear weapons. But as the timeline of events shows, this was not 
the case, most likely because the reliability and permanence of the American commitment 
to West Germany’s security was never seen as unquestionable (Gerzhoy 2015, 110).  
The transition from Eisenhower to Kennedy in 1961 came with a novel attitude on the side 
of the United States towards the spread of nuclear weapons. Whereas Eisenhower stopped 
short of encouraging their development in Europe, the Kennedy administration took a more 
negative view of their proliferation. Every additional nation with nuclear weapons would 
introduce new risks into the international system; and every American ally with nuclear 
weapons would make it more likely that America would get drawn into a nuclear conflict 
(Küntzel 1992, 41–42). Kennedy himself summed up this understanding in his address to 
the nation on July 26, 1963 on occasion of signing the Nuclear Test Ban Treaty with the 
Soviet Union: 
During the next several years, in addition to the four current nuclear powers, 
a small but significant number of nations will have the intellectual, physical, 
and financial resources to produce both nuclear weapons and the means of 
delivering them. […] I ask you to stop and think for a moment what it would 
mean to have nuclear weapons in so many hands, in the hands of countries 
large and small, stable and unstable, responsible and irresponsible, scattered 
throughout the world. There would be no rest for anyone then, no stability, no 
real security, and no chance of effective disarmament. (JFK Library 1963a) 
Shortly after Kennedy came to power in 1961, it became visible what he had in mind with 
restricting nuclear weapons to the four states that possessed them at the time: the United 
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States, the Soviet Union, Great Britain and France. All American nuclear weapons sta-
tioned in Europe were equipped with technology that would require authorization by the 
America President for their deployment; and the idea of giving control over nuclear weap-
ons to NATO allies in the context of a combined strike force was abandoned (Gerzhoy 
2015, 111). Additionally, Kennedy was “in principle ready to draw the line after France” 
(Trachtenberg 1999, 366): whereas Britain and France would be allowed and even receive 
American support to develop nuclear weapons, West Germany would be excluded from 
this exclusive group.  
West Germany was thereby pushed back into the role of a non-nuclear state. Simultane-
ously, West German foreign policy was perceived as running counter to these ambitions. 
Although the nuclear weapons program from 1957 had gone nowhere, West Germany and 
France once again made steps towards a joint program for the development of nuclear 
weapons. In January 1963, Adenauer and de Gaulle signed the Élysée Treaty, formally 
committing themselves to the friendship of the two nations and the mutual political con-
sultation on a variety of issues. The impression created by the treaty was strengthened by 
a press conference one week prior in which the French President had declared his ambition 
to create an independent Europe that would be neither under the dependency nor the control 
of the United States43. 
                                                     
43 The Kennedy administration saw in de Gaulle a force that opposed America’s interests in Europe 
and a threat to the West’s political integrity as well as NATO. As Carl Carstens, State Secretary in 
the West German foreign office, reported after a trip to the United States and conversations with 
dozens of American politicians: “It is becoming ever more evident to them that de Gaulle wants to 
rule over Europe, that he wants to push the United States out of Europe, and that he wants to ulti-
mately destroy NATO. [...] In doing so, he trusts that the Americans, even after they would have left 
Europe, would be forced to defend Europe in case of a Russian attack. It is the cynicism expressed 
in these goals and methods of de Gaulle that especially embitters the Americans” (Institut für Zeit-
geschichte 1993, 88; translation by the author). Concerns about West Germany arose against this 
backdrop and from questions about the country’s alignment and a possible desire to acquire nuclear 
weapons. The United States, for obvious reasons, did not want West Germany to follow de Gaulle. 
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From the American perspective, de Gaulle’s rhetoric and the friendship treaty signaled the 
intention to create an independent European block in world politics – and most likely the 
collaboration in the nuclear field as well as the prospect of West Germany acquiring nuclear 
weapons. After all, if the European powers were planning to distance themselves from the 
United States, they would require a nuclear deterrent of their own against the Soviet threat. 
But whereas de Gaulle’s general attitude towards America’s role in Europe was seen as a 
rather abstract problem, the “German nuclear question was the ultimate touchstone” that 
had to be dealt with (Trachtenberg 1999, 392, 369–70).  
West German politicians subsequently tried to convince the United States that their gov-
ernment did not follow de Gaulle’s line and had no ambitions to create a European bloc 
(see, for example, FRUS 1994d, 190). Secretary of State Dean Rusk furthermore notified 
Kennedy that there is no evidence for an open or secret Franco-German nuclear weapons 
program. Yet the suspicion had been created and Rusk cautioned to the West German De-
fense Minister that “we would take a very serious view of any such arrangement” (JFK 
Library 1963b). The impression that the friendship treaty between France and West Ger-
many was motivated by the German interest to acquire nuclear weapons was also present 
in Moscow, as Nikita Khrushchev himself made clear in conversations during a visit to 
Great Britain (Institut für Zeitgeschichte 1993, 117). 
Considerations about nuclear weapons were indeed made in France as well as in West Ger-
many, although not in public and without specific intent. One week before the signing of 
the Élysée Treaty, Adenauer asked his advisor Heinrich Krone whether he should tell de 
Gaulle that Germany was ready to cooperate on the production of nuclear weapons (Krone 
2003, 2:146). The day before the treaty was signed, de Gaulle and Adenauer agreed that 
America was holding its European allies in a state of perpetual security dependency by 
monopolizing the nuclear weapons on the continent. Adenauer therefore welcomed that 
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France was developing its own nuclear weapons; and de Gaulle stated it would be only 
natural for West Germany to seek nuclear weapons of its own. Their acquisition would 
change the country’s relations with both the West and the East, but France would not op-
pose this step, as he argued (Institut für Zeitgeschichte 1993, 117–18, 141–42). 
The West German interest in nuclear weapons and the American determination to strictly 
limit their proliferation therefore clashed with each other from the early 1960s on. The 
Kennedy administration was aware of this and willing to utilize its institutional position in 
the security alliance with the Adenauer government. As Trachtenberg writes about the 
American approach: 
Even if Britain and France were helped, the Germans could still be told that 
they could not have their own nuclear weapons. They would not like it, but 
they were dependent on the United States and could be made to swallow the 
pill. If they defied America, where else could they go for protection? It was a 
question of who needed whom, and the Germans would have to give way in 
the end. (Trachtenberg 1999, 356) 
Based on de Gaulle’s rhetoric, Kennedy furthermore feared the creation of a Franco-Ger-
man block, either because the Europeans did not trust America’s security guarantees – or 
because they saw the alliance with America as detrimental for their own security. As Ken-
nedy cautioned in a meeting of the National Security Council Executive Committee on 
January 25, 1963: “As soon as the French have a nuclear capability […] we have much less 
to offer Europe and the Europeans may conclude that continuing their ties with us will 
create a risk that we will drag them into a war in which they do not wish to be involved” 
(FRUS 1994e, 488). Apart from controlling the proliferation of nuclear weapons, an Amer-
ican interest at the time was therefore the prevention of a Franco-German bloc that would 
diminish the role and influence of the United States in Europe. 
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Kennedy’s conclusion in a meeting on February 5: The United States should “make clear 
to the Germans that they faced a choice between working with the French or working with 
us” (FRUS 1994c, 175). For this purpose, America had to “get ready with actions to 
squeeze Europe” and develop “a cold, hard attitude toward the situation which may develop 
in Europe” (FRUS 1994e, 489–90). One week later, he therefore reasoned that a letter to 
Adenauer should outline the potential consequences of a political split between Europe and 
the United States, among them “the opportunity to the Russians to fish in troubled waters” 
and the “public demand to get out of Europe” on the American side (FRUS 1994b, 163). 
The Kennedy government therefore started to play on the West German fears of abandon-
ment. In the words of the American Ambassador to West Germany, the goal was to keep 
the Germans “nervous about our relations with them” (FRUS 1994c, 175). In a meeting 
with the German Ambassador and the head of the CDU’s parliamentary faction, Rusk cau-
tioned that “it would be impossible for any American Government to keep US troops” 
(FRUS 1994d, 190) in Europe if the public came away with the impression that the United 
States were not welcome there.   
The West German government attempted to prove wrong the American suspicions. In fact, 
there have been no indications that West Germany would side with France at the cost of its 
relationship with the United States or actively pursued the development of nuclear weapons 
after the failure of the trilateral program in 1958. In the law ratifying the Élysée Treaty, the 
German Bundestag added a preamble stating that the agreement was signed to maintain 
and deepen “the association of free peoples, especially the close partnership between Eu-
rope and the United States of America“ (German Historical Institute 2017, 2). Nevertheless, 
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the Kennedy administration wanted an assurance that Germany would refrain from pursu-
ing nuclear weapons of its own – and found a litmus test in the Partial Nuclear Test Ban 
Treaty44 which was under negotiation at the time. 
The treaty was negotiated in 1963 by the United States and the Soviet Union as part of a 
general easing of relations between the two superpowers. It was open for signature to all 
states, and the Kennedy administration subsequently expected and pressured West Ger-
many to join. One reason was that this fit Kennedy’s ambitions to limit the proliferation of 
nuclear weapons. As Kennedy argued already in 1961 in a conversation with Khrushchev, 
a nuclear test ban would not reduce the number of weapons already in existence and not 
stop the production of new ones. Yet it “would make development of nuclear weapons by 
other countries less likely” (FRUS 1994a, 88). Beyond that, the American government had 
an interest in West Germany signing the treaty as, in exchange for the United States keeping 
West Germany’s nuclear ambitions in check, the Soviet Union acquiesced on the issues 
surrounding Berlin (Gerzhoy 2015, 117).  
Initially, the Adenauer government voiced objections. Its primary concern was that a sig-
nature of both West Germany and East Germany, as intended by the United States and the 
Soviet Union, would be a de-facto recognition of the German Democratic Republic. In 
order to prevent this break with the West’s long-standing policy of not accepting the Ger-
man division, the United States and Great Britain explicitly labeled East Germany as a non-
                                                     
44 As the name of the treaty implies, is does not prohibit nuclear tests in general. The Partial Nuclear 
Test Ban Treaty only prohibits nuclear explosions in earth’s atmosphere, under water and in space. 
As most nuclear tests take place underground, it is therefore anything but an effective ban on the 
development of nuclear weapons. Beyond that, the treaty contains no details about how a ban on 
nuclear tests could be actually enforced. With this in mind, it has to be interpreted as an expression 
of a general yet limited easing of tensions during the Cold War (Pautsch 1994, 151). Additionally, 
the Partial Nuclear Test Ban Treaty should not be confused with the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-
Ban Treaty, which does prohibit all nuclear tests but has so far not come into force. 
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state signatory (Pautsch 1994, 148). In August 1963 the treaty was therefore signed by 
West Germany.  
Adenauer had been a stringent opponent of the treaty. In a conversation with de Gaulle on 
September 21, 1963 he described the treaty as having “weder Sinn noch Zweck” (neither 
logic nor purpose) (Institut für Zeitgeschichte 1993, 356; translated from German by the 
author). In his biography, he argued that West Germany had already agreed to not produce 
nuclear weapons in the Paris Accords. The only purpose of the treaty was therefore to 
tighten the grip of the superpowers on Europe, and especially of the Soviet Union over 
West Germany (Adenauer 1978, 244–45). Strauß in an interview not only raised the same 
points as Adenauer about the questionable purpose of the treaty; he went so far as to com-
pare it to the Munich Agreement of 1938 through which France and Great Britain had ac-
cepted the partial annexation of Czechoslovakia by Nazi Germany (Pautsch 1994, 131).  
That the Partial Nuclear Test Ban Treaty would lock in West Germany’s status as a country 
without nuclear weapons of its own was evident (Küntzel 1992, 67; Trachtenberg 1999, 
394). As a secret briefing for the German Foreign Minister argued, the treaty would not 
only prohibit West Germany from testing nuclear weapons of its own but also from partic-
ipating in other countries’ nuclear tests – which can be read as a reference to a potential 
Franco-German nuclear program. Furthermore, the de-facto ban on the development of nu-
clear weapons would not be contingent on security guarantees from other Western powers, 
as is the case in Paris Accords. In other words: West Germany would lose the potential to 
develop nuclear weapons as leverage in negotiations with both West and East (Institut für 
Zeitgeschichte 1993, 244–45). 
Especially with an eye on Adenauer’s fear that the United States might abandon West Ger-
many, there was little incentive to sign the treaty. Yet it stands to reason that this was not 
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an option, in part because of how the Kennedy administration played on these fears. Aden-
auer therefore explained to Strauß that abstaining from the treaty was not an option due to 
the international pressure that the country was facing (Strauß 2015, 331). In a similar vein, 
Krone noted in his diary: “Sollen wir unterschreiben? Es wird nichts anderes übrigbleiben. 
Ich denke an Versailles“ (Shall we sign? There will be no other choice. I am thinking of 
Versailles) (Krone 2003, 2:206; translated from German by the author), thereby referring 
to the Peace Treaty at the end of World War I that was forced upon Germany.  
Even the previously-cited secret briefing for the German Foreign Minister, regardless of its 
outspoken opposition to the treaty, came to this conclusion. It argued that a refusal of Ger-
man participation would not be possible because of how significant the United States con-
siders the treaty for world peace (Institut für Zeitgeschichte 1993, 245). 
Against this backdrop, it is reasonable to assume that the American exploitation and am-
plification of the Adenauer government’s fear of abandonment contributed to the West 
German participation in the Partial Nuclear Test Ban Treaty. As Trachtenberg sums up, a 
withdrawal of the United States from Europe was “not entirely out of the question”; and if 
“the Americans insisted that Germany remain non-nuclear as part of the détente policy, the 
Federal Republic had little choice but to accept that status” (Trachtenberg 1999, 397).  
That this process was perceived coercive on the German side is evident in Krone’s refer-
ence to Versailles. It is also visible in Adenauer’s description of the situation as existen-
tially threatening for West Germany and “friß oder stirb” (sink or swim) (Institut für Zeit-
geschichte 1993, 257; translated from German by the author) in a conversation with Robert 
McNamara, the US Secretary of Defense. The decision to sign the treaty was thus not made 
because the West German government saw it as beneficial – but because even the agree-
ment’s critics saw no viable alternative (Pautsch 1994, 147). 
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This is not to say that the perceptions of German decision-makers were necessarily correct 
and that the West German participation in the treaty was against its national interest. After 
all, the treaty solidified the détente policy after some of the Cold War’s worst years and 
ensured America’s commitment to Germany’s security. This study does also not argue that 
America’s exploitation of West German fears was the only factor at play. The Adenauer 
government also signed the Partial Nuclear Test Ban Treaty in order to not isolate itself 
internationally and provide the Soviet Union with fodder for its propaganda machine, and 
because German public opinion as well as parts of the domestic political spectrum were far 
less critical of the United States and the agreement than Adenauer and his aides (Institut 
für Zeitgeschichte 1993, 245; Trachtenberg 1999, 397).  
Nevertheless, it stands to reason that the American efforts at stoking the German fear of 
abandonment were a “major factor” (Trachtenberg 1999, 397) in the decision-making pro-
cess of the Adenauer government to join the Partial Nuclear Test Ban Treaty. The two 
governments had different interests regarding Germany’s acquisition of nuclear weapons – 
and America made West Germany act in accordance with its preferences. Just as was the 
case in the previous case study, this exercise of power utilized the mechanism of compul-
sion and therefore confronted the West German government in Bonn with the choice be-
tween acquiescence and paying a price that was considered too high. Its first order prefer-
ences were changed; its second order preferences about nuclear weapons remained in place. 
The foundation of this compulsion was the manipulation of emotions and, in particular, the 
stoking of West Germany’s fear of abandonment. 
While it is uncontentious that fear represents an emotion, it is worth specifying here how 
fear is assumed to work. Consider Frijda’s conception of fear: he considers “avoidance” as 
the action tendency that results from it and “protection” as the purpose of fear (Frijda 1986, 
88). What this means in practice is highly dependent on the context. Fear does not result in 
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any particular behavior but rather in the production of specific goals that have an “avoid-
ance quality” (Miceli and Castelfranchi 2015, 128). The outcome of fear can therefore be 
the desire to flee, to seek information, to hide – or, as in the case of West Germany, to 
acquiesce to demands in order to avoid the object of fear. The fear of abandonment there-
fore pushed the government in Bonn to do what was necessary to avoid the potential alter-
native: abandonment by the United States. 
As Gerzhoy (2015) illustrates, this logic of the United States exercising power over West 
Germany prevailed beyond the year 1963. Adenauer left office and Kennedy was assassi-
nated in the fall of that year, yet the West German lack of confidence in America’s security 
guarantee prevailed, just as the desire to suppress Germany’s nuclear ambitions prevailed 
in the United States. And just like the Kennedy government had stoked the West German 
fear of abandonment in order to ensure the participation in the Partial Nuclear Test Ban 
Treaty, so did the Johnson government play on German fears in order to ensure a signature 
for the Non-Proliferation Treaty in 1969. 
2. Alleviating Fear: The US and South Korea 
Causing and stoking the fear of abandonment is one way in which the manipulation of 
emotions can play a role in exercising power. The other way around, emotions are also 
manipulated when one actor tries to calm the fear of abandonment of another actor. One 
example for this can be found in the security alliance between the United States and South 
Korea during the 1970s. Richard Nixon had just become American President after running 
a campaign during which he made the pledge that “we shall have an honorable end to the 
war in Vietnam” (McMahon and Zeiler 2012, 1:628). Little more than half a year after he 
came into office, in July 1969, he therefore announced what came to be known as the Nixon 
Doctrine: America would stand by its alliance commitments and provide a nuclear umbrella, 
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yet its allies would generally be responsible for their own security. For the presence of the 
United States in Vietnam this meant that the burden of fighting would be shifted to South 
Vietnamese troops and that American forces would slowly be withdrawn.  
At the time, the security situation on the Korean peninsula was short of escalating after a 
number of incidents. North Korea had attempted to assassinate the South Korean President 
Park Chung-Hee in January 1968 and, only a few days later, taken the American spy ship 
USS Pueblo as well as its crew hostage. Against this backdrop, the more than 66.000 Amer-
ican soldiers (Kane 2005b) stationed in South Korea were seen in Seoul as essential to deter 
North Korean aggression and as a symbol for the commitment of the United States to South 
Korea’s security. Yet this troop presence was about to be cut down by the Nixon Doctrine. 
As the US President noted in a memorandum to Henry Kissinger, his National Security 
Advisor, in November 1969: “I think the time has come to reduce our Korean presence” 
and “to cut the number of Americans there in half” (FRUS 2010a). These plans were an-
nounced to the South Korean government in December of that year.  
The result was an increasing fear of abandonment on the South Korean side. A number of 
factors added to this impression in Seoul: US foreign policy making at the time was unilat-
eral and largely ignored South Korean concerns and interests. The decision makers in 
Washington cared first and foremost about the situation in Vietnam and saw their country’s 
Asia policies through that lens. A military response to the North Korean provocations at 
the time was rejected in Washington in order to avoid an American entanglement in another 
corner of Asia. On top of that, America as a nation seemed disenchanted with its military 
presence in the region. Later on, through Nixon’s trip to Beijing in 1972, the United States 
even reproached a country that South Korea had been fighting against only two decades 
earlier. The result has been described as the “Nixon shock” that led to disappointment, 
156 
 
frustration and anxiety in South Korea (Hwang 2006, 59; see also Engel 2016; C.-J. Lee 
2006, 69; S.-Y. Kim 2001, 54–55; Nam 1986, 78).  
The South Korean side did not hide this shock. A month after the North Korean assassina-
tion attempt in 1968, the impression that President Park left on American diplomats was 
already that of a “[h]ighly emotional, volatile, frustrated and introspective” (FRUS 2000, 
385) man. Speaking with the Head of the American Joint Chiefs of Staff in November 1969, 
Park even described war with North Korea as inevitable should America withdraw its 
troops (FRUS 2010b, 46). In April 1970, the South Korean Ambassador to the United 
States reported to the Department of State that the proposal of troop reductions had come 
to Park as a “profound shock” (FRUS 2010e, 57). Two months later, the South Korean 
head of state himself wrote a letter to Nixon in which he argued that the announcement of 
troop withdrawals would have “psychological adverse effects” on the Korean people and 
would leave them with an “unexpected shock” (FRUS 2010i).  
During the runup to the troop withdrawal, the decision makers in the United States were 
certainly aware of the South Korean fear of abandonment. After the announcement of the 
Nixon Doctrine, Kissinger spoke of an “overwhelming” (FRUS 2003, 112) fear of aban-
donment of America’s allies in Asia in case of a withdrawal of the US from the region45. 
In an internal memo, the American Joint Chiefs of Staff cautioned that any troop withdraw-
als “could cause anxiety to the Koreans” (FRUS 2010c) and leave the impression that the 
United States was retreating from its alliance commitments. The memo therefore argued 
for measures to offset these fears, for example support for the modernization of South Ko-
rea’s military forces. Similar rhetoric is visible in a memo of a National Security Council 
                                                     
45 Kissinger prefaced the document by saying that it was written by an aide and that “I do not agree 
with its every last word”. His statement about the fears of America’s allies in Asia does not refer to 
South Korea in particular and mentions several other countries; yet it is implied that all allies of the 
United States in the region are being referred to. 
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meeting in March 1970 during which both President Nixon and Vice President Agnew refer 
to the fears of Asian leaders about American intentions and the desire to avoid the impres-
sion of American disengagement from the region (FRUS 2010d). On another occasion, 
Agnew even compared the Nixon Doctrine’s reception among America’s allies in Asia to 
that of a “lead balloon” (Subcommittee on International Organizations of the Committee 
on International Relations. U.S. House of Representatives 1978, 60).  
One obvious question in this context is whether the South Korean fear of abandonment, 
and especially that of President Park, can be legitimately be described as an emotion. Talk 
about the fear of abandonment can, after all, be interpreted as nothing but a metaphor for 
strategic calculations about insecurity, reliability and trust. Yet there is reason to believe 
that this fear of abandonment was in fact an emotional reaction.  
As Kim argues, his fear “should not be dismissed as merely a self-serving excuse or anti-
communist propaganda” (H.-A. Kim 2011, 32). Park had good reasons to feel personally 
threatened by the political situation on the Korean peninsula. His wife had been shot by a 
North Korean sympathizer in 1974 during an assassination attempt on Park himself. Four 
years later, North Korean soldiers infiltrated South Korea and made their way to the Pres-
ident’s residence in order to kill him. The assassination attempt was thwarted only at a 
check point in front of the building and ended in a firefight that killed dozens. After a 
meeting with Park one month later, Cyrus Vance – a former United States Deputy Secretary 
of Defense sent to Seoul as an envoy - therefore wrote in a memorandum that these events 
had “unfortunate psychologic effects on him” and that “his fears for his own safety and that 
of his family were markedly increased” (FRUS 2000, 385).  
Beyond the geopolitical circumstances of South Korea, the fear of abandonment has also 
been described as an inherent trait of Park’s personality. As Chon argues in his biography 
of Park, anxieties about abandonment were dominant force in his life from early childhood 
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on. He was an unwanted child, and after multiple abortion attempts had failed, his family 
never hid this from him. His career can be interpreted through this lens as a struggle to 
achieve a sense of social belonging, for example in the military, and to gain of safety from 
the possibility of abandonment. A logical conclusion of this mindset: the desire for over-
coming weakness, insecurity and the reliance on others (Chon 2006). Controversial policies 
such as South Korea’s decision to pursue the development of nuclear weapons have there-
fore been interpreted as driven by Park’s fear of abandonment and the goal of acquiring 
independence, thereby ridding the country of the possibility that it might be abandoned, 
chiefly by the United States (Hymans, Kim, and Riecke 2001, 131). 
It therefore stands to reason that both South Korea’s political situation and Park’s personal 
situation drove this fear of abandonment, and that this fear went beyond cynical maneuver-
ing and had an emotional dimension. To my knowledge, no opinion surveys are available 
that allow for conclusions about how the wider public in South Korea felt during this era; 
yet it seems likely that at least Park did actually feel the fear of abandonment. It originated 
from the circumstances of his country, and it was emphasized by his biography and the 
close link between national security and his personal security. While these personal emo-
tions might have been of little relevance in a political system less centered on one individual, 
Park’s dominant role in the South Korean governance apparatus likely made his emotions 
influential enough to warrant understanding them as state emotions. 
The decision makers on the American side were probably aware of Park’s situation. As 
even Kissinger, who repeatedly was the source of much pressure on the South Korean gov-
ernment at the time, wrote by hand on a memorandum in 1970: “I feel sorry for Park” 
(FRUS 2010j, 165). 
The American government, thus, took various steps to alleviate the South Korean fear of 
abandonment. In August 1969, one month after the Nixon Doctrine had been announced, 
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the US President assured President Park during a meeting in San Francisco that “I rejected 
the idea of decreasing the number of our men staying” (FRUS 2009, 35). Nevertheless, at 
the end of that year, the United States announced its plans to withdraw troops. Nixon wrote 
two letters to Park during the following summer in which he assured him of the ongoing 
commitment of the United States to the shared alliance, the sufficient strength of America’s 
remaining troops (together with the armed forces of South Korea) to ensure South Korea’s 
security, and of plans to provide the country with the means for a comprehensive modern-
ization of its armed forces (FRUS 2010f, 2010j). Vice President Agnew even made a trip 
to Seoul in August 1970 in order to personally provide President Park with reassurances of 
America’s commitment46. 
Not only did the United States seek to reassure the South Korea government that its national 
security would not be negatively affected by the troop withdrawals and that it would be 
compensated through a modernization of its armed forces. Nixon’s Assistant for National 
Security Affairs, Henry Kissinger, even gave these plans a positive spin in a memorandum 
for a Member of Congress who was about to travel to Korea. In that memo, the troop with-
drawals are presented as “a means of assuring that [the United States] can continue to co-
operate over the long term in assuring Korean security” (FRUS 2010k, 13). After two dec-
ades without significant military confrontation on the Korean peninsula, the current troop 
levels would seem excessive to the public, as he argued; bringing back some troops would 
therefore alleviate pressures to withdraw from Korea. This illustrates the American effort 
                                                     
46 While Agnew’s trip to Seoul was meant to alleviate the South Korean fear of abandonment, it 
made the news also because of a statement by the Vice President prior to his departure. He stated 
that all American troops would be withdrawn anyway within five years, independent of the current 
dispute. This was “unexpected and contrary to the stated U.S. policy” and “greatly upset the Koreans” 
(Subcommittee on International Organizations of the Committee on International Relations. U.S. 
House of Representatives 1978, 67). The purpose and background of this statement are not clear. 
One interpretation is that Agnew intended it as a way of emphasizing to the South Korean govern-
ment that the presence of American troops should not be taken for granted. 
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to allay the South Korean fears, even though it is not clear whether this framing of the 
withdrawal plan ever reached the Park government in Seoul. 
Beyond diplomatic assurances, the United States provided South Korea with $1.5 billion 
in support for its military modernization, thereby covering a significant part of the project. 
Over the following years, this allowed the government in Seoul to acquire hundreds of 
tanks, artillery pieces, airplanes and anti-aircraft guns (J.-I. Kim 1996, 38–40; Nam 1986, 
101). The US Congress furthermore decided to approve the construction of an American 
arms factory in South Korea (Subcommittee on International Organizations of the Com-
mittee on International Relations. U.S. House of Representatives 1978, 66–68). Taken to-
gether, these efforts at allaying the South Korean fears of abandonment were able to over-
come the resistance of the Park government. While it was certainly not happy about the 
withdrawal of American troops, it was at least able to extract diplomatic commitments and 
military assistance from the United States. For this case as well as the “Nixon shocks” that 
preceded and followed it, Engel concluded that “it could be argued that the Nixon Doctrine 
did its best to relieve Korean fears of abandonment” (Engel 2016, 85) after each decision 
that undermined the faith in America’s security commitment.  
But while the details of the American plans to withdraw troops as well as the compensation 
for South Korea underwent lengthy debates and negotiations, and although decision makers 
in Washington, D.C. took the South Korean fears into account, the opposition of the Park 
government did not lead to a reconsideration. By the time Nixon was halfway through his 
first term in 1971, the number of American troops in South Korea had therefore been cut 
by 40% and stood at about 40.000. South Korea went along and began to shoulder more of 
its defense burden – to which the military modernization program is testament. This out-
come represents a successful exercise of power by the United States. The Nixon Doctrine 
and the “shift from paternalism to partnership in alliance policy” (Nam 1986, 67) were 
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successfully implemented on the Korean peninsula and, although not with the outspoken 
approval of the Park government, at least with its acquiescence.   
The change in attitude on the South Korean side is visible in American diplomatic cables 
of the time. In meetings with American diplomats during the summer of 1970, the attitude 
of President Park was marked by “hard line resistance”, “recalcitrance” and a “lack of sen-
sitivity” towards American concerns (FRUS 2010h). In a conversation with the American 
ambassador, he implied that troop reductions without his approval were not even possible 
under the shared alliance agreement (FRUS 2010g). In another meeting he insisted that 
consultations on the issue could not begin without guarantees regarding American support 
for South Korea’s military modernization (FRUS 2010l).  
A few months later, things looked markedly different. In October 1970, the South Korean 
government presented the American government with a draft agreement in which troop 
reductions would be accepted in exchange for guarantees of American support (FRUS 
2010m). Ten days later, the American Ambassador was “surprised to some extent by Park’s 
acquiescence” and his general acceptance of troop reductions (FRUS 2010n). 
This illustrates that power and the manipulation of emotions not only come together where 
the fear of abandonment is stirred, as was the case for America’s efforts to dissuade West 
Germany from its nuclear ambitions. The exercise of power through the manipulation of 
emotions also plays a role where the opposite is goal is pursued: calming down an ally’s 
fear of abandonment. Obviously, this exercise of power cannot be described as a form of 
compulsion. Rather, the American government was able to change the preferences of the 
South Korean government through incentives. While it was not able to win outright support 
from President Park for the troop withdrawals, it at least influenced him in a way that made 
him give up his stubborn opposition.  
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3. Sticks, Carrots and Fear: The US and South Korea 
The previous sections have illustrated how states can exercise power by stoking or allevi-
ating the fear of abandonment in other states. These two approaches cannot only be used 
on their own, but also simultaneously: on the one hand, the stoking of fear can be used to 
coerce another state into compliance; on the other hand, the alleviation of fears can be used 
to change preferences through softer means. The relationship between the United States 
and South Korea, once again, can be used to illustrate this. The simultaneous use of both 
approaches became visible, in particular, during the Presidency of Gerald Ford in the mid-
1970s and after it had become apparent that South Korea was trying to develop nuclear 
weapons of its own.  
The decision to acquire nuclear weapons was made in South Korea in response to the grow-
ing fear of abandonment and a lack of trust in American security commitments. This desire 
can therefore be interpreted as a reaction to the Nixon Doctrine, even though factors such 
as the American rapprochement with China and North Korean provocations certainly also 
played a role. From the early 1970s on, the government and scientists in South Korea there-
fore worked on a nuclear weapons program and tried to acquire the technology necessary 
to produce fissile materials from Canada and France.  
These decisions were made without prior consultation with the United States, were kept 
secret and led to a “nuclear ‘hide and seek’ game” (Choi and Park 2009, 377). South Korea 
utilized deceptive means, for example by describing its nuclear program as civilian in na-
ture, and sent signals to back this up, for example by signing the Nuclear Non-Proliferation 
Treaty in 1975. At the same time, it kept itself all options open, for example when President 
Park announced that his country would go nuclear should America recede its nuclear um-
brella (Burr 2017a, 2017b; Hong 2011, 487; Hymans, Kim, and Riecke 2001, 129–31; Jang 
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2016; Reiter 2016, 110; Subcommittee on International Organizations of the Committee on 
International Relations. U.S. House of Representatives 1978, 79–80). 
Nevertheless, the American government found out about the nuclear ambitions of its ally 
around early 1975. In February of that year, a National Security Council memorandum 
concluded based on reports from the American embassy in Seoul that South Korea “has 
entered the initial stage of nuclear weapons development” (FRUS 2010o). From then on, 
the United States opposed and tried to stop South Korea’s nuclear program. As the State 
Department explained in a telegram to the embassy in Seoul, nuclear weapons in South 
Korean hands would have a “major destabilizing effect” and “significant political impact” 
on neighboring countries. Among the potential consequences was a nuclear arms race in 
the region. It was therefore the “basic objective” to prevent this from happening (National 
Security Archive 1975b). Compromise was not an option as America’s interests in the re-
gional order as well as in the global nonproliferation regime were at stake (Hong 2011, 485, 
493).  
The communication between the State Department and the American embassy in Seoul as 
well as within the White House indicate that the development of a strategy to deal with this 
problem had to integrate a number of conflicting considerations. A swift and firm approach 
was seen as prudent, especially in the face of President Park’s recalcitrance and denials as 
well as with an eye on what was at stake in the region. At the same time, it was perceived 
as unlikely that South Korea could be permanently dissuaded from developing nuclear 
weapons as long as the United States could not provide a permanent and convincing secu-
rity guarantee. In conversations in the White House it was therefore acknowledged that 
“South Koreans had some reason for their concern over their future security” (U.S. Depart-
ment of State 2010). In fact, too much diplomatic pressure came with the potential to 
deepen the rifts between the United States and South Korea and to further weaken the 
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shared security alliance (Hong 2011, 499–500; U.S. Department of State 1975a, 1975c). 
The approach taken therefore reflected these conflicting considerations. 
On the one hand, the United States went to great lengths to stoke the South Korean fear of 
abandonment. As various accounts of the events stress, not all details of how this was done 
are known as relevant documents remain classified to the present day and many of the 
involved individuals are not alive anymore (Hong 2011, 500, 502; Young 2003, 20). Yet it 
is clear that the US exerted increasing pressure on the South Korean government. Initially, 
this was done by emphasizing the negative consequences that the nuclear program would 
have on the region’s stability and on American nuclear support, for example in the form of 
financial assistance (National Security Archive 1975a; U.S. Department of State 1975b, 
1976a). Beyond that, the US confronted the South Korean government with the possibility 
of reevaluating its security commitment should the nuclear program proceed against Amer-
ican interests. 
In August 1975, James R. Schlesinger, the American Secretary of Defense, made clear to 
President Park during a visit to Seoul that a South Korean nuclear program had the potential 
to jeopardize relations between the two countries (Oberdorfer and Carlin 1997, 71). A few 
months later, a telegram sent by Richard Sneider, the American ambassador to South Korea, 
to the Department of State advocated even stronger pressure. He recommended that it 
should be made unmistakably clear to the South Korean ambassador in Washington, D.C. 
that America was willing to reevaluate its military and political ties with South Korea 
should the nuclear program proceed (Hong 2011, 500, 501). One week after that, Sneider 
conveyed this to South Korean officials in Seoul (Hong 2011, 502). The same message was 
delivered by Philip Habib, the former American ambassador to South Korea, who had a 
reputation for frank talk and a well-established reputation in the Park government (Young 
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2003, 19–20). In Spring 1976 this was repeated once more by Donald Rumsfeld, who had 
taken over Schlesinger’s post as Secretary of Defense (Oberdorfer and Carlin 1997, 72). 
Oberdorfer and Carlin have labeled this approach as “the heaviest threat ever wielded by 
the United States against South Korea” (Oberdorfer and Carlin 1997, 72). This illustrates 
how the American government, on the one hand, employed extreme means to dissuade the 
Park government from developing nuclear weapons. It stands to reason that this approach 
was chosen to stir and utilize the South Korean fear of abandonment, especially because 
decision makers in Washington, D.C. must have been well aware of this fear based on the 
experiences made in the aftermath of the Nixon doctrine’s announcement.  
On the other hand, the United States also tried to alleviate the South Korean fear of aban-
donment during the clash over the country’s nuclear weapons program. In 1975, the Amer-
ican government acknowledged for the first time publicly that tactical nuclear weapons had 
been deployed to South Korea. They had first been sent there shortly after the Korean War; 
as of the mid-1970s, several hundred nuclear weapons of different types were stored in 
South Korea. Around the same time, the American military began to regularly visit South 
Korean ports with submarines carrying ballistic missiles and nuclear warheads. These dis-
plays of the nuclear umbrella have been interpreted as a means of reassuring the Park gov-
ernment that South Korea was protected by a nuclear deterrent even without a nuclear 
weapons program of its own (Kristensen and Norris 2017, 351–52; O’Neil 2013, 61; Roeh-
rig 2017, 149). During testimony in Congress in June 1975, this message was supported by 
Schlesinger’s statement that nuclear retaliation for the purpose of defending allied nations 
was an option for the United States (S.-Y. Kim 2001, 64; O’Neil 2013, 61).  
Schlesinger also delivered further assurances during high-level meetings with the Korean 
government. In August 1975, he assured President Park and several other high-ranking 
officials that America was fully committed to South Korea, that there are no plans and 
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desires for troop reductions in the coming years, and that the United States was willing to 
support the local defense industry, the development of South Korea’s defense forces, and 
to expand joint military exercises (Wilson Center Digital Archive 1975). And going beyond 
assurances to South Korea in particular, President Ford announced in December 1975 his 
“Pacific Doctrine” and emphasized that America’s national security was dependent on its 
commitments in Asia (Naughton 1975). 
This combination of threats and assurances, of measures to stoke and alleviate South Ko-
rea’s fear of abandonment, was successful: by 1976, the Park government indicated that it 
was giving up its nuclear program. In January of that year, Sneider recommended that the 
United States should take pressure off the Park government, most likely because conces-
sions on the South Korean side had become visible (Hong 2011, 502). At the end of the 
month, the Park government stated in discussions with United States officials that it was 
considering to step away from the plan to purchase nuclear reprocessing facilities from 
France. In exchange, the American government held out the prospect of expanding the co-
operation and assistance in various areas relating to the peaceful use of nuclear energy (U.S. 
Department of State 1976b). As a result, historical accounts of South Korea’s nuclear weap-
ons program generally locate the end of the country’s nuclear ambitions in late 1975 or 
early 1976 (Debs and Monteiro 2017, 377; Hong 2011, 507; Lin 2012, 181; Reiter 2016, 
110). 
This supposedly straightforward narrative comes with two caveats. For one, the American 
attempt to stop the South Korean nuclear weapons program was not restricted to the bilat-
eral relations between the two countries. The United States also lobbied the governments 
of Canada and France to reconsider or at least delay the sale of nuclear technology to South 
Korea. As a result, the Canadian government made the sale of a nuclear reactor conditional 
on South Korea not purchasing a reprocessing plant from France (Burr 2017b; Lin 2012, 
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179). Kissinger described this requirement in January 1976 as a “knockout blow” (U.S. 
Department of State 1976c, 3) to the Park government’s desire for a reprocessing plant. In 
addition, both Canada and France joined in on the American pressure on South Korea to 
ratify the Non-Proliferation Treaty in April 1975, thus setting up additional hurdles for any 
nuclear weapons program by the Park government (Hong 2011, 499). 
Secondly, the situation in early 1976 did not mark the end of the story of South Korea’s 
nuclear ambitions. One year after, Jimmy Carter became President in the United States and 
was openly talking about renewed troop withdrawals from South Korea (Malcolm 1977). 
This reignited the Park government’s ambition to acquire a nuclear deterrent. Based on the 
agreement from a year earlier, the acquisition of the necessary technology from abroad was 
not seen as feasible. And as the country had ratified the Non-Proliferation Treaty and faced 
suspicion from the United States, it could hardly engage in the direct development of nu-
clear weapons. The Park government therefore focused its efforts on the acquisition of the 
knowledge and technology to develop nuclear weapons through an indigenous civilian pro-
gram. These plans led to several research programs but largely came to an end with Park’s 
assassination in 1979 (Hong 2011, 508–10). 
Regardless of these caveats, the events during the Ford Presidency thereby illustrate how 
the fear of abandonment can be simultaneously stirred and alleviated. The approach of the 
United States for exercising power over South Korea has therefore been described as in-
volving both “carrots and sticks” (Hersman and Peters 2006, 548; Lin 2012, 179).  
This case furthermore illustrates that the fear of abandonment can be stirred both intention-
ally and unintentionally. That the Nixon doctrine led to a growing fear of abandonment in 
South Korea was both an unintentional and undesired outcome of American foreign policy 
decision making. That the American attempts to dissuade the Park government from devel-
oping nuclear weapons stirred the South Korean fear of abandonment, on the other hand, 
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was intentional and desired. The relations between the two countries during the 1970s 
therefore illustrate various other aspects of how power and the fear of abandonment interact 
beyond what is visible in the first example based on America’s efforts to dissuade West 
Germany from going nuclear. 
In all three cases, the United States successfully exercised power. In dealing with the nu-
clear program of West Germany, the power mechanism at work was clearly compulsion as 
the government in Bonn was confronted with possible consequences it was not willing to 
endure. In contrast to that, the effort to alleviate the South Korean fear of abandonment 
during the Nixon era utilized the mechanism of preference change in order to convince the 
government of President Park of America’s commitment to the shared alliance. Lastly, the 
way in which the United States got South Korea to abandon its nuclear ambitions show-
cases a combination of both mechanisms. What united these examples: the fear of aban-
donment was an object of power relations and an emotion that was intentionally shaped, 




VII. Anger  
1. Provoking Anger: Prussia and France 
Beyond shock and fear, the link between power and a third emotions will be illustrated with 
the afore-mentioned example of the Franco-Prussian War in 1870 and 1871. During the 
months prior to the war, Prussia shaped French behavior through the creation of anger. As 
in the previous case studies, attention will be given to both the considerations made on the 
Prussian side and the reactions on the French side. This historical episode was previously 
analyzed with an eye on the emotions at work by Hall. His focus lay on the emotional 
component of provocation. But while he linked the act of provocation to considerations 
about power, this was done in an implicit fashion (Hall 2017a). The account of the lead-up 
to the Franco-Prussian War provided here thus strives to offer a perspective different from 
Hall’s in that it analyzes the events with a focus on the exercise of power and the manipu-
lation of emotions for this purpose. 
The historical context of the events is the search for a new king in Spain after the revolution 
of 1868 which toppled Queen Isabella II47. A suitable candidate was found in Leopold, 
Prince of Hohenzollern48, who was subsequently offered the crown by the leaders of the 
Spanish revolution. While Leopold was disinclined to accept, he was willing to “appreciate 
reasons which would subordinate his personal wishes to considerations of high policy” 
                                                     
47 While the search for a new king of Spain provided the immediate context of the Franco-Prussian 
War, a number of other developments contributed to the ongoing tensions between Prussia and 
France. Among them were two other disputes relating to the German emperor’s official title and a 
railway through Switzerland. Additionally, the decision-makers in both Prussia and France faced 
domestic predicaments that contributed to their willingness to escalate the tensions between their 
countries (Wawro 2003, 29–33). 
48 The House of Hohenzollern had been ruling the Kingdom of Prussia ever since its creation in 
1701. From the Franco-Prussian War onwards, the German Emperors came from the House of Ho-
henzollern until the end of Germany’s monarchy in 1918. 
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(Steefel 1962, 54). The decision was therefore deferred to Wilhelm I., the head of the Ho-
henzollern family and the King of Prussia. His chancellor, Otto von Bismarck, outlined in 
a memo the benefits Prussia could expect from putting Leopold on the Spanish throne: a 
prestigious post, increased commercial exchange with Spain, and a military ally to south 
of France, which would keep the French animosity towards Prussia in check and encircle 
it in case of war (Steefel 1962, 57–58).  
The last point is of particular importance once the political climate of the era is taken into 
account. Prussia had anti-French sentiments lingering from the Napoleonic wars (1803-
1815) and was acutely aware of its own growing national strength. France was suspicious 
of Europe’s tilting balance of power, especially after Prussia’s territorial expansion in the 
aftermath of the war with Austria in 1866. On top of that, a war with France was seen in 
Prussia as a potential opportunity to unite with the southern German states (Headlam 1899, 
315–16). As Bismarck reminisced in his biography: “I took it as assured that war with 
France would necessarily have to be waged on the road to our further national development” 
(Bismarck 1898, 57). In this context, the decision whether to accept the Spanish offer and 
put Leopold on the throne was not merely a family affair of the Hohenzollern house but a 
question of European power politics. 
By the end of June 1870, the candidacy was approved by Wilhelm I. and accepted by Leo-
pold. Although it was Bismarck’s intention to delay the announcement and to keep the 
Prussian involvement secret, the French government found out in early July. Its position 
was promptly announced in a statement by foreign minister Antoine de Gramont. It labeled 
the Prussian ambition to put Leopold on the Spanish throne as a threat to Europe’s balance 
of power and to French interests and honor. Should the Prussian plan be realized, “we shall 
know how to discharge our duty without faltering or weakness” (as quoted in Steefel 1962, 
114). France, in other words, was infuriated and threatened war in response to what was 
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perceived as a major insult and threat. In the words of the Prussian ambassador to France, 
“the devil is loose in Paris. It looks like war” (as quoted in Steinberg 2011, 285). 
Driven by the desire to keep the peace, Wilhelm I. wrote to Leopold’s father who subse-
quently convinced his son to renounce the candidacy for the Spanish throne on July 12. 
Bismarck learned of this change of plans only after the fact and retained his position that 
war with France was, ultimately, a necessity (Steefel 1962, 174; Steinberg 2011, 286). Yet 
this Prussian concession was not deemed sufficient on the French side. During a conversa-
tion with Wilhelm I. in the German spa town of Bad Ems on July 13, the French ambassador 
to Prussia, Count Vincent Benedetti, demanded a guarantee that no similar efforts at placing 
a Prussian candidate on the Spanish throne would ever be made again. The king rejected 
this demand as well as the request of a further meeting with the ambassador who wanted 
to discuss the matter once more. 
On the face of it, the matter was therefore settled. After Wilhelm I. had met with the am-
bassador, Bismarck received a telegram by the king containing a summary of the conver-
sation in Bad Ems as well as the authorization to publish its contents to the press as well as 
the Prussian embassies abroad. Bismarck did as he was told – yet he shortened the account 
of the meeting to about half of its original length, thereby changing its tone. The edited 
version did not add anything that was not part of the original version, yet it removed the 
conciliatory rhetoric of the Prussian king and turned the event into a “brusque confrontation” 
(Carr 1991, 197). The result was a press release that cast the courteous meeting between 
Wilhelm I. and the French ambassador as an impolite rebuke after the diplomat’s demand 
of further concessions.  
The implicit conclusion of the account that was published was that Prussia had just rebuffed 
the French Ambassador and terminated diplomatic relations, done so without even provid-
ing an explanation, and communicated this not through diplomatic channels but rather via 
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the media for all the world to see (see Steefel 1962, 189; Wawro 2003, 37). The text printed 
in the continent’s newspapers thereby turned “a dynastic insult into a national one” (Wawro 
2003, 301) and was “a slap in the face” (Gall 1986, 359) for France. Additionally, this 
account of the meeting in Bad Ems was communicated to the other European powers via 
the Prussian embassies in order to “give the affront a formal and official character” (Lord 
1924, 104).  
In his memoirs, Bismarck justified this step with the defense of “the honour of Prussia and 
the national confidence in it” (Bismarck 1898, 100) against the presumptuous French dip-
lomatic conduct49. He was well-aware that the likely outcome would be an ignition of the 
mutual animosities in both France and Prussia, and therefore war. But as long as the hos-
tilities were initiated on the French side, this was perceived as a success. The international 
perception of Prussia as a victim would serve the German “impetus towards our national 
development” (Bismarck 1898, 98), unite the German states under Prussia’s leadership 
against a common enemy and prevent the intervention of any outside powers, as he calcu-
lated (Gall 1986, 359).   
There is evidence that this was more than mere opportunism by Bismarck but the outcome 
of longstanding plans. More than a year before the events in summer 1870 he already told 
a Russian diplomat about his intention to provoke France so it would attack Prussia. This 
would allow Prussia to engage in a conflict with France without giving an aggressive im-
pression, as he later on reminisced in his writings (Clark 1942, 197). 
                                                     
49 It remains an open question to what extent Bismarck saw this as a personal defeat and not only 
than a national humiliation. As he writes in his memoirs, the initial decision by Prussia to withdraw 
Leopold’s candidature after the French threat of war brought him to the verge of resigning from 
government service. “This impression of a wound to our sense of national honour by the compulsory 
withdrawal so dominated me that I had already decided to announce my retirement at Ems” (Bis-
marck 1898, 94). 
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The role that emotions, and especially the arousal of anger in the face of humiliation, were 
supposed to play in this plot is visible in Bismarck’s own recollections50. The Ems Dispatch, 
as the account of the meeting in Bad Ems that was released to the public became known as, 
was intended as a “red rag upon the Gallic bull” and supposed to play on “Gallic overween-
ing and touchiness” (Bismarck 1898, 101). As the chancellor’s words emphasize, his goal 
was not merely the evocation of emotions for their own sake, but rather for the purpose of 
eliciting an aggressive response from French decision-makers. Thus, the Prussian chancel-
lor attempted to manipulate emotions on the French side in order to make France act in 
accordance with his preferences and declare war on Prussia. 
Bismarck’s plan proved to be successful. The French mobilization began on July 14, the 
day after the Ems Dispatch had been publicized, and on July 19 a declaration of war was 
sent to Prussia. The driving force was the public’s reaction which swept from anger to 
enthusiasm about the opportunity to answer the Prussian provocation. French decision-
makers faced a “rising crescendo of public excitement” (Wetzel 2003, 161; see also Kolkey 
1996, 133). Crowds were shouting “On to Berlin! Down with Wilhelm! Down with Bis-
marck!” (as quoted in Wawro 2003, 38) in the streets of Paris and spectators were cheering 
for the troops even at remote train station in the countryside (Wawro 2003, 65). In the 
words of Wetzel: 
                                                     
50 Obviously, Bismarck wrote his memoirs after the fact and might have described the events of July 
1870 in a manner that fits his interests and the image of himself he would like to promote. It has 
therefore been argued that the “statements in his memoirs are notoriously unreliable and misleading” 
(Lord 1924, v). The narrative according to which Bismarck planned the Franco-Prussian war well 
in advance as the last chapter of the two countries’ competition “does not today command general 
assent” (Howard 2001, 40) Additionally, the possibility of the hindsight bias at play has to be kept 
in mind: the predictability and influenceability of events may seem obvious after they have occurred, 
even though none of this may have been evident at the time. It is therefore worth keeping in mind 
that Bismarck’s recollections may – intentionally or unintentionally – misrepresent the events.  
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Much of the country was celebrating. In Paris, something like hysteria reigned; 
mobs in the street blurted out the forbidden Marseillaise and shouted 'Vive la 
guerre!' by day and night. Unbridled joy filled the air. (Wetzel 2003, 3; em-
phasis in original) 
This outpouring of national sentiment left an impression among the elite: nothing but a 
display of swift and decisive action by the government against Prussia would be acceptable 
to the upset masses. The recollections of Émile Olliver, at the time Prime Minister of France, 
illustrate this. In a conversation with Emperor Napoleon III. he cautioned that “the people 
would throw mud at our carriages and hoot us” if the decision about how to react to the 
Prussian provocation would not be taken by the Emperor but left to parliament. The Em-
peror agreed, saying that the decision to go to war had to be taken regardless of necessity 
“in order to comply with the will of the people” (Olliver 1914, 321). 
Similar sentiments arose within the government. Olliver himself describes in his book on 
the origins of the war that “I was beaten in my fight for peace. […] After this slap in the 
face from Bismarck peace was no longer possible save in weakness, in humiliation, in de-
basement” (Olliver 1914, 326). He also quotes his foreign minister, Antoine Gramont, as 
stating to him that “you see before you a man who has just been slapped in the face” (as 
quoted in Wetzel 2003, 165). In the same vein, the other ministers of the cabinet perceived 
the Ems Dispatch and its flaunting in the press and through diplomatic channels as a “de-
liberate insult”, just as the chambers of the French parliament “howled for war” (Lord 1924, 
114–15). 
This indicates that the Prussian behavior created anger and the enthusiasm to go to war 
both among the elites as well as the wider public. At the same time, it is noteworthy that 
the French decision makers in private spoke of the necessity to behave in a way that would 
fit the public anger. It stands to reason that Napoleon III. and his Prime Minister had qualms 
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about going to war that were overwhelmed by the public’s war fever, as their conversation 
about the necessity to align with the popular sentiment illustrates. But as Welch argues, the 
French cabinet was not in a position to resist the public’s call for war and the government 
so weak that it might not have survived opposing these demands (Welch 1993, 87). 
With this in mind, the events in July 1880 showcase three forms of outrage as they were 
conceptualized by Hall in his paper on provocation and the Franco-Prussian war: the per-
sonal outrage of decision makers; the performative outrage of decision makers which com-
municates to the public an image of outrage; and the public outrage (Hall 2017a). In the 
lead-up to the Franco-Prussian war, a combination of all three forms of outrage can be seen 
as the driving force behind the events. The perception that Prussia had treated France in a 
disrespectful manner “resonated through the government and public alike” (Welch 1993, 
88). As Hall argues, “French attention—both official and popular—became fixated upon 
immediate satisfaction, and no other option but the blind rush to war became thinkable” 
(Hall 2017a, 25). On top of that, the decision makers around Napoleon III. knew about the 
performance that the angry public expected from them. 
As has to be emphasized, the target of this anger was primarily the style of Prussia’s be-
havior, independent of its larger implications for great power politics and the balance of 
power in Europe. Olliver singles out the Ems Dispatch in his memoirs as the decisive factor 
behind the French declaration of war. As he writes, the war was caused by neither the ten-
sions between Prussia and France during the previous months and years, nor the Prussian 
refusal to guarantee a renunciation of the Spanish throne, nor the rejection of the French 
Ambassador by the Prussian king. Instead, the French “were outraged by that refusal of an 
audience solely because it had become a palatable insult by virtue of the promulgation of 
the telegram placarded in the streets and transmitted to the legations and newspapers” (Ol-
liver 1914, 335). 
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The same emphasis on the style of Prussia’s behavior – and the emotional reaction it caused 
in France – instead of its substance can be found in a statement of Napoleon III. in a con-
versation with Olliver. “Just see in what a position a government may sometimes find itself: 
even if we had no admissible excuse for war, we should be obliged none the less to make 
our minds to it, in order to comply with the will of the country” (as quoted in Olliver 1914, 
321). Olliver’s own statements point in the same direction. In front of the parliament he 
argued that war was necessary to defend French dignity in the face of Prussian “pieces of 
theater”, without mentioning any larger necessity51. In his words, the cabinet was accepting 
this responsibility “with light heart” (as quoted in Wawro 2003, 39) and without any qualms. 
Other sources equally reference the French sense of honor and its violation. Carr argues 
that the runup to the Franco-Prussian War saw the emergence of a perception of interna-
tional affairs “which substituted for rational discussion of disputes the ethos of a dueling 
match” (Carr 1991, 203). Without this attitude, the events in Spring and Summer 1870 
could not have escalated towards a declaration of war. In the same vein, Olliver stresses 
this feeling of the inevitability to declare war in response to the Prussian provocation in his 
recollections. He saw “France […] threatened in her dignity and her honor” (Olliver 1914, 
298); “we had no choice. Placed between a doubtful war and a dishonorable peace, we were 
compelled to pronounce for the war” (Olliver 1914, 396). 
In this context of the violation of the French sense of honor, anger and the lust for revenge, 
voices that urged caution were quickly drowned out, attempts at solving the crisis through 
diplomacy among the great powers were abandoned, and political moderation became an 
                                                     
51 As other sources emphasize, the Prussian behavior not only violated the French sense of pride and 
honor but was also met with “one genuine French perception of injustice” (Welch 1993, 89) The 
Prussian attempt at installing a member of the Hohenzollern family on the Spanish throne went 
against the international norm of asking for consent among Europe’s great powers before placing 
someone on a foreign throne. 
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impossibility. Adolphe Thiers, a politician who would become President of the Third 
French Republic later during the same year, even called out the government in front of 
parliament for going to war without a substantive reason: “Do you want all of Europe to 
say that although the substance of the quarrel was settled, you have decided to pour out 
torrents of blood over a mere matter of form?” (as quoted in Howard 2001, 56; see also 
Olliver 1914, 330–31; Wawro 2003, 39).  
As a result, France declared war on Prussia without a substantial reason, without having 
realistic objectives and without a clear prospect for victory. From today’s perspective, this 
decision therefore seems irrational (Aschmann 2005, 151). Kolb equally argues that “irra-
tional-emotionale Faktoren” (irrational-emotional factors) (Kolb 1970, 131; translated 
from German by the author) played a dominant role at the cost of a somber analysis of the 
situation and the diplomatic options. Howard goes so far as to speak of a “tragic combina-
tion of ill-luck, stupidity, and ignorance” that led France to war “in a bad cause, with her 
army unready and without allies” (Howard 2001, 57). A similar judgment is reached by 
Wetzel who sees the war with Prussia as an example for the “irrational, costly and ulti-
mately self-destructive purposes” (Wetzel 2012, 143) that France pursued out of nationalist 
fervor among large parts of its society. 
Historians locate a primary reason for the French defeat in the hasty and chaotic mobiliza-
tion that followed on this enthusiasm. For the troops of Napoleon III. “everything turned 
on the speed with which they could deploy to the frontiers” (Wawro 2003, 65)52. Yet the 
mobilization ended in disorder as it was undertaken without a comprehensive plan, led by 
                                                     
52 At the same time, the urgency that sprang from French anger was not the only reason for a hasty 
mobilization. A quick mobilization was assumed to give France an upper hand in at the outset of the 
war as it had a large standing army, whereas Prussia would have to mobilize its reserves first in 
order to ready its smaller army for war (Wawro 2003, 85). 
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a disorganized high command, stymied by a lack of transport infrastructure, logistical dif-
ficulties and a lack of trained reserve soldiers. Not even the food supply of the soldiers on 
their way towards Prussia could be ensured. This chaos became the primary reason why 
France was at an overwhelming disadvantage in the war against Prussia from the beginning 
(Howard 2001, 52–59; Wawro 2003, 67–79). 
France, consequently, lost the war in a humiliating fashion and had to surrender in May 
1871. The armies of Prussia and its German allies “totally destroyed” (Howard 2001, 1) 
the French forces and laid bare its outdated foundations. It was inferior not only in terms 
of manpower, but also in its organization, logistics, strategic planning and leadership. 
These realities and the advancements made on the Prussian side had been openly visible 
for years, for example in the Austro-Prussian War of 1866. Yet they had not resulted in 
appropriate reforms of the French armed forces, partly out of complacency, partly because 
of domestic opposition (Carr 1991, 177; Wawro 2003, 41–53, 60–63). On the outset of the 
war, the French nation was nevertheless “confident in the invincibility of its army” (Olliver 
1914, 397), as Olliver wrote later. 
These evaluations emphasize what could have been visible to the French decision-makers: 
declaring war on Prussia was not in France’s national interest. But judging from the avail-
able evidence, these somber assessments of the situation were cast out by the anger about 
the Prussian diplomatic conduct and the enthusiasm to go to war. As a result, the French 
decision-makers were not only convinced that going to war was the right thing to do but 
also that France would win a war against Prussia (Carr 1991, 200–201; Olliver 1914, 298, 
397).  
This aspect of the Franco-Prussian War emphasizes how effective this exercise of power 
was: it not only changed French preferences but did so to an extent that made France act 
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against its actual interests. It is obviously difficult to determine the “real interest” of a na-
tion – after all, the French public as well as its government were convinced at the time that 
war was in their interest. Nevertheless, and in accordance with the historians cited on the 
previous pages, it shall be maintained here that the war did not serve France’s larger na-
tional interest, and that this was foreseeable.   
These observations about the French behavior are congruent with what psychology tells us 
about the effects of anger and the ways in which it influences human cognition, thinking, 
judgment and behavior. Anger is usually the result of situations which create the perception 
that the self has been offended or harmed by someone else. A central element of anger is 
therefore the perception of unfairness. The perceived source of this unfairness matters: an-
ger is different from sadness, which is usually the result of negative events that are blamed 
on circumstances, as well as from guilt and shame, which are usually the result of negative 
events for which oneself is responsible for (Frijda, Kuipers, and ter Schure 1989, 220; Jen-
nifer S. Lerner and Tiedens 2006, 117; Mauro, Sato, and Tucker 1992, 309).  
One consequence of anger is the desire to answer the injustice with punishment, independ-
ent of the offender’s intentions (Goldberg, Lerner, and Tetlock 1999, 789). In fact, anger 
influences causal judgments and determines how others are seen and how blame is assigned 
to them. The perception of others as responsible is therefore an integral element of what it 
means to experience anger. As Keltner et al. argue, under the influence of anger even “our 
colleagues, friends, loved ones, and children seem lazy, manipulative, and intentionally 
obtuse” (Keltner, Ellsworth, and Edwards 1993, 751). On the collective level, anger has 
been associated with “a psychological readiness to evaluate outgroups negatively vis-á-vis 
ingroups” and the appearance of negative prejudices against out-groups “from thin air” 
(DeSteno, Dasgupta, et al. 2004, 323).  
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As a result, anger leads to “antagonistic tendencies” (Frijda, Kuipers, and ter Schure 1989, 
220; emphasis in original) and the desire to act. In the words of Izard, anger creates an 
“impulse to strike out, to attack the source of anger” and “the need for physical action” 
(Izard 1991, 241). Various studies indicate that these urges go beyond verbal expressions 
of anger and create a desire of physical action with the intention of inflicting hurt on a 
target (Berkowitz 1999, 424–25). Elster (2009, 402) describes the action tendency created 
by anger simply as the desire to cause suffering in the object of anger. Nussbaum even goes 
so far as to argue that “anger conceptually contains the payback wish” (Nussbaum 2016, 
35). Against this backdrop, the French desire to punish Prussia for the perceived offense 
and the enthusiasm to go to war can be interpreted as a direct result of anger.  
In the context of the Franco-Prussian war, the action tendencies on the French side can 
aptly be described as the desire for revenge (or vengeance). This desire it by no means the 
only outcome that anger can produce, although it has been described as an integral compo-
nent of it. The events in Summer 1870 fit Elster’s definition of revenge as “the attempt, at 
some cost or risk to oneself, to impose suffering upon those who have made one suffer, 
because they have made one suffer” (Elster 1990, 862). It is noteworthy that revenge in 
itself is not an emotion, yet the desire for revenge showcases all the hallmarks of an emotion, 
among them a state of impulse and physical excitement as well as an action tendency to-
wards a specific target (Frijda 2007, 260). In reaction to the Prussian provocation, the par-
ticular form that anger took on the French side can thus be described as the desire for re-
venge.  
The role that honor played during this historical episode emphasizes how anger brought 
about the desire for revenge. Of all the explanations that have been advanced for why hu-
mans develop the desire for revenge, Elster (1990, 883) considers the drive to assert one’s 
honor as the most convincing. Elsewhere, too, the drive to restore pride and escape shame, 
181 
 
to get even and correct a perceived loss of power are seen as reasons for why we desire 
revenge (Frijda 2007, 265–74). This fits with how historians see the French sense of honor 
and its violation at the center of the Franco-Prussian war. Anger therefore went hand in 
hand with the desire to right the perceived wrong, possibly to the extent that this desire was 
perceived as a moral duty (Aschmann 2005, 153–54).   
These action tendencies induced by anger go hand in hand with a sense of urgency. The 
concept is different from impatience: whereas the latter describes a preference for early 
rewards, urgency refers to a preference for early action (Elster 2009). This helps to explain 
why France declared war against Prussia a mere six days after the Ems Dispatch had been 
released and in the absence of any urgent threat that would have necessitated this haste.    
The historical circumstances were conducive to this reaction. The French anger was created 
in a situation in which the relations with Prussia were already strained and characterized 
by aggressive tendencies on both sides. It is possible that the result was a vicious cycle. As 
Tiedens (2001, 248) argues, aggressive individuals make more hostile inferences, which in 
turn make aggressive behavior more likely. Thus, it stands to reason that the Prussian prov-
ocation might have had less of an effect if relations with France had not already been at a 
low point. 
From anger, thus, came the desire to respond to the offense and punish Prussia, which led 
France into a war that it would lose decisively. Anger can be part of the explanation for the 
seeming irrationality of this decision: as various studies have shown, it decreases risk per-
ceptions, leads to more optimistic evaluations as well as to risk-seeking behavior (Hemeno-
ver and Zhang 2004; J. S. Lerner and Keltner 2001; J. S. Lerner et al. 2003; Jennifer S. 
Lerner and Tiedens 2006, 123). In fact, the judgments of probabilities and consequences 
made by angry individuals are similar to those made by happy individuals and, thus, very 
182 
 
different from the pessimistic outlook of individuals under the influence of fear (J. S. Ler-
ner and Keltner 2001, 150). From the French perspective, the odds of winning a war against 
Prussia might therefore have looked better than they actually were. 
Other consequences of anger, too, indicate that it likely had an effect on French reasoning 
and decision making. Anger has been associated by various studies with a feeling of cer-
tainty about what is going on, a lower depth of mental processing as well as an increased 
reliance on stereotypes (Bodenhausen, Kramer, and Süsser 1994, 621; Jennifer S. Lerner 
and Tiedens 2006, 125–26; Tiedens and Linton 2001, 981). Angry individuals are therefore 
likely to take mental shortcuts and to “rely on simple cues in reacting to social stimuli” 
(Bodenhausen, Sheppard, and Kramer 1994, 58), possibly because anger elicits quick re-
sponses meant to deal with a source of harm. The afore-mentioned sense of urgency that 
anger creates also plays into this as it leads to “short-term-ism” (Elster 2009, 403) through 
which little time is spent on the gathering of information and the thinking about long-term 
consequences. 
Emotions like anger also help to determine how attention is directed and information pro-
cessed. Depending on their emotional state, individuals tend to consider information as 
more persuasive that matches their own emotions. For example, angry individuals consider 
arguments in favor of tax increases as more convincing if these were presented as necessary 
to deal with angering problems (such as traffic jams) rather than saddening problems (such 
as the plight of special-needs children). In other words: angry individuals “turn to their 
emotions as a source of information” (DeSteno, Petty, et al. 2004, 52). 
While much of the research on anger and its effects concerns itself with individuals, some 
of these insights were shown to also apply to groups of individuals and other collectives. 
As Mackie et al. argue, anger makes members of a group more likely to show “action 
tendencies like arguing with, confronting, opposing, and attacking the out-group” (Mackie, 
183 
 
Devos, and Smith 2000, 613), especially compared to the influence of fear. Similar to what 
was already mentioned about individuals, the study by Mackie et al. also illustrates that the 
perception of one’s own group as strong increases the experience of anger and, thus, the 
inclination to act against another group (Mackie, Devos, and Smith 2000, 614).  
The political implications of anger’s effects on cognition, thinking, judgment and behavior 
in the context of political decision making have been looked at by a number of authors. On 
the basis of surveys, Huddy et al. analyzed the effects of anger and anxiety on public sup-
port for the Iraq War in 2002 and 2003 in the United States. As they conclude: “Anger 
leads to a reduced perception of the war's risks and promotes support for military interven-
tion” (Huddy, Feldman, and Cassese 2007, 228). They furthermore reason that anger leads 
to a proclivity for action and lets individuals adopt opinions that are “designed to propel 
action by ignoring contrary information about possible risks” (Huddy, Feldman, and 
Cassese 2007, 229). The authors interpret this as an expression of a lower intellectual effort 
that is put into thinking about decisions under the influence of anger. 
Of particular relevance in the context of international relations is also the link between self-
perception and anger. As Lebow writes about the Aristotelian understanding of anger, it is 
“a luxury that can only be felt by those in a position to seek revenge” (Lebow 2008, 69). 
France saw itself on eye-level with Prussia, thus it experienced the anger that great powers 
feel “when they are denied entry into the system, recognition as a great power or treated in 
a manner demeaning to their understanding of their status” (Lebow 2008, 69). For the con-
text of the events in 1870 this implies that a weaker state than France might have experi-
enced the Prussian humiliation without an angry reaction.  
These implications of anger help to illuminate the French decision to go to war. It is likely 
that cognition, thinking, judgment and behavior on the French side were shaped by anger. 
One can assume that this influence of anger manifested itself in several aspects of this 
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historical episode: the intensive French desire to punish Prussia and the righteous believe 
in the utility of war; the believe in the French capacity to decisively strike against Prussia; 
the optimism and urgency with which France took to arms; and the blindness for infor-
mation that would have led to a reconsideration of the chances for victory in an armed 
conflict with Prussia. While this, obviously, is a counterfactual, it stands to reason that 
Franco-Prussian relations and European history might have taken a different course without 
these influences of anger.  
From the outside, the French response to Bismarck’s provocation creates the “Eindruck 
von Irrationalität” (impression of irrationality) (Aschmann 2005, 151; translated from Ger-
man by the author), of “stupidity, and ignorance” (Howard 2001, 57), and of decisions that 
served only “irrational, costly and ultimately self-destructive purposes” (Wetzel 2012, 143). 
These harsh evaluations of the French behavior are common judgments of behavior that is 
driven by the desire for revenge. The “apparent uselessness of revenge and its occasional 
self-destructiveness” (Frijda 2007, 261) are among the hallmarks of this desire and make it 
seem, from the outside and in hindsight, as inherently irrational. France, furthermore, is 
certainly not alone in the history of international relations in that it was driven by this desire. 
As Lebow and Stein write:  
From Masada to the Irish Easter Rising, from Thermopylae to the resistance 
of the beleaguered Finns in 1940 [...] Honor, anger, and national self-respect 
proved more compelling motives for action than pragmatic calculations of ma-
terial loss and gain would have been reasons for acquiescence or passivity. 
(Lebow and Stein 2007, 125) 
Yet it is questionable if the desire for revenge in itself can be actually considered irrational 
or unpragmatic. An actor can expect meaningful gains from the desire for revenge, for 
example the restoration of a sense of honor, pride and justice. What may be considered 
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irrational are the emotions that underpin this desire for revenge (Frijda 2007, 264–65). 
Once the French mood was characterized by anger, the desire for revenge and the conclu-
sion that this desire should be enacted by going to war were thus rational conclusions from 
the French perspective. Thus, if France is to blame for anything in this context, it is proba-
bly for falling victim to this degree of anger, not for reaching certain conclusions under this 
influence of anger. 
Regardless of these evaluations in hindsight, the French perspective at the time was quite 
different and characterized by enthusiasm, certainty, a feeling of righteousness and opti-
mism. This illustrates what Lerner and Tiedens have argued about anger: while it is usually 
perceived as a negative emotion in hindsight, the actual experience of anger can be positive, 
energizing and even joyful. The action tendencies caused by anger, after all, lead to forward 
reflection and plans that address the source of the anger (Jennifer S. Lerner and Tiedens 
2006, 129–30). This gave the French public as well as the country’s decision makers little 
incentive to question the assumptions they were making and the actions they were under-
taking. Instead of careful considerations that take into account all available information, 
anger became the dominant determinant of the French incentive structure.     
The exercise of power described by this case study can therefore be found in the creation 
of anger and the subsequent influence of this anger on the behavior of France. It changed 
the perceived costs and benefits associated with the available courses of action and, as a 
result, led French decision makers as well as the public to conclude that going to war with 
Prussia was a more attractive option than the alternatives, for example a mere diplomatic 
voicing of anger. 
The target of this exercise of power – or, in the schematic terms used in this study, actor B 
– were the individuals that constitute the French nation as a collective actor. Both the elites 
as well as the wider public experienced anger, and whereas the actual decision to declare 
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war against Prussia was made by the former, the popular demands for an armed response 
were part of the reason why this decision was made. This does not imply that every last 
citizen of France felt this emotion. But the anger that overcame France was sufficient to 
create an impression among decision makers of national outrage, and to lead to decisions 
at the very top that made the nation as a collective actor behave in a way that was intended 
by Bismarck.  
Actor A, consequently, has to be found on the Prussian side. But whereas France as a nation 
was targeted and affected by this exercise of power, it was not exercised by Prussia as a 
nation. The decisive actions were all undertaken by Bismarck himself and without much 
contribution or even knowledge of other parts of the Prussian government. Even Wilhelm 
I. cannot be described as an active and willing participant in Prussia’s instigation of a war 
with France. “His conduct and his talk throughout the crisis show that he was reluctant, in 
his old age, to engage in another war” (Steefel 1962, 214). Going beyond this assessment, 
Welch concludes that “the King, too, had been a pawn in Bismarck’s game” (Welch 1993, 
91). In the context of this case study, actor A can therefore be found in a single person – 
even though the French people certainly saw Bismarck’s behavior as representative for 
Prussia as a whole. 
In summary, this case study argues that Prussia, first and foremost in the person of Otto 
von Bismarck, was able to influence France’s first as well as second order preferences in a 
way that suited its own interests. By violating the French sense of honor and by creating 
emotions such as anger, Prussia got France to want what it wanted it to want: declaring war. 
This decision was made against the real national interest of France and illustrates how the 
manipulation of emotions can change preferences. 
As in the case study on the American nuclear bombs dropped on Japan, it must be empha-
sized that the claim made by this case study is narrow. While it intends to show that the 
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Prussian exercise of power played a role in provoking the French declaration of war, it does 
not argue that it represents the sole cause. During the years before the outbreak of the war 
in 1870, stringent nationalism and mutual animosity became prominent aspects of the 
Franco-Prussian relationship (Carr 1991, 144–52). These attitudes were fanned by several 
political crises that arose out of the power politics between the two countries. Additionally, 
domestic interests provided incentives to decision-makers on both sides to escalate foreign 
policy disputes. Bismarck saw therein a chance to unite the German states, Napoleon III. a 
chance to compensate for repeated diplomatic failures (Wawro 2003, 22). 
Against this backdrop, historians have a hard time agreeing on the cause of the war. 
Halperin, for example, argues that there was “eagerness for a showdown” on the French 
side, yet there might have been no war without the events surrounding the candidature for 
the Spanish throne (S. W. Halperin 1973, 83, 91). Carr (1991, 161) points out that the war 
was by no means inevitable, whereas Wawro argues it “might as easily have come in 1867, 
1868, or 1869” as the two countries “went to the brink of war in each of those years” 
(Wawro 2003, 22).  
Beyond the evaluations of historians, a number of IR scholars have interpreted the outbreak 
of the Franco-Prussian war in Realist terms and as a product of, first and foremost, the logic 
of the international system and considerations about power. Welch, for example, labels it 
“very clearly the product of Realist motivations” (Welch 1993, 77, 92) and proposes to 
interpret it through the lens of power transition theory. In the same vein, Organski and 
Kugler (1980) used the Franco-Prussian war to illustrate the workings and the validity of 
power transition theory.  
It can therefore not be said with absolute certainty to what extend the Ems Dispatch actually 
changed preferences on the French side. War might have come without it as it was seen as 
necessary and inevitable on both sides - or simply because it was the result of dynamics in 
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the international system. At the same time, there is no dispute that the reaction it provoked 
in France was the immediate cause of the war.  
This case study, therefore, merely argues that the Prussian exercise of power in July 1870 
led to the French declaration of war – but not that it represents the sole cause of the war or 
that war would not have happened without it. Yet any explanation of this historical episode 
that does not take into account the creation and the influence of anger can hardly paint a 
complete picture of the events. Without paying attention to the role of anger, it is difficult 
to explain how Bismarck got what he wanted at the moment he wanted it – and why France 
went into a war that should probably have been recognized as a bad idea from the start. 
Anger may not have been the sole cause of the Franco-Prussian war, yet it is a variable that 
cannot be ignored in explaining how Bismarck got France to want what he wanted it to 
want. 
2. The Failure to Alleviate Anger: Japan and South Korea 
Another example for how anger can become an object of power can be found in the rela-
tions between Japan and South Korea during the past decades. Similar to the examples 
involving South Korea and the United States in the previous chapter, this case does not 
focus on the creation or stirring of an emotion, but rather an attempt at weakening it. Be-
yond that, the relationship between Japan and South Korea illustrates an aspect of how 
power and emotions interact that has so far not received attention in this study: that attempts 
at exercising power by manipulating emotions can fail. In this case, Japan has attempted 
for decades to placate the South Korean anger about the way in which the Japanese gov-
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ernment and individual politicians have distorted, embellished or ignored the colonial his-
tory between the two countries and the atrocities that Japan committed during that era53. 
But while there were episodes of formal progress, the anger visible on the South Korean 
side has largely persisted and even grown. 
At this point, an obvious question is whether the Japanese attempts at reconciliation with 
South Korea do actually represent an exercise of power. After all, one can reasonably sup-
pose that both countries have an interest in reconciliation, and that both countries prefer a 
positive relationship with each other to one that is marked by negative perceptions, anger 
and mistrust. Under the assumption that power only describes the influence of actor A on 
actor B’s behavior against B’s will, this case would certainly not qualify as an exercise of 
power. But as explained in chapter III, this study assumes that power merely describes A 
making B behave in a way that suits A’s interests, independent of whether this behavior 
suits the interest of B or goes against them. The attempt to change South Korea’s negative 
perception of and emotions towards Japan is, in this context, therefore an attempt at exer-
cising power over South Korea.  
Opinion surveys shine a light on the negative attitudes in South Korea towards Japan. Ac-
cording to polls taken by the ASAN Institute for Policy Studies since 2015, the South Ko-
rean public generally views Japan as well as its Prime Minister as less favorable than both 
                                                     
53 The Korean peninsula was under formal colonial rule by Japan from 1910 to 1945. The legacy of 
this era is controversial: on the one hand, the Japanese occupation brought wide-ranging reforms 
and industrial development to Korea. On the other hand, the Korean people, their culture and self-
determination were suppressed and dissent was answered with violence. During the past two decades, 
the “comfort women” have been a particularly contentious issue in this context. The term refers 
euphemistically to tens of thousands of girls and women from Korea and other Asian countries who 
were forced into sexual slavery by the colonial government and the Japanese army before and during 
the Second World War. The issue rose to prominence in the relations between Japan and South 
Korea only in the 1990s after numerous of the former comfort women broke their silence, research 
into the issue intensified and the Japanese government had to admit the existence of an organized 
system of sex slavery in Imperial Japan. 
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the United States and China, and only marginally more positive than North Korea (The 
Asan Institute for Policy Studies 2018, 11, 12). Surveys conducted by the PEW Research 
Center as well as the Japanese think tank Genron NPO equally point to an extraordinarily 
negative perception of Japan in South Korea. The latter report provides some details on the 
underlying reasons: from the South Korean perspective, the dominant issue that divides the 
two countries is the lack of reflection in Japan about the past (besides an ongoing dispute 
about the ownership of a group of islands located between the two countries) (Stokes 2015; 
The Genron NPO 2017).   
This is surprising in so far as that the Japanese government has repeatedly expressed regret, 
sorrow and apologies towards South Korea for the injustices and atrocities of the colonial 
era. These statements were made since the 1950s on various occasions by Prime Ministers, 
other high-ranking government officials, through parliamentary resolutions, and by two 
Emperors. In addition, the Japanese government paid or organized the payment of compen-
sation money to South Korea and private victims on several occasions. Especially the 1990s 
saw what has been described as an “apology boom” (Dudden 2014, 39).  
A landmark in this context was the statement issued by the cabinet of Prime Minister 
Tomiichi Murayama in August 1995, five decades after the Pacific War and Japan’s colo-
nial empire came to an end. It went beyond previous declarations with its references to 
“profound remorse” and “heartfelt apology” and is still used as a model for Japan’s official 
stance and a benchmark for new statements (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan 1995; see 
also Clements 2018, 13; Kawashima et al. 2017; Lind 2008, 62; Rose 2005, 103–4). 
Yet this so-called Murayama Statement and the events surrounding it also illustrate why 
negative perceptions in Korea largely persist. Alongside the government’s declaration, a 
resolution by the Japanese Diet was supposed to express the same sentiments. But as there 
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was no agreement within the parliament about what blame the country should actually ac-
cept and apologize for, the outcome was a consensus statement with vague and weak 
phrases. Instead of an apology, the resolution only referred to “deep remorse”, to name but 
one example from the text. It thereby put on display the absence of a “national consensus 
on coming to terms with the past or striving for genuine reconciliation” (He 2009, 240). 
The fact that half the members of the diet even abstained from voting on the resolution out 
of disagreement only emphasized this. 
Other events not only put on display the absence of a consensus among the Japanese elites 
about remorse and apologies, but even called into question what had been expressed in the 
past. This became evident in 2001 when a dispute about the government approval of new 
textbooks became the focus of diplomacy in the region. At the time, as on several occasions 
before, nationalistic and conservative forces in Japan tried to publish school textbooks that 
cast a particular light on the country’s colonial era, downplaying Japanese atrocities and 
omitting or embellishing references to victims, among them the comfort women. The gov-
ernment in 2001 approved the textbooks in question, against the protest of the South Korean 
and the Chinese governments, and after numerous official statements that were interpreted 
as a step away from the understanding of Japan’s history expressed in the Murayama State-
ment. These textbooks have since been approved once more several times (Kimura 2016, 
15–18; Seaton 2007, 89–91; Yang 2013, 32–34).  
The same year brought into office Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi. His behavior and 
statements repeatedly strained relations with Japan’s neighbors until he left office in 2005. 
Most controversially, he made yearly visits to the Yasukuni Shrine in Tokyo where those 
who fell in Japan’s wars since the 19th century are commemorated. Among them are more 
than a thousand convicted war criminals, fourteen of which were found guilty of crimes 
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against peace. These visits drew criticism from South Korea and China, yet Koizumi re-
jected the notion that his behavior was of any diplomatic significance or that it honored the 
war criminals enshrined at Yasukuni. Instead, he justified his decision as a “matter of the 
heart” (as quoted in Uchiyama 2010, 148). And while Koizumi was the most prominent 
visitor at the time, he was by no means alone. Other politicians routinely did the same, for 
example in April 2005 when more than 80 members of the diet visited the shrine (Kajimoto 
2005). 
The reactions in South Korea were predictable: diplomatic expressions of anger and disap-
pointment, summons of the Japanese ambassador, public protests, even self-mutilations of 
activists (du Mars and Rennie 2001; McCurry 2006; The Japan Times 2003, 2004). The 
response in China was not any more favorable; the governments in Beijing and Seoul even 
banded together in protest and cancelled a scheduled summit with Japan in 2005 (Iida 2013, 
175). In opinion surveys conducted during Koizumi’s time in office, about seven out of ten 
South Koreans expressed a negative perception of Japan and more than 80% voiced oppo-
sition to the shrine visits (The Japan Times 2005). Koizumi and his government have there-
fore been credited with producing the “frostiest relations and greatest public anger in East 
Asia for a generation” (Seaton 2007, 58–59). 
None of this is to say that Japan underwent a fundamental change of its stance during the 
Koizumi years. In fact, the Prime Minister issued a statement on the day of his first visit to 
the Yasukuni Shrine in 2001 in which he expressed remorse for Japan’s aggression of the 
past:  
Following a mistaken national policy during a certain period in the past, Japan 
imposed, through its colonial rule and aggression, immeasurable ravages and 
suffering particularly to the people of the neighboring countries in Asia. This 
has left a still incurable scar to many people in the region. Sincerely facing 
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these deeply regrettable historical facts as they are, here I offer my feelings of 
profound remorse and sincere mourning to all the victims of the war. (Ministry 
of Foreign Affairs of Japan 2001) 
Half a year later, during a visit to South Korea, Koizumi once again expressed remorse and 
laid down a wraith at a former prison and museum in Seoul which was built during the 
colonial era and had housed Korean independence activists (French 2001). In 2005, another 
four years later, he abstained from visiting the Yasukuni shrine and released a statement 
that went beyond his previous remarks. It spoke of “colonial rule and invasion” and “apol-
ogies from my heart”, thereby echoing the wording of the Murayama Statement from a 
decade earlier (Onishi 2005). Yet, as if to contextualize these words, members of his cabi-
net as well as several dozen members of the Japanese diet were visiting the Yasukuni Shrine 
on the same day. 
The reasons for these seemingly contradictory actions are complex. To stay with the con-
troversy surrounding the shrine: what a visit to Yasukuni actually means is a matter of 
interpretation. While South Koreans perceive them as a glorification and celebration of the 
past by the Japanese government, Koizumi stressed on numerous occasions that his visits 
are private, serve exclusively the purpose of mourning, are not dedicated to the war crimi-
nals honored in the shrine, and purely a domestic matter.  
Koizumi’s visits were also interpreted as serving a domestic purpose to win support among 
conservative lawmakers for other agenda items. They have also been cast as part of an 
effort at reinventing Japan vis-à-vis its neighbors: as a country that does not defer to criti-
cism from abroad anymore. The public perception of these visits equally illustrate the com-
plexity of the issue: public opinion was largely split about the appropriateness of visits to 
the Yasukuni Shrine throughout these years (Cheung 2017, 81–82; Deans 2007, 276–80; 
Fukuoka 2013, 38; Koga 2016).  
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These many contradictions lie at the heart of the South Korean perception that Japan’s 
expressions of remorse are not genuine, and that the statements of Japanese politicians can-
not be trusted. Japanese officials can routinely be seen offering apologies for the past – 
only for them or other officials to engage in a form of “apology nullification” (Seaton 2007, 
59) afterwards. This process oftentimes involves what Lind has described as “permissible 
lies” (Lind 2009, 143) through which politicians and even government members glorify 
history, for example by embellishing Japan’s colonial policies, without facing any official 
reprimands. Since the 1990s, there has therefore been little progress in the politics of rec-
onciliation. In fact, it seems unlikely that the apologies will ever live up to the demands 
that some recipients have after decades of disappointment and mistrust (Dudden 2014, 41). 
In sum, since the 1990s, Koreans have reacted with shock and outrage to 
words and deeds by Japanese politicians that have glorified, denied, or justi-
fied past violence. Koreans view such statements as reflections of Japan’s true 
hostile intentions. Thus, although Koreans recognize and appreciate contrite 
gestures, Japan’s unapologetic remembrance has eroded any positive effects 
and has sustained Korean distrust. (Lind 2008, 89) 
Against this backdrop, the Japanese attempt to exercise power by manipulating South Ko-
rean perceptions and emotions can be judged a failure. As Dudden emphasizes, this repre-
sents an “apology failure” and not a “failure to apologize” (Dudden 2014, 33). The Japa-
nese government did apologize numerous times and continues to do so. Yet these apologies 
amount only to an attempt at exercising power, not a successful exercise. They are not taken 
serious on the South Korean side and therefore fail to produce the intended effect: the alle-
viation of anger. In fact, the Japanese apology nullifications rather keep this anger alive as 
they continuously provide the South Korean people with evidence for the perceptions and 
emotions they already harbor. Even seven decades after the end of Japan’s colonial rule 
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Although this study aims to describe and illustrate in a comprehensive fashion how power 
can be exercised through the manipulation of emotions, it comes with a number of limita-
tions. These are, first and foremost, a result of how power is conceptualized here and the 
choice of case studies. As was already mentioned in the introduction, the idea of power 
over represents only a limited and inevitably incomplete understanding of what power is. 
The specific definition of power utilized here further limits how the concept is understood 
in this study. Beyond these theoretical foundations, the case studies were selected with 
several criteria in mind, among them a focus on interactions among states. While certain 
ways in which power and emotions interact in international relations have therefore been 
outlined, many others did not receive attention. The following section will therefore spell 
out several of the limitations of this study and briefly point out alternative choices that 
could have been made in order to describe and illustrate the interactions of power and emo-
tions that are absent in this study. 
 Focus on power over 
This study approaches power exclusively from the perspective of power over. This focus 
was chosen as it was seen as the most promising one for exploring how the exercise of 
power can rely on the manipulation of emotions. Not part of this study are therefore alter-
native conceptions of power. Among them are the concept of power to, which is most 
prominently embodied by the element of national power approach in IR, as well as concep-
tions of power such as power with that emphasize the cooperative, not the dominating di-
mension of power processes between actors. Nevertheless, it is easy to imagine that both 
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of these alternative approaches to power can be the foundation for fruitful research on the 
exercise of power through the manipulation of emotions.  
The first one of these alternatives, the conception of power as power to, has the potential 
to illuminate the resources and skills that underlie the exercise of power over through emo-
tions. The IR literature so far includes little work on these foundations of the manipulation 
of emotions. One of the few exceptions are Nye’s writings on soft power and leadership. 
He describes emotional intelligence as an essential skill for the purposes of leadership, the 
exercise of soft power and the creation of attraction in others (Nye 2008, 69–71, 92). In 
other words, emotional intelligence provides the power to that is necessary to exercise soft 
power, and therefore a form of power over. A similar concept was developed by Kramer 
who speaks of political intelligence, which he contrasts from emotional intelligence, soft 
power and the strategic use of empathy. Individuals with political power “appreciate the 
power of fear and its close relation, anxiety” (Kramer 2006, 91); they intimidate to exercise 
power. Both emotional and political intelligence thereby describe skillsets and capacities 
on the basis of which emotions are manipulated to exercise power. 
The vast literature on the leadership styles of American Presidents illustrates how the ex-
ercise of power can be looked at through this lens. Emotional intelligence has been de-
scribed as an indispensable quality of presidents, and especially so with an eye on how they 
control their own emotions and the emotions of those around them. On this basis, politi-
cians such as Lyndon B. Johnson, Richard Nixon, Jimmy Carter and Bill Clinton have been 
described as “emotionally handicapped” (Greenstein 2009b, 219). With an eye on IR, the 
“defective emotional intelligence” (Greenstein 2009a, 3) of Woodrow Wilson has even 
been named as a reason for the failure of the Treaty of Versailles. And Nye (2016) himself 
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ascribed Donald Trump a deficit in terms of emotional intelligence that makes him unsuit-
able for office. The skills of powerful individuals to manage emotions, both those of others 
and their own, can therefore be interpreted as a form of power to. 
The power to that is necessary to manipulate emotions for the purpose of exercising the 
power over can also be sought in materials means. Most prominently in IR, nuclear weap-
ons have been described as a means to manipulate emotions. The prospect of mutually 
assured destruction during the Cold War has therefore been said to have produced not only 
a balance of power, but also as a balance of terror. This balance is maintained by a “vicious 
circle of fear” (Edwards 1986, 167) that motivates all sides in a conflict to keep their nu-
clear guard up and prevents escalation. In fact, fear has been described as the hallmark of 
the nuclear era. As Boyer argues in his study on how the nuclear bombs shaped American 
public thought and culture, the atomic explosions in the summer of 1945 “bisected history” 
and brought to America’s consciousness “a new and terrible fear of unfathomable magni-
tude” (Boyer 1994, 105, 133). The presence of certain resources can therefore provide the 
power to, but it can also exercise a form of power over in its own right. 
Focus on the intentional exercise of power 
One of the criteria for the selection of case studies was the intentionality of the power ex-
ercise at play. This corresponds with the definition of power utilized here and its focus on 
intentional exercises of power. This criterium was applied to avoid the analyses of histori-
cal cases in which the exercise of power could easily be dismissed as a collateral effect or 
simply luck. But while this study and various other authors consider intentionality a neces-
sary element of the power over, the concept can also be understood without reliance on 
intentionality. As Lukes argues, it imaginable that power can be exercised “without delib-
eratively seeking to do so, in routine or unconsidered ways” (Lukes 1986, 1). Advocates of 
power as a structural phenomenon, such as Foucault, even go beyond that and argue that 
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the exercise of power does not require any agency at all. Structural power is therefore com-
monly interpreted as free of intentionality. 
In the IR literature, the idea that the power over can be exercised in unintentional ways has 
received attention especially where it relates to processes such as attraction and co-optation. 
In the writings by Manners about the normative power of the European Union, one mech-
anism underlying this power is contagion: the “unintentional diffusion of ideas from the 
EU to other political actors” (Manners 2002, 244). The concept of soft power, too, features 
the unintentional exercise of power. The original writings of Nye describe a country’s for-
eign policies as one foundation of soft power; much of the literature and rhetoric about soft 
power therefore focus on the right policies to exercise soft power. Yet Nye also speaks of 
culture and political values as soft power resources, both of which can hardly be described 
as products of an intentional effort to produce soft power. With this in mind, soft power 
and its utilization of emotions can not only be the result of intentional behavior but also of 
“unintended consequences and larger social forces” (Nye 2011b, 14, 84). 
Focus on state-to-state interactions 
As the dominant unit in IR scholarship is the state, the focus of the case studies here lies 
on interactions among states. Yet it is not only states that exercise power over the behavior 
of other states by manipulating their emotions. Non-state actors can equally exercise this 
power or be affected by it. In fact, some non-state actors excel in the manipulation of emo-
tions in order to change others’ behavior. To name but one example, organizations such as 
the international animal rights advocacy group People for the Ethical Treatment of Animals 
(PETA) strive to create disgust and anger through campaigns that depict the industrial treat-
ment and inhumane suffering of animals. The goal: to effect changes in popular attitudes 
and government legislation via the manipulation of emotions. 
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The targeting of emotions by non-state actors also plays an integral role in one of the dom-
inant themes of contemporary Western security politics: radical Islamic terrorism. The per-
petrators usually have few financial and materials means available; their attacks do not pose 
a significant threat to the existence of Western societies and their functioning; and they 
cause death and destruction on a scale that pales in consideration to other sources of harm, 
for example unhealthy lifestyles. Instead, they aim to exert power on a more subliminal 
level by creating an atmosphere of insecurity and fear: 
The only strategic impact of the attacks is their psychological effect. They do 
not affect the west’s military capabilities; they even strengthen them, by put-
ting an end to military budget cuts. They have a marginal economic effect, 
and only jeopardise our democratic institutions to the extent that we ourselves 
call them into question through the everlasting debate on the conflict between 
security and the rule of law. The fear is that our own societies will implode 
and there will be a civil war between Muslims and the “others”. (Roy 2017) 
The manipulation of emotions allows non-state actors even to exercise power over the be-
havior of great powers. One example is the way in which Somali insurgents in 1993 and 
1994 were able to cause the withdrawal of American troops from the UN peacekeeping 
mission in the country. Aware that a change in public opinion could diminish the American 
resolve to stay (Blechman and Wittes 1999, 5), they exploited a botched military raid in 
Mogadishu to create images for the world media of dead American soldiers being dragged 
through the streets of the city. The public’s attitudes in the United States about the suppos-
edly humanitarian mission of its soldiers did indeed change and led to widespread calls for 
the withdrawal of American troops. The result was pressure on President Clinton and, ulti-
mately, the decision to pull out of Somalia in 1994 (Rutherford 2008, 161–68). 
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This reaction was “driven by media images and the emotions they can generate” (Logan 
1996, 173), and primarily by shock, anger and frustration. This effect lingered for years 
and has been referred to as the “Mogadishu factor”. It has been named as one of the reasons 
for why the international community did not intervene when atrocities were unfolding in 
places like Rwanda and Srebrenica (MacFarlane and Khong 2006, 135). This illustrates 
how power can be exercised through the manipulation of emotions by non-state actors – 
and potentially to the extent that a rudimentarily equipped group of insurgents is able to 
manipulate the behavior of a superpower like the United States. It stands to reason that 
many non-state actors even have incentives to attempt manipulating the emotions of those 
they want to exercise power over: where military might and economic weight are not avail-
able to exercise power, manipulating emotions may be an alternative. 
Of relevance for international affairs is furthermore the power that states exercise over their 
own populations by manipulating emotions. While this process might not in itself influence 
international affairs, it can shore up support for specific foreign policies or demonstrate 
certain attitudes towards the outside world. Examples are abounding: the promotion of fear 
in the United States and Great Britain by the respective governments during the run-up to 
the invasion of Iraq in 2003 (Cardaras 2013; Northcott 2012); the stirring of resentment at 
home towards Japan by the South Korean and the Chinese government (He 2007; Wiegand 
and Choi 2017; Zhao 1998); and the efforts of governments to create alarmism about the 
impending consequences of climate change (O’Neill and Nicholson-Cole 2009, 358). 
 Focus on powerful states 
This study limits the scope of its case studies not only to interactions among nation states. 
It also uses only particular states as examples. What unites all case studies is that they focus 
on extraordinarily powerful states that exercise power over less powerful states. The case 
studies on how the United States was able to change the behavior of Japan, West Germany 
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and South Korea exemplify this as they take the behavior of a superpower as their respec-
tive starting point. The remaining case studies on Prussia’s and Japan’s exercises of power 
are equally about states that count (or counted at the time when the events in question took 
place) among the heavyweights in international relations, even though they may not be 
comparable to the extraordinary position of the United States.  
This focus on powerful states is somewhat unintuitive in the context of a study. The per-
ception of these nations as powerful is rooted in material factors such as economic activity 
or military capacity. This study, in contrast to that, deals with a largely immaterial phe-
nomenon. It would therefore be an obvious choice to focus on states that, based on the idea 
that power is based on material factors, are generally not perceived as powerful yet manage 
to exercise power through the manipulation of emotions. This would have had the potential 
to isolate the exercise of power through the manipulation of emotions from other factors 
that could explain how power was exercised, for example material means. Independent of 
that, a particularly interesting starting point for case studies would be interactions in which 
a less powerful state manages to exercise power by manipulating the emotions of a more 
powerful state.  
Yet this study puts its focus on powerful states in order to achieve its goal: to bring emo-
tions back into the mainstream IR discourse. The discipline deals, first and foremost, with 
powerful states and their interactions. Case studies that illustrate how less powerful states 
exercise power would have inevitably come with the implication that the argument made 
here may apply to states with little power – but that it cannot tell us much about powerful 
states. After all, there are already sufficient explanations of how these powerful states ex-
ercise power. The choice to look at powerful states in the case studies was therefore made 
to engage with the discipline’s mainstream and its conception of power, and to illustrate 
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that a focus on power and emotions can provide insights even where lots of work has al-
ready been done. 
None of this is to imply that case studies on countries with little power would not be worth-
while. As the previous section already illustrated for non-state actors, a focus on power and 
emotions can provide insights into various prominent topics in IR. This is the case for ter-
rorism and insurgencies; and this is probably true for understanding the role and behavior 
of middle powers and small states. Some texts on soft power and public diplomacy haven 
already taken this approach, even though they usually do not speak explicitly about emo-
tions and power. To pick two examples: countries like Norway and Canada have been de-
scribed as middle powers that have and exercise power not only on the basis of their mate-
rial means, but also because they assert themselves as stewards of “attractive causes such 
as economic aid or peacemaking” (Nye 2004, 9), thereby cultivating an international repu-
tation and creating goodwill (Henrikson 2005). 
 Focus on negative emotions 
The case studies presented in this study all focus on emotions that are commonly interpreted 
as negative or unpleasant: shock in the case of the nuclear bombs dropped on Japan; fear 
in the case of the American relations with West Germany and South Korea; and anger in 
the case of the German provocations towards France and the legacy of Japan’s colonial 
empire in South Korea. These examples, obviously, do not cover the whole spectrum of 
emotions and, in particular, exclude emotions generally perceived to be positive or pleas-
ant54. This is not meant to imply that power cannot be exercised through the manipulation 
                                                     
54 To categorize emotions based on whether they are of a positive or negative nature is in fact com-
mon in the literature and not merely a simplification that we see in everyday language (Verweij et 
al. 2015, 3). 
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of emotions in positive ways. In fact, much of the existing research that implies a link 
between power and emotions has focused on positive examples of the latter.  
Arguably the most prominent example in IR is that of soft power. The principal author of 
the concept, Joseph Nye, repeatedly refers in his writings to the link between the exercise 
of soft power and the manipulation of emotions. As he argues, soft power can “inspire 
followers through the careful management of emotion” and “create an emotional attraction 
for followers” (Nye 2008, 55, 92). Among the skills necessary to exercise soft power is 
therefore emotional intelligence (Nye 2008, 69–70). By definition, the emotions manipu-
lated in this context have to be of a positive nature in order to create attraction, and thereby 
to allow for “leading by example and attracting others to do what you want” (Nye 2004, 5). 
The idea that positive emotions are of relevance in international relations and the exercise 
of power is also visible in works on friendship between states (Berenskoetter 2014; Eznack 
and Koschut 2014), on the constitution of empathy, solidarity and community in the after-
math of disasters (Hutchison 2010, 2016, 183–210), on the expression of amity within se-
curity communities (Koschut 2014) as well as of sympathy by one state towards another 
state in times of tragedy (Hall 2015, 80–109). Where these positive emotions appear in the 
IR literature, they oftentimes go hand in hand with a conception of power that is different 
from the power over, at least if it is understood as representing domination and conflictual 
relations. Rather, the afore-mentioned examples point towards Arendt’s understanding of 
power as “the ability to act in concert” (Arendt 1972, 143) or Allen’s (1998) concept of 
“power with” that can imply empowerment, legitimacy and solidarity. 
 Focus on agency-driven power 
Early on in this study, power was defined as a process that involves two actors. Explicitly 
excluded were structural forms of power which exercise power without any clear form of 
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agency or intentionality. But as explained in the context of the debate on the faces of power, 
this is by no means an inevitability. Authors like Michel Foucault have conceptualized 
power as a structural phenomenon and a fourth face of power has been described on this 
foundation. In the chapter on power it has also been outlined that structural power can be 
exercised through the manipulation of emotions, and that this process is captured by con-
cepts such as that of emotional regimes. Yet this dimension of how power and emotions 
interact has been largely excluded from this study. This represents another limitation of the 
argument made here. 
This omission deserves special attention. As was described on the previous pages, it is 
relatively easy to see how the interplay of power and emotions could be explored with an 
eye on the power to, on unintentional exercises of power, exercises of power by and over 
actors other than nation states, and through the manipulation of positive emotions. It is 
much less intuitive to imagine how structural power is exercised in world politics through 
the manipulation of emotions and how emotional regimes shape events on the international 
stage. For this reason, it is worth to briefly describe one potential example for structural 
power and an emotional regime in some detail.  
The example in question is the emotional regime that regulates Western - and possibly all 
modern - attitudes towards warfare. The workings of this regime become visible once con-
temporary attitudes are compared to the attitudes that drove Europe into the First World 
War during the early 20th century. Whereas warfare was once seen as a “glorious, heroic, 
holy, thrilling, manly, or cleansing” activity, it became a “repulsive, uncivilized, futile, 
stupid, wasteful, and cruel” (Pinker 2012, 247; see also Linklater 2011, 21; Mueller 1989, 
264; Stalfort 2013, 117) endeavor. The transformation of this emotional regime re-defined 
which emotions the thought of warfare is associated with and what attitude towards warfare 
counts as normal. 
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While this transformation of the dominant emotional regime has not driven violence from 
the international system, it has been linked to the decade-long absence of major warfare, a 
global increase in human security and the spread of human right norms.  
To characterize this emotional regime, the concept of romantic militarism can be utilized. 
The term was coined by Rosenblum who defined it as an attitude towards war as “as the 
way to enforce justice and as the occasion for self-expression” (Rosenblum 1982, 249; 
emphasis in original). Romantic militarism is therefore different from ordinary militarism, 
which concerns itself with the emphasis of the militaristic over the civilian, as well as from 
the love of war, which finds excitement and comfort in armed conflict. Rather, it describes 
“an imaginative invention and a psychological stance” (Rosenblum 1982, 249). Romantic 
militarism does therefore not equal a tendency for or glorification of aggression and war-
mongering; it rather exists in “heroic dreams” (Rosenblum 1987, 9) and “romanticizations 
of soldiering and war” in contrast to the “frustrations with ordinary civilian life” (Rosen-
blum 1998, 248). 
As must be emphasized, romanticism is not an emotion in itself. Just as was the case for 
shock and honor in the previous case studies, so does romanticism rather refer to a larger 
concept that involves a number of emotions and cannot function without them. According 
to the dictionary definition, romanticism describes an attitude “marked by the imaginative 
or emotional appeal of what is heroic, adventurous, remote, mysterious, or idealized” (Mer-
riam-Webster 2018). A romantic attitude, for example towards militarism, is therefore in-
herently emotional and characterized by positive emotions. And one place where this ro-
mantic militarism and the emotional regime that went hand in hand with it were particularly 
strong was Europe. As an advisor to US President Woodrow Wilson wrote from Germany 
in Spring 1914 about the situation on the continent: “The situation is extraordinary. It is 
militarism run stark mad” (as quoted in Link 1956, 315). 
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This attitude was a product of structural forces and, in particular, socialization, as was 
maybe best visible in the German Empire. Education put heavy emphasis on the indoctri-
nation of nationalist attitudes, the subordination of the individual and an idealization of 
combat. The military itself was an integral part of public life in the German Empire through 
various organizations and festivals. Veteran associations promoted embellished memories 
of wars fought in the past and idolized those who fought them. Numerous popular books, 
and many of those aimed at young readers, depicted war as an opportunity to live up to the 
nation’s historic promise, unite the people of all classes, reach for greatness and achieve 
victory. War was not feared for the mass slaughter that it would be; it was awaited as a 
necessary as well as inevitable proving ground on which individuals as well as the nation 
as a whole would undergo rejuvenation and achieve progress (Donson 2004; Hewitson 
2004, 85–111; Koch 2005, 90–92; Leonhard 2014, 76–78).   
Historians refer to the mood during the early days of the war as “the spirit of 1914”. When 
Russia mobilized its troops at the end of July 1914, the mood in the urban centers of the 
German Empire had “already taken on the air of a public festival” (Chickering 2004, 13). 
Among the reasons: war became increasingly seen as inevitable and as an opportunity for 
Germany to finally stand up against the threats it faced from its European neighbors. The 
wide-spread enthusiasm was furthermore based on the belief that going to war would initi-
ate a period of national elevation and renewal. This spirit moved the masses, it built collec-
tive enthusiasm on the idea of romantic militarism, and it captured individuals though this 
shared experience55.   
                                                     
55 At the same time, the existence of this romantic militarism should not be interpreted as blind 
fervor, as historians emphasize. For example, the idea that European nations rode into the First 
World War on an unequivocal wave of war enthusiasm has been called into question. On the one 
hand, there is plenty of evidence for some “naive, carnivalesque enthusiasm” and the idea of war as 
“glorious, chivalrous, and heroic” (Verhey 2000, 231) in the streets of Germany in 1914. On the 
other hand, there are also indications of ambiguity, anxiety, confusion and many other emotions, 
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While the emotional regime of romantic militarism is certainly not restricted to the German 
Empire, nor to the eve of World War I, this attitude towards warfare is usually linked to 
that society and that conflict. For one, because it thereby culminated in the most destructive 
conflict the world had seen to date; and secondly, because the year 1914 is seen as a turning 
point for the prevalence and influence of romantic militarism. To pick but one example, 
this is visible in how Howard describes the period and depicts that year as a crossroads: 
It is true, and it is important to bear in mind in examining the problems of that 
period, that before 1914 war was almost universally considered an acceptable, 
perhaps an inevitable and for many people desirable way of settling interna-
tional differences, and that the war generally foreseen was expected to be, if 
not exactly frisch und fröhlich, then certainly brief: no longer, certainly, than 
the war of 1870 that was consciously or unconsciously taken by that genera-
tion as a model. (Howard 1983, 9; emphasis in original) 
This illustrates that warfare did not have the overwhelmingly negative connotation that it 
has in large parts of the world today. To the contrary: until the Great War, and especially 
right before it, war was seen as a means of personal development and societal progress. 
Ultimately, this romantic militarism was confronted with reality, and this clash was no-
where as harsh as in the all-encompassing slaughter of the First World War. As Verhey 
argues for the case of Germany: “This romantic vision of war did not survive the first ex-
perience with the real war, the first sight of death” (Verhey 2000, 105). 
                                                     
oftentimes depending on factors such as social class, location, age and gender. Apart from that, there 
was clearly awareness of the unique quality that a war among Europe’s great powers and with the 
help of modern technology would have (Chickering 2007, 204; Hewitson 2004, 94–95; Hirschfeld 
2011; Leonhard 2014, 76–78; Verhey 2000, 232). 
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The emotional regime that permitted the expression of romantic militarism thus came to an 
end with the First World War. The period between 1914 and 1918 is commonly described 
as a turning point for this attitude. It “put an end not just to romantic militarism in the 
Western mainstream but to the idea that war was in any way desirable or inevitable” (Pinker 
2012, 246). In the words of Luard, the First World War “transformed traditional attitudes 
towards war” (Luard 1986, 365); and as Brodie put it, afterwards a “basic historical change 
had taken place in the attitudes of European (and American) peoples towards war” (Brodie 
1973, 30). Expressions of the idea that war was of intrinsic value for individual as well as 
societal progress, and that there was a romantic quality to it, thus became “extremely rare” 
(Mueller 1991, 2). 
War therefore lost its romantic, admirable and appealing qualities and, instead, became 
“Rather Embarrassing” (Mueller 1989, 18, see also 220). Where it was once acceptable to 
harbor positive feelings towards warfare and to voice these, the new emotional regime 
made this less and less tolerable. As the new emotional regime established itself, those who 
went to war increasingly “found it necessary to proclaim that war had been ‘forced’ on 
them” (Luard 1986, 361). In fact, “affirmations of peaceful intent now became obligatory” 
(Luard 1986, 366). The expression of positive emotions towards warfare fell out of fashion 
and became outright unacceptable in large parts of the world. Whereas the decision to go 
to war was once made for unabashedly egoistic reasons, it now requires more complex 
justifications that usually refer to only the best of intentions as well as the unfortunate ne-
cessity and unavoidability of war.  
In Mueller’s account, this idea was propelled to prominence during the First World War by 
a number of catalytic factors. Among them are the rise of an anti-war movement, the expe-
rience of a relatively peaceful century prior to the war, and the British and American am-
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bition to ensure a lasting peace after 1918. This multitude of actors and processes empha-
sizes an important characteristic of Mueller’s narrative: the absence of an actor who is in-
tentionally exercising power through this phenomenon. What Foucault writes about sys-
tems of disciplinary power therefore applies here, too: “no one is there to have invented 
them, and few who can be said to have formulated them” (Foucault 1978, 95). Mueller 
points in a similar direction when he labels the changing attitudes towards warfare as “phe-
nomena that cannot easily be measured, treated with crisp precision or probed with deduc-
tive panache” and that have an “inherent and rather unpleasant mushiness” (Mueller 1991, 
3), just like every expression of structural power. 
This example thereby illustrates how the structural exercise of power through the influenc-
ing of emotions could be explored through a case study. The current setup of this study is 
not able to take structural power of this kind into account as it assumes that power is exer-
cised by one actor over another actor. In the case of romantic militarism, it is clear that 
power is exercised over individuals and collectives – yet it is not possible to point towards 
any entity that could be described as an actor exercising power. What this example further-
more illustrates is that structural exercises of power through the influencing of emotions, 
for example in the form of emotional regimes, potentially influence world politics to a 
degree far higher than any actor-driven, non-structural exercises of power. 
2. Contribution 
The starting point of this study was the observation that the “emotional turn” in IR has so 
far barely been linked to one of the discipline’s central concepts: power. As the literature 
reviews shows, the expanding and broadening work on emotions in international politics 
has barely taken into account how power and emotions interact. The other way around, the 
IR literature on power has traditionally paid little attention to emotions. While the idea that 
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power can be exercised through the manipulation of emotions is an implicit assumption 
that many authors make, it is rarely acknowledged and has so far received little to no ex-
plicit attention. A bridge between the growing work on emotions and the established work 
on power, and between one of the discipline’s recent trends and its traditional mainstream, 
has therefore been missing.  
The first contribution of this study to the IR literature is therefore that it represents a step 
towards the building of such a bridge. It does so, first and foremost, by focusing and elab-
orating on one possible link between power and emotions: the idea that power can be ex-
ercised through the manipulation of emotions. This is by no means the only way in which 
the link between power and emotions can be approached, yet it is a crucial one. As the case 
studies show, the manipulation of emotions played a significant or even decisive role at 
numerous points in world history. But while scholars, philosophers, generals and politi-
cians throughout the ages wrote about it, the modern IR literature has little to say about the 
link between power and emotions. Against this backdrop, the contribution of this study is 
“to bring emotions back in”, first and foremost into the IR discourse on power. 
This study does so by providing a theoretical framework for thinking about power and 
emotions and how they relate in international relations. One pillar of this framework rests 
on the literature on power from the field of political theory. It utilizes the conception of 
power as power over and the idea of power mechanisms to define what power is understood 
as in the context of this study, and where a focus on emotions has the potential to go beyond 
the existing IR literature on power. The second pillar of this framework is rooted in the 
discipline of psychology, and in particular in the field’s appraisal approach towards emo-
tions, the concept of emotion regulation and intergroup emotion theory.   
Through this framework, this study goes beyond the links between emotions and power 
that have so far been established in IR. It connects emotions and their role in international 
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politics with an established, clear and comprehensive understanding of power. Where the 
existing IR literature on emotions speaks about power, it usually does so without much 
reflection on what power is and what forms it can take. References to power are usually 
made in passing, as if the term would represent a unified concept in within the discipline. 
And where power comes into focus in the discipline’s literature on emotions, this is usually 
done in a one-dimensional fashion, for example with an exclusive focus on soft power. By 
rooting its approach to power in more fundamental considerations about the concept and 
introducing the idea of power mechanisms, this study expands on this limited understand-
ing of the term.  
The other way around, this framework also allows for a more thorough examination of 
emotions. Whereas most IR literature treats emotions in a superficial manner, seemingly 
with the assumption that there is an intuitive consensus about what emotions are and how 
they work, this study takes emotions serious as a psychological phenomenon. As Pa-
shakhanlou has argued for the discipline’s foundational writings on Realism, references to 
emotions such as fear rarely go beyond “generic statements” (Pashakhanlou 2017, 117). 
And although the literature on soft power makes frequent references to emotional phenom-
ena such as attraction, “the psychology behind it is missing” (Hall 2010, 206). In contrast 
to that, the framework established in this study explores what emotions are, how they work 
and can be manipulated, and what effects they have on behavior. In addition, this frame-
work outlines how emotions matter not only on the level of the individual, but also for 
groups and collectives, and thus for the most relevant actors in international relations. 
The first contribution of this study to the IR literature is therefore that it brings together 
power and emotions – and that it does so in a way that goes beyond the implicit or superfi-
cial references to emotions in the literature on power, and vice versa. By doing so, this 
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study picks up where authors such as Hutchison and Bleiker left off when they recom-
mended that an examination of power and emotions would be valuable to link the IR liter-
ature on emotions with the discipline’s established concepts. As they wrote, this process 
would require the building of bridges to find common ground: 
Examining the links between emotions and power would entail compromises 
and consequences on both sides. Emotions scholars would need to engage 
more seriously with the debates on the nature of power, including those linked 
to social identity, nationalism, alliances, regimes, or institutions. More con-
ventional scholars must, in return, start considering the far-reaching implica-
tions that accompany the knowledge that emotions are, indeed, everywhere. 
(Hutchison and Bleiker 2014, 509) 
This study – hopefully – presents a first step in this direction. It engages “more seriously” 
with the concept of power than has so far been the case in the IR work on emotions; and it 
takes into account the “far-reaching implications” that emotions can have for our under-
standing of how power is exercised. The five case studies in this study illustrate the analyt-
ical value of this perspective on power and emotions. Yet the utility of this framework is 
not limited to the approach taken in these case studies. After all, and as the previous section 
on the limitations of this study has outlined, they establish the link between power and 
emotions in a somewhat narrow fashion, for example because they look only at the inter-
actions of nation states. It is therefore easy to imagine how the foundations provided here 
could be used for further analysis, for example of the power that non-state actors exercise 
through the manipulation of emotions.  
A second contribution of this study is to the debate between rationalist and constructivist 
approaches in IR. As Fearon and Wendt have outlined, a central point of contention within 
this debate is the question whether actors and their preferences should be taken as given – 
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or whether their constitution can and should be examined. Rationalist advocate the former 
approach and focus on the explanation of actors’ behavior. Constructivists follow the latter 
logic and examine how actors came to be, how they acquired the qualities and preferences 
they have, and how their social environment contributed to these processes, for example 
through norms. That is to say, rationalists focus on explaining behavior whereas construc-
tivists focus on explaining preferences (Fearon and Wendt 2013, 62–65)56. 
This study follows the constructivist logic on display in this debate and focuses on the 
constitution of preferences. This is evident in the approach to power that was chosen here. 
It takes the preferences of actor A as its starting point and describes the manipulation of 
B’s preferences. This manipulation unfolds through power mechanisms, several of which 
are introduced here with an eye on how they affect the first and second order preferences 
of B. The case studies equally focus on historical episodes in which actor A was able to 
manipulate the emotions of actor B, and subsequently B’s preferences and behavior. On 
this foundation, the second contribution of this study lies in how it further illuminates the 
formation preferences in international relations through its emphasis on emotions.  
Within the discipline as a whole, in which we still see a “hegemony of rationalist ap-
proaches” (Crawford 2000, 122), this strengthens the argument that assumptions about 
given preferences should be critically examined. Under the assumption that emotions are 
an inescapable fact of all human and social life, and in a discipline that evolves around 
power relations, it suggests itself to examine how the interplay of emotions and power 
shapes preferences and behavior. Arguably, rationalist approaches have problems doing so 
and thereby run in danger of missing out on a relevant aspect of social relations. In other 
                                                     
56 At the same time, Fearon and Wendt argue that these differences and their relevance are often-
times overstated. Both sides bring something to the study of international affairs and can easily come 




words, this study provides further support for incorporating constructivist perspectives into 
the study of international relations. This does not have to happen to the exclusion of ration-
alist approaches as the two can complement each other, yet it does suggest the need for a 
critical attitude towards the rationalist assumptions about preferences. 
In line with that, this study lends further support to those who call into question the as-
sumption about emotions that have become a hallmark of rationalism. It seems difficult to 
sustain the idea that emotions can only explain deviations from rational behavior – or, in 
other words, irrational behavior – with an eye on the case studies presented here. Consider 
the example of Japan’s surrender at the end of the Second World War. The decision can 
hardly be explained without emotions such as shock, yet one would not label the decision 
makers in Tokyo as irrational. This calls into question whether rationality and emotions 
should be seen as mutually exclusive, as is oftentimes the case. Various authors have al-
ready made this point in IR, for example Mercer when he wrote that “emotion is integral 
to preferences” (Mercer 2010, 13), or Bleiker and Hutchison when they argued that there 
might be “different forms of rationalities, from the prevailing instrumental versions to more 
intuitive and emotional ones” (Bleiker and Hutchison 2008, 118). 
3. Closing Thoughts 
As the preceding chapters were hopefully able to show, there is purpose and utility to link-
ing power and emotions in the study of international relations. Bringing these two concepts 
together is of value both for theorizing as well as for analyzing international relations, both 
from an academic perspective as well as for the public discourse. But whereas the various 
case studies were able to show how historical events from decades ago can be understood 
on this foundation, it is worth and important to emphasize that power and emotions also 
come together in contemporary politics – and maybe more so than ever before. 
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The rise of Donald Trump to power and into the White House has come to symbolize this. 
It has been argued that emotionality is becoming a “significant contributor to the national 
climate” (Stearns 2018) and that the 2016 election turned the country into “The United 
States of Emotion” (Yurkevich 2017). Donald Trump’s name has been described as the 
most emotional word of that year and argued that probably no other candidate for President 
brought this level of emotionality to the election (Stayner 2016). Beyond these general 
observations, it has been proposed that Trump’s success rests on emotions, and in particular 
on anger (Wahl-Jorgensen 2017) and fear (Ball 2016), and on his ability to mirror the frus-
tration and threat perceptions of his supporters (Korostelina 2017, 74–75). In the words of 
Hochschild, he was an “emotions candidate” who “focuses on eliciting and praising emo-
tional responses from his fans”, and more so than any other candidate for the White House 
in decades (Hochschild 2016, 221). 
Of course, power and emotions come together not only in the United States and not only in 
election campaigns. The influx of refugees in European countries during the past years 
equally illustrates how the two concepts interact. In particular, the way in which the media 
frames these issues and thereby produces powerful images and narratives, as well as corre-
sponding emotions, has come into the focus of research. As has been shown for reporting 
in publications from various countries, among the dominant frames are two that clearly 
relate to specific emotions: the depiction of refugees as a potential threat and unwanted 
invaders – and the depiction of refugees as passive and tragic victims in need of support 
(Greussing and Boomgaarden 2017; Parker 2015). Especially the first one of these two 
frames has been utilized by political actors across Western countries in order to answer, 
spark and utilize popular fears, and to promote nationalist as well as isolationist agendas 
(Anderson-Nathe and Gharabaghi 2017; Postelnicescu 2016).  
217 
 
The manipulation of emotions also continues to feature in interactions between states and 
remains an instrument of foreign policy. Among the most prominent examples of the recent 
past have been propaganda campaigns, both on social media and through traditional chan-
nels such as television, linked to the Russian government. As analysts of these efforts argue, 
they aim at the manipulation of emotions in other countries, the creation of mistrust, fear 
and anger, and the stoking of societal and political divisions. While usually covert and 
diffuse, these activities have specific goals, for example the discreditation of particular pol-
iticians or ideas, as became visible in Russia’s meddling in America’s Presidential election 
in 2016. Subsequently, these campaigns have been interpreted as a novel form of political 
warfare. They aim at manipulating whole societies and will only become more powerful 
through technologies advances in fields such as big data and artificial intelligence (Polya-
kova and Boyer 2018; Sydell 2017).  
Against this backdrop, it is easy to conclude, as many commentators do, that contemporary 
politics is driven by emotions to an exceptional degree. Other voices argue that this view 
is mistaken and that emotions merely seem more influential than at other times. One expla-
nation for this perception: in the face of unexpected political outcomes that defy the estab-
lished wisdom, such as the election of Donald Trump or the British decision to leave the 
European Union in 2016, emotions are emphasized (Jenkins 2018). But regardless of which 
side of the debate one stands on, it is hard to deny that recent events have emphasized the 
role that emotions play in politics – and the way in which emotions are manipulated for the 
purpose of exercising power.  
Here, the public discourse mirrors the academic discourse. Both pay more attention to emo-
tions in politics today than has been the case in the past. And as this study hopefully was 
able to show, both would do well to pay attention not only to emotions and their effects, 
but also to the power relations that produce and manipulate these emotions. The starting 
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point for doing so is the insight that emotions are not merely naturalistic and intrinsic phe-
nomena in individuals. They are also the product of social relations. And if we accept the 
idea that social relations and power relations cannot be separated, as was most prominently 
suggested by Foucault, or merely assume that social relations oftentimes feature power 
relations, the link between power and emotions becomes easy to see. This does not mean 
that all emotions have social origins and are the product of power processes, though this is 
certainly a position one can take; but it indicates that emotions should not be seen in isola-
tion from social and power relations.  
The most straightforward implication of this insight is a critical approach towards emotions. 
Where emotions are visible, one can ask what power processes may be behind these emo-
tions, or simply whose interests these emotions might serve. In some areas, this is already 
happening: social media platforms are critically examined with an eye on the emotional 
distraction they provide and capitalize on (Gilroy-Ware 2017). It has been pointed out that 
the manipulation of emotions is an integral feature of free markets (Akerlof and Shiller 
2015). The conception of emotions as commodities has even been labeled as one of the 
dominant features of modern capitalism (Illouz 2018). This questioning attitude is also vis-
ible in analyses of political affairs, and in particular with an eye on political advertisement 
and election campaigns. Yet the question about the power relations behind emotions is not 
asked with the same frequency and vigor when analyzing international relations. 
The other way around, linking power and emotions also leads to the question of how emo-
tions can be most effectively manipulated for the purpose of exercising power on the inter-
national stage. This does not necessarily have to take the form of perfidious manipulation 
or propaganda. It can also serve purposes such as the creation of unity, for example within 
security alliances, the promotion of friendship and reconciliation – or, in more general 
terms, the exercise of soft power.  
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Regardless of what perspective one takes when looking at power and emotions in interna-
tional relations, the underlying conclusion of this study is that the interplay of both matters 
in ways that have received little attention so far. Emotions were barely considered by main-
stream IR scholarship until very recently. And where they did receive attention, they were 
usually treated without consideration of how they relate to the very core of politics: the 
exercise of power. As this study was hopefully able to show, emotions can play an integral 
role in power processes, can be utilized and targeted for the purpose of exercising power, 
and can be a venue in which politics take place. These insights are by no means revolution-
ary, but they seldom feature in contemporary IR and the public discourse on global affairs. 
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Name: Max Nurnus / 눌누스 막스 
School, Department and Major: 서울대학교, 국제대학원, 국제학과 
국제관계에 있어서 감정과 권력 간 관계에 대한 연구 
국제관계학에서 감정에 대한 관심은 지난 약 20년간 꾸준히 높아져 왔다. 감정에 
대한 존재론적 의문과 방법론적 문제, 또한 특정 감정의 영향력에 대한 논의는 다수 
이루어진 반면, 국제관계학에서 주요 개념으로 다뤄지는 권력과 감정 간의 관계는 
충분한 검토가 이루어지지 않았다. 이는 감정이 자연발생적으로 생성되지 않는다는 
점을 고려할 때 의문이 발생하는 부분이다. 감정은 사회적 상호작용의 산물이자, 
권력행사의 목적을 위해 조종될 수 있다. 
이에 본고는 국제관계학에서의 권력행사에 감정조종이 어떠한 역할을 하는지에 
대해 탐색한다. 본 연구는 국제관계학에서 권력에 대한 기존 담론을 감정에 관한 
기존연구와 이론적으로 연결짓고, 국제관계학에서 권력과 감정을 연결하기 위한 
분석틀을 제시하며, 역사적으로 감정조종을 통해 권력행사가 어떻게 이루어졌는지 
국가사례를 통한 설명을 제시하는 것을 목표로 한다. 
전반부는 이론적 내용을 다루고 있으며 총 세 부분으로 구성되어 있다. 첫째, 권력은 
한 행위자가 의도적으로 다른 행위자로 하여금 자신의 의도에 맞는 행위를 하도록 
하는 것으로 정의된다. 이러한 과정은 다양한 형태를 띠며, 일련의 권력 기제를 
동원한다. 둘째, 감정은 인간의 인지, 사고, 판단, 행위에 영향을 미치는 행위의 
경향성으로 정의된다. 감정은 조종될 수 있으며 개인이 아닌 사회적 정체성에 
바탕을 둘 경우 사회적 양상을 띨 수 있다. 따라서 권력은 감정의 유발, 자극, 경감을 
통해 개인 혹은 개인으로 이루어진 집단에 행사될 수 있다. 국제관계학의 맥락에서 
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상당수의 구성원들이 공유된 사회적 정체성을 토대로 감정을 경험하고 이러한 
감정이 행위에 영향을 미친다면, 국가와 같은 집단적 행위자도 감정을 갖는다고 볼 
수 있다.  
후반부는 총 여섯 가지의 사례 분석을 통해 역사적으로 감정조정을 이용하여 어떻게 
한 국가가 다른 국가에 권력행사를 했는가를 검토한다. 첫번째 사례로는 1945년 두 
차례에 걸친 미국의 일본 원폭 투하를 통해 충격이라는 감정과 의도적 유발을 
살펴본다. 이후 세 가지 사례를 점검하여 방기의 공포(fear of abandonment)를 
중심으로 미국이 냉전시대를 걸쳐 동맹국들에 권력행사를 한 방법을 검토한다. 
1950-1960 년대에 서독의 핵개발 동기를 좌절시키기 위해 방기의 공포를 
자극하였으며, 닉슨 시대에 남한에서의 미군 철수 반대를 극복하기 위해 방기의 
공포를 경감시켰고, 1970 년대 남한의 핵개발을 중단시키기 위해 앞서 언급된 두 
가지의 접근법을 동시에 사용하였다. 마지막 두 가지 사례 분석을 통해서 분노의 
조종을 설명한다. 먼저 전쟁 발발을 위해 1870 년 프랑스 정부와 대중의 분노를 
자극한 프러시아 사례를 살펴본다. 다음으로 일본이 지난 몇 십년간 과거 식민지배 
역사에 대한 일본인의 처리방법과 태도에 대한 남한의 분노 경감 실패 사례이다. 
결론에서는 권력, 감정, 그리고 사례연구 선정방법에 대한 한계점을 점검하고 
국제관계학에서 본고가 갖는 함의를 제시한다. 또한, 현대 정치에서 권력과 감정의 
상호작용에 대한 추가적인 분석과 해당 연결고리에 대한 이론적 논의의 필요성을 
제안한다.  
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